

The Month in Review



RECENT WEEKS were marked by a great deal of activity in Poland and Hungary, where plenary sessions of the Parties' Central Committees, held in July, committed these regimes to a continuation of the reforms promised earlier in the year. In both these countries there are now two kinds of ferment—the unofficial demands of intellectuals striving to quicken the pace of liberalization, and the official revisions in policy. These movements, one from “below,” the other from “above,” tend to reinforce each other, creating novel, often apparently unexpected changes in the atmosphere and, to some extent, in the very fabric of Polish and Hungarian national life. At present the situation appears less in flux in Poland, where for some months past intellectuals have been able to vent long-suppressed thoughts and feelings. Recriminations and suggestions for drastic improvement have on the whole been directed into regime-approved channels, and “outsiders” (anti-Stalinist intellectuals) have had the sting taken out of their arguments by Premier Cyrankiewicz' forthright espousal of their cause. In Hungary, on the other hand, liberalization is more recent, and the highest Party officials have not yet committed themselves to it as thoroughly as some of their Polish counterparts. The Hungarian “reformers” are therefore pressing for change with a vehemence now somewhat diminished in the Polish press debates.

Despite these differences, recent developments in both Hungary and Poland clearly show a striking similarity in the substance of their Parties' programs. Since the Poznan riots liberalization in both countries has been directed by the regimes toward improvement of the people's economic plight, though the extent of the program is sharply limited by the directives of the current Five Year Plans. There are indications, however, that the regimes can and will undertake some emergency measures for immediate alleviation of the economic conditions of those who have suffered most from past policies. Efforts have been made to raise the wages of some employees and to curtail discriminatory measures against groups of peasants and artisans. In both countries important trade union meetings took place and workers were promised that their representatives would henceforth have more opportunity and power to defend the interests of the rank-and-file membership.

The expansion of political liberalization in Poland and Hungary was marked by a notable increase in the scope of parliamentary activities, an increase of the role of the so-called “Fronts” (the Patriotic People's Front in Hungary, the National Front in Poland), with particular emphasis on the importance of non-Communist members, and repeated appeals for the active cooperation of members of once-powerful opposition parties, the toleration of mass religious ceremonies, and the continued, but now more concrete, program for decentralization and diffusion of some power to lower echelons. The sharpest break with the past occurred at the recent session of the Polish Parliament. Deputies vigorously questioned the government, asked it to account for many of its actions, disapproved of some policies, abstained on some issues and violently disagreed among themselves on a number of occasions.

In Poland Party Secretary Ochab and Premier Cyrankiewicz made a number of speeches in recent weeks. Both appeared to favor a continuation of the general “thaw,”

though the tone, and indeed the substance, of their speeches were so different as to suggest that the underlying disparities went deeper than differences in temperament and in the nature of the posts they hold. The Party Secretary spoke mostly in clichés, said little that had not often been said before, and repeatedly referred to alleged plotters, foreign and native, who threatened the security of "People's Poland." The Premier, on the other hand, went so far as to endorse indirectly even the "deviations" of liberalization—including the "excesses" in the press—and devoted major parts of his speeches to constructive proposals for further reforms. The Premier thus informed Parliament that he favored an increase in its powers, that further wage increases should be forthcoming, that foreign credits were to be sought, that housing construction and the development of private handicrafts would be encouraged, that his own power had been curtailed and that, above all, the Polish government had taken the initiative of entering into discussions with Soviet authorities to effect the repatriation of Poles now in the USSR. The official enforcement of "legality" was highlighted in the appointment of General Wacław Komar, only recently released from prison, as Commander of the Internal Security Corps.

In contrast to the rapidly changing situation in Poland and Hungary, recent weeks have been almost totally uneventful in the other countries of the orbit. Czechoslovakia, which appeared to be entering its own initial phase of a "thaw" before its recent Party Conference, has now drawn back into maintenance of the *status quo*; in that sense regime policies are now nearer to those of Romania, Bulgaria and Albania than to those now prevailing in the two neighboring countries. The only concession recently granted to the people has been a slight reduction in working hours.

It appears that in all the countries where the "thaw" has either been nipped in the bud or never allowed to materialize, events in Poland are influencing segments of the population in much the same way events in Yugoslavia did when liberalization took place in that country after the break with Moscow. In Czechoslovakia, for instance, writers have been told specifically not to try to imitate the example shown by Polish intellectuals, and from all the countries unofficial reports indicate that the Polish press is avidly read, widely discussed and generally warmly endorsed. Now and then, despite official disapproval, intellectuals in these countries express guardedly "liberal" views in clear emulation of their Polish comrades.

In all of the countries of the orbit the banning of the Communist Party in West Germany and the Suez Canal controversy have evoked a great deal of response. Much indignation was expressed with respect to the German situation, and it was stressed that West German militarists and fascists had thus deliberately plotted to retard the process of reunification. On the Suez question, all the regimes sided with Egypt. Some objected to not having been invited to the London Conference, and most of them harped on the question of colonialism and denounced alleged imperialist schemes, including those of the USA. In a number of instances oblique references were made to a fundamental similarity between the Suez and Panama Canals, with a prophecy of a future settling of accounts with the USA about the latter.

I Chose Truth by *Seweryn Bialer*

A Former Leading Polish Communist's Story

SEWERYN BIALER was one of the leading representatives of the younger Communist generation in Poland. Born in 1926, he fought in the underground during the war, and was imprisoned in the Auschwitz and Friedland concentration camps. After the war he attended the highest Party schools, held important positions in the Party ideological and training apparatus, interpreted the Party line for the benefit of the Party rank and file, and was a member of the most exclusive group of leading Communists, those 200 men in the so-called Party Central *aktiv*.

In January 1956 he gave all this up and escaped to the West. Here he makes public for the first time in English the first installment of his eyewitness observations and deeply-felt personal experiences. Simultaneously, this material is being broadcast to the Polish people by Radio Free Europe and sent to Poland in leaflet form by the Free Europe Press.

POLSKA ZJEDNOCZONA PARTIA ROBOTNICZA	LEGITYMACJA członkowska
Nazwisko <i>Bialer</i>	Nr 0130240
Imię <i>Seweryn</i>	Wydana przez Komitet <i>Bolesławiecki</i>
Data urodzenia <i>4. XI. 1926r</i>	<i>Warszawa - Pomie</i>
Data wstąpienia do P.Z.P.R. <i>15. XII. 1948</i>	wojew.
	<i>23 czerwca 1949</i>
<i>Bialer</i> Podpis właściciela legitymacji	 Podpis sekretarza Komitetu

Bialer's Party card, issued in June 1949.

AT THE end of January 1956, when I was breaking with Communism once and for all, and crossing the border into West Berlin, I knew that I was wiping out my past life. I took this step with my eyes open, however, after carefully deliberating for several months.

I was 15 in 1942 when I enrolled in the Communist underground organization in Lodz. I was trained by the Party and trained others to be loyal to it. Several thousand PZPR activists in Warsaw, Lodz, Wroclaw, Bydgoszcz, Kielce, and other cities know me from the lectures and briefings I gave as a lecturer appointed by the Central Committee of the Party. Readers of Party publications also know me well from my articles. My colleagues at the Social Science Institute and the Central Committee's school of Marxism-Leninism—where I was Secretary of the Party authorities—also know me well. I am known to Party members from various other institutions and scholarly positions, as well as propaganda posts with which I was associated. I owe all of these people an explanation: Why did I break with the Party? Why did I stop believing in Communism?

Corruption, Waste, Poverty

They know perfectly well that I did not escape to the West to secure a job or to make a career, because all this was secured for me by the Party, and open to me in Poland.

Shortly after the war, at the age of 19, I became head of the Political Department at the Citizens' Militia Training Center and after that I advanced swiftly. When I left Poland, I belonged to the Central Committee Party *aktiv*. As a result of the duties with which I was charged and the posts I occupied, I had access to materials, facts, and documents which are often inaccessible to the majority of Party activists, not to speak of the rank and file and the general public. As a result, I could gradually acquaint myself with the truth. For a very long time I thought that poverty, waste, terror, and falsehood were the inevitable price every revolution has to pay for progress. Having been for many years active in the Party, I was thoroughly familiar with its working methods, its system of government, and I arrived at the conclusion that it was a system doomed to live on corruption, generate waste, and produce poverty.

The Dictatorship Remains

Why did this change of attitude toward Communism take place in me during the last, post-Stalin period? Because I saw then with a particular intensity, and became convinced, that the evil connected with Communism does not arise from individual mistakes, but from the Communist system itself. The dictator's death had to bring about certain changes in the dictatorship, both in Russia and in the captive countries. However, as I had learned from my experiences of the past three years in Poland, the changes could not bring about the disappearance of dictatorship itself. *The membership of the Politburo has changed, and perhaps will continue to change, but its omnipotence has remained.* Look at the new First Secretary of the Central Committee, Ochab. What is his history? He is notorious for Stalinist brutality, nothing else. Look

at the people who blame Stalin and Beria for everything. These same people made use of the methods of Stalin and Beria as much as they could. What is more, when it is deemed necessary, they restore these methods, fighting openly and secretly against any pronounced attempts to democratize Party and national life.

I shall give you at least one example. At the end of 1953, at the Politburo office, I was shown a letter which the Presidium of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had written to Soviet Party activists, explaining why Beria had been liquidated. One of the reasons for the Beria purge was his alleged attempt to get in touch with Tito and the Yugoslav Party. A year later, the same Khrushchev who had signed the above-mentioned letter went to Belgrade to win over Marshal Tito and to ask his forgiveness, making Beria responsible then for Tito's excommunication. This told me that Khrushchev and company were fighting for power against their antagonists by the same methods Stalin had used, though externally their methods might seem different. I also ascertained irrefutably that the Party leadership continued to disclose and condemn only those crimes and dark pages in Communist history which could not be kept secret, or which had to be disclosed because it was necessary for the leadership. They continued to treat the rank and file of the Party, not to mention the people at large, as the objects of their rule, and to suppress the truth about the many internal events in the Party and most of the problems discussed by its leaders. How can one explain otherwise the paradoxical fact that the resolutions of the III Plenum were not published, though the Plenum was allegedly an epoch-making event aimed at the democratization and gradual reevaluation of Party activities in Poland?

The Intellectuals Degraded

As an activist and employee of the Central Committee, I took part in the debates in the Central Party *aktiv*. I know the way comrades from the Politburo tried to smother and suppress the so-called thaw, because they were panic-stricken by its results. I also know what a farce the trial of Rozanski and his comrades was. I know how passionately Berman, Bierut, Ochab, and others shielded, as long as they could, Beria's successors in Poland—Radkiewicz, for example—and how they tried to make them suffer as little as possible.

For several years I was closely connected with the ideological work of the Party. In this work I was in touch with the leading Marxists in Russia and the Soviet bloc countries. I devoted many years to the study of Marxist-Leninist ideology, and finally concluded that in the Communist version, real freedom of scientific research is impossible. The repudiation of some of the theoretical theses formulated by Stalin by the present Russian Communist leaders does not change anything, because the head of the Party continues to be the highest, virtually infallible scientific oracle in all matters pertaining to economics, philosophy, history, agronomy, and many other branches of knowledge. (Stalin's place has now been taken by that noteworthy intellectual personality Nikita Sergeyevitch Khrushchev,



Photographed by CPA

WELCOME TO THE SOVIET DELEGATION AT THE WARSAW AIRPORT. FROM LEFT TO RIGHT: S. SKRZESZEWSKI, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS; I. KONIEV, MARSHAL OF THE U.S.S.R.; N. KHRUSHCHOV, FIRST SECRETARY OF THE C.C. C.P.S.U.; J. BERMAN, VICE-PREMIER; B. BIERUT, FIRST SECRETARY OF THE C.C. POLISH UNITED WORKERS PARTY; OLGA IVASHCHENKO, SECRETARY OF THE C.C. COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE UKRAINE; A. ZAWADZKI, PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF STATE



Photographed by CPA

UPON ARRIVAL IN WARSAW: N. KHRUSHCHOV AND B. BIERUT



Photographed by CPA

POLISH DELEGATION IS GREETED AT THE MOSCOW AIRPORT. FROM LEFT TO RIGHT: L. KAGANOVICH, V. MOLOTOV, N. BULGANIN, J. CYRANKIEWICZ (AT THE MICROPHONE) AND AMBASSADOR W. LEWIKOWSKI

Unbreakable Friendship

ON the occasion of the tenth anniversary of signing the Polish-Soviet Pact of Friendship and Mutual Aid (April 21, 1945), cordial gatherings were held in both countries. Poland was host to a government delegation from the U.S.S.R. headed by N. Khrushchov, First Secretary of the C. C. of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; the Polish delegation to the U.S.S.R. was led by Premier J. Cyrankiewicz

The smiling propaganda face; Bialer tells of the reality. Text and pictures from *Poland* (Warsaw) No. 4 (8), 1955

called Nikita Kukuruznik by the Party activists themselves.)

Everyone knows that in 1955, two years after the old tyrant's death, the priority of heavy industry was restored in the USSR. Bad as that is, what is worse is that a ban was placed on discussion of the main problem of economic policy—I mean the problem of the relation between development of heavy industrial production and consumer goods production. Priority was restored in Poland too, not because the best economic thinkers believed it to be the best thing for our people and others, but because the Soviets ordered it. And we, the workers of the Party's ideological front, the intellectual activists, were instructed to limit ourselves to writing essays defending the Party line. That is not democracy; it is not even realistic practice.

One of my Party assignments was to prepare guidances for the propaganda policy aimed at the West. I had, there-

fore, access to materials, facts, and statistics which are kept carefully secret from the Party and the general public. What did I read in those secret files? Facts which could not be used in support of the line the propagandists were ordered to take. Facts like the improvement of the condition of the working classes in the West and the miserable standard of living in all Communist countries, which contradicted the Party line. Here, and as participant in the work of various institutions where I held various scholarly posts, I saw the methods of falsification, embellishment, suppression of data and statistics concerning the standard of living in Poland, and the way in which garbled Western statistics were rigged for Communist propaganda purposes.

Step by step I learned the truth. Of course, I ended by losing faith in Communism. I ended by hating the fact that I had to lie, to pretend. Finally I came to the conclusion

that I could no longer live in that way, that it was better to erase 15 years of wasted life than to continue to live without faith.

These are the reasons I broke with Communism. That is why I gave up brilliant prospects in the Party and took the decisive step, which was very difficult for personal reasons. That is why I crossed the Western border. Now I am free to speak openly and to tell the facts, which the Communist leaders suppress.

Beria's Case

In March 1953, greatly impressed by Stalin's death, I listened, together with other Party members, to the speeches that Beria, Malenkov, and Molotov gave in Moscow's Red Square. They all spoke of the inflexible unity of Party leadership, and promised to guard that unity constantly. I believed them then, and listened to their speeches with great emotion.

Four months later I heard about Beria's arrest, and then that he had been shot. The official explanation in the press filled me with serious doubt.

In the autumn of 1953, at the office of the PZPR Politburo, I was shown a secret letter from the Soviet Party Presidium to the Party *aktiv* in Russia. The letter gave the reasons why Beria's purge was necessary. Certain chosen members of the Central Party *aktiv* besides myself were also allowed to read the letter. Afterward, it was returned to the PZPR Politburo safe, where it probably still lies, under Ochab's vigilant eye.

Of course I read this letter with great interest. I had no illusions about Beria's role as Security Police Chief. On the other hand, I realized that many reasons publicly given for his liquidation had been invented, and *did not apply exclusively to him*. That is why I was curious to know whether, in a letter reserved for a small group of the most trusted Comrades, I would find the explanation. But the secret letter merely repeated the commonplace charges I already knew from the communique in the newspapers. Even the absurd charge that since 1918 Beria had been a spy and an imperialist agent was repeated. Was that less foolish than for Stalin to suspect Voroshilov of being a British agent, as Khrushchev revealed in February?

Beria Surrounds Other Politburo Members with Spies

In addition to the well-known charges, there were other accusations. Beria was accused of using the Security apparatus in the struggle for power within the Soviet Politburo. I remember that this charge was supported by the statement that Beria had seized control of the Kremlin guards and with their help had organized surveillance and wire-tapping of the conversations of other Politburo members. Tell me, what Security chief has not done these things; is not doing them this very day, if not for himself, then for Khrushchev or Ochab or another?

The second fact cited in the letter was even more typical. It was maintained that when one of the Politburo members was leaving for Lwow, Beria ordered the head of the NKVD in Lwow to put that member under surveillance. When the head of the Lwow NKVD expressed his surprise

that such an order could be issued about a Politburo member, Beria reminded him what refusal to execute his order would entail, and said—I remember the phrase very clearly—: "If you don't carry out my orders, I shall crush you into labor-camp dust." In spite of that, the NKVD agent from Lwow was so shocked that he immediately called upon other Politburo members to tell them of Beria's order. But who will believe that Communist leadership can rule in any other way? I am not the last man to see such things; nor the last one to be revolted by them—and to leave.

Other charges referred to economic matters. They were very numerous, and I shall mention them only briefly here. Among other things, Beria was accused of having hampered the development of the agricultural sector by his influence in the Politburo. Also, Beria was accused of having consistently hindered the policy of raising the standard of living of the working classes by opposing any lowering of prices.

The Amoral Profile of Beria

The letter from the Soviet Politburo also said that Beria was a moral degenerate in his private life. As proof, the following facts were listed: it was maintained that Beria had a special apartment in Moscow where he organized erotic orgies in selected company. On his orders, specially-chosen women were brought from the Moscow prisons. According to the letter, these women were later liquidated in labor camps. Beria also forced other women he liked to take part in these orgies. When he grew bored with them, they were arrested and sent to special labor camps.

The letter also said that Beria had appropriated authorship of the book entitled *The History of the Bolshevik Organization in Transcaucasia*, whose authors he had shot. According to the letter, the book contained many historical falsehoods, which exaggerated Beria's role. If that is true, why was Beria's book one of the official manuals used in the Party training which I myself had organized in Poland? Beria was no Stalin. Khrushchev and company did not tremble in his presence. Why was he not liquidated as soon as the fact was known and not years afterward?

L. P. Beria



POLSKA RZECZPOSPOLITA
LUDOWA

LEGITYMACJA

Nr 372821

WARSZAWA

dn. 17 stycznia 1955 r.

UCHWAŁA RADY PAŃSTWA

z dnia 17 stycznia 1955 r.

odznaczony(a) został(a)

Ob. BIALER

Seweryn s. Wiktora

ZŁOTYM KRZYŻEM ZASŁUGI

PRZEWODNICZĄCY
RADY PAŃSTWA

Document accompanying the award of the Gold Cross of Merit to Bialer in January, 1955.

Nor did the list of charges end there. The letter maintained that Beria had persecuted the family of the dead Party leader Ordjonikidze because he had been one of the first to suspect Beria and to distrust him. After Ordjonikidze's death, Beria transferred his hatred to his family, persecuting and destroying it.

Who Performed the Leningrad Murders?

From the letter on Beria I also learned for the first time officially about the so-called "Leningrad affair." The Politburo accused Beria of having conducted a policy of liquidation of people devoted and loyal to the Communist Party simply because they were devoted and loyal. The "Leningrad affair" was an example; in a series of secret trials the flower of the political *aktiv* of Leningrad was liquidated. According to the letter, the material evidence in those trials had been fabricated by Beria.

It is possible that Beria was actually one of the men who organized the Leningrad trials. But I understood the perfidy of this accusation only later, in February 1955, when I read another secret letter explaining Malenkov's dismissal. There I found, among other things, a charge that Malenkov also was responsible for the organization of the Leningrad trials. It was easy to see that Khrushchev,

aiming at seizure of power in the Party, was using the classic tactic of removing his rivals one by one. So long as it was necessary, he joined with Malenkov in accusing Beria of staging the Leningrad trials. Eighteen months later, when Malenkov's turn came, Khrushchev made him responsible.

Beria Wished to, but Khrushchev Went . . .

The most perfidious charges related to Beria's alleged attempts, after Stalin's death, to get in touch with Tito. In the Politburo letter, the Yugoslav Party was described as a fascist and anti-Soviet party. I even remember a certain detail in connection with that charge. Beria was accused of wanting to make direct telephone contact with Belgrade, for private talks with the Yugoslav leaders and therefore urging the re-opening of a direct telephone line between the Kremlin and Belgrade.

The perfidy of this charge appeared to me only later, when Khrushchev went to Belgrade, and when the new Politburo policy toward Yugoslavia was announced. *On the one hand, Khrushchev blamed Beria for having broken off relations with Tito and Yugoslavia, and on the other he accused and indicted him for having attempted to re-establish those relations.*

Khrushchev Degrades Malenkov

After Beria's purge the next step in the power-struggle inside the Soviet Politburo was the forced resignation of Malenkov. Before this we had a period of reawakened hope. After the Beria affair, changes were introduced. *The question of improvement of the standard of living was considered the most important task.* I must state that in 1954 I myself, and a considerable number of other Party activists, really believed that the power-struggle in the Soviet Politburo was over. We believed that after Beria's removal the highest Soviet leadership was united.

Yet in February 1955 the news of Malenkov's removal came like a thunderclap. It shocked the entire Party *aktiv*. We knew immediately that the struggle in the Politburo was still going on. We were indignant at the way in which Malenkov had been removed, rather like a schoolboy, not the Premier of a great country which was considered to be a model "democracy." Finally, we thought that the official reasons given for Malenkov's dismissal, which we were asked to believe and to tell others, were ridiculous.

"Obey the Moscow Politburo"

In our doubt, we turned to the PZPR leadership for an answer, to Bierut, Berman and Ochab. They had only one answer for us: we must trust the Soviet Party Presidium completely. Moreover, they cut short all discussion of the subject. I remember, for example, that in February 1955, at one of the Party meetings at the Institute of Social Sciences of the Central Committee, I was sitting next to Berman and expressed my doubts about Malenkov's resignation. Berman answered with phrases about full confidence, and, greatly agitated, cut off further discussion.

When I was given a Soviet Communist Party Presidium letter to the Soviet Party *aktiv* at the Politburo office shortly thereafter, concerning Malenkov this time, I wondered whether I would find an answer there to the questions that haunted me—and I found it.

Because the reasons for Malenkov's removal have not yet been given to the Russian people, or to the Party, or to the Polish people, I would like to tell about the contents of that letter. These are the reasons mentioned in the confidential letter, not those given in the press, which were so absurd that no one could believe them. I shall enumerate them one by one.

Not Farming and the Farmer's Life, but Power

The first charge concerned Malenkov's responsibility for serious errors in the farm policy. This accusation was already known to me from Malenkov's statement explaining his resignation. In the Soviet Politburo letter the charge was amplified. It was said that Malenkov was in charge of farm policy. The state of farming in the Soviet Union was alarming, and Malenkov was chiefly responsible for this state of affairs.

When I read those charges, the following questions came to my mind. First, if Malenkov was responsible for the farm crisis, what could we say about Khrushchev, who had for many years been Party Secretary in the Ukraine, the granary of the Soviet Union? Secondly, if Malenkov knew

so little about agriculture, what could be said about Bulganin, his successor, who, as I learned from his biography, had never had anything to do with farming? Thirdly, if Malenkov were little acquainted with agriculture, he knew even less about electric power stations, yet in spite of this he had been appointed Minister in charge of electric power stations. Finally, the first steps, which in the opinion of Khrushchev and the entire Politburo were to change the farm situation completely, had already been taken under Malenkov. Therefore, it was not Malenkov who was preventing implementation of agrarian reforms. Consequently, the question of farming was not involved. My suspicion was subsequently confirmed when, in spite of Malenkov's resignation, no really new resolutions on farm questions were announced.

What also struck me was that Beria too had been accused of being responsible for the farm crisis. This coincidence of charges brought against both Beria and Malenkov became even more striking when I read the rest of the letter. I shall write of this later, in connection with co-responsibility for the "Leningrad affair."

Light Industry—No!

Before taking up that matter, I should like to mention other charges brought against Malenkov in the Soviet Politburo's confidential letter. Attention was drawn to the danger of Malenkov's policy to the regular development of the People's Democracies. This charge was formulated cautiously and, like the whole letter, briefly: the policy followed by Malenkov could bring about a decrease of economic effort in the People's Democracies. I immediately understood what it was all about. At that time, there was in the Polish Party great interest in the developments in Hungary after Imre Nagy had come to power. During that period, Hungary abandoned the principle of stressing heavy industry at any cost and by any means. Not only I but many other people also saw in it a great relief for the Hungarian people. During this period pressure was brought to bear on Party leadership in Poland by the *aktiv* to follow the Hungarian example more resolutely in establishing a proper relation between heavy industry and consumer goods production, so that the standard of living could be raised.

This pressure was firmly resisted by the Party leadership. They were at that time greatly displeased with the Hungarian comrades, who were making the situation in Poland more difficult. I remember especially clearly that Szyr was furious when some of the activists maintained that Hungarian economic policy was more sensible than Polish.

Shortly after Malenkov's removal, even before I had the opportunity of reading the Soviet Politburo's letter, I learned of Imre Nagy's dismissal, and that is why, when I read in the letter that Malenkov had been accused of endangering the orderly development of the People's Democracies, I understood how this charge was justified from the viewpoint of the Soviet Politburo. Malenkov had, in fact, conducted a policy which might have brought some measure of relief in the economic situations of the captive countries. In the long run, however, this would mean an increase in the independence of those countries, and with

G. M. Malenkov



such a policy Khrushchev and the rest of the Politburo could not agree. Besides, during Khrushchev's stay in Poland in the spring of 1955, I had been personally able to ascertain this, from listening to his very aggressive unpublished speeches.

The next charge in the letter concerned Malenkov's incorrect attitude toward the development of heavy industry. I was struck by the fact that Malenkov was actually accused of deviation from Stalinism, for one of Stalin's fundamental economic principles was the priority of heavy industry and the maintenance of a steady difference of tempo between heavy industrial and consumer goods industrial development. The simple conclusion occurred to me that whatever in Stalinism is convenient to the present Party leadership will without fail be maintained. I also remember that whereas formerly there were numerous discussions in the Party on the proper ratio between heavy industry and consumer goods industry, after Malenkov's dismissal these discussions were strictly forbidden.

Finally, there was yet another charge in the letter which gave me much to think about. The Soviet Politburo accused Malenkov of co-responsibility for the "Leningrad affair." The charge was formulated as follows: during the period of struggle against Beria, Malenkov adopted a conciliatory attitude toward him, and was, moreover, co-responsible for the "Leningrad affair." How can that be, I said to myself, since Malenkov had been Khrushchev's aide when Beria was purged. Still another question occurred to me: why wasn't Malenkov accused of this when Beria was accused? The answer was clear enough—Malenkov was indispensable in the fight against Beria, and his turn had not yet come.

Molotov's Political Demotion

The third step in Khrushchev's showdown with his Politburo rivals was to remove Molotov from all influence on political affairs in the Party leadership. This took place at the Plenum last July. How did it come about?

In July 1955 the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU was held. Material in connection with the

Plenum filled the Soviet and Polish press for several days; it was the subject of discussion and official training in the PZPR. The subject discussed at the Plenum, at least as far as one could judge from the press, was the question of introducing new technical methods into Soviet industry. Bulganin made a speech. I remember considering it a positive thing that all the speeches of the participants were published, a rare thing at Russian plenums and even at Polish ones. The discussion was not secret, and was in many instances very lively.

True, I found it odd that in view of such important events in the international arena as the visit of Khrushchev and Bulganin to Belgrade, the Austrian problem, and the Geneva Conference, no foreign policy matters were discussed at the Plenum. However, I did not attach great importance to this. It did not occur to me that so soon after Malenkov's removal new personal showdowns were in the making. Besides, it was a period of intensification of the "thaw" in Poland, and these problems occupied my attention completely.

Three months passed, and the questions connected with the July Plenum were slowly forgotten. The problems of the Plenum ceased to be discussed at training centers. But in October Bierut suddenly called a meeting of the members of the Central Committee, and of part of the Central Party *aktiv*. When we had gathered on the sixth floor of the Central Committee building, Bierut got up and told us that, in addition to its published activities, the July Plenum had had secret and unpublished activities. In a short talk Bierut informed us of some of the matters discussed during the secret part of the July Plenum. Our meeting was strictly confidential. I remember Bierut told us that we could not take notes.

Bierut's brief information was later passed on, in even more shortened form, to certain groups of the Party *aktiv* in Warsaw, and Jerzy Morawski reported on it to the lecturers of the Central Committee. For my part, I made a report on these matters to Party schools, and again it was understood that no notes were to be taken. Also, attendance at the meeting was closely checked against a list and Party identity cards. No questions or discussion were permitted; in short, the material was treated as strictly confidential. But all became clear to me when I read a stenographic transcript of the secret part of the Plenum.

A few days after the meeting with Bierut in the Politburo office, I was given a full stenographic record of the July Plenum to read. It was the only copy sent to Poland, for the use of the Polish Politburo. Only a very small number of members of the Party *aktiv* were permitted to read it. The record was very long. The Plenum had lasted eight days, and some of the speeches had taken several hours, so I shall deal with only some of the problems discussed at the Plenum.

Khrushchev Versus Molotov

What was the chief subject discussed at the secret part of the July Plenum? After reading the record carefully, I saw that it concerned itself chiefly with the showdown between Khrushchev and the rest of the Soviet Politburo on

the one hand, and Molotov on the other. The secret part of the July Plenum was, therefore, the third step in clearing the way for the so-called collective leadership—i.e., for Khrushchev.

What was the platform of this showdown? The Yugoslav issue. The problem of the attitude of the Soviet Communist Party toward Marshal Tito and the Yugoslav Party. But it would not be fair to restrict the discussion to Tito's case alone. The fact is that the question of Yugoslav relations was only a point of departure for a long discussion of political and economic problems.

A good deal of space was given to a discussion of co-existence with the capitalist countries, to the problem of political relations between the Soviet Party and the Parties of the People's Democracies, to the problem of diplomatic relations with the People's Democracies. The question of the underdeveloped countries was also discussed, and the attitude toward Socialist Parties in the West, and the attitude toward Stalinism. However, the most important subject, and the basis for the showdown with Molotov, was the Yugoslav problem. What follows is based on the shorthand minutes of the secret part of the Plenum, about the showdown itself.

In February, at the Supreme Soviet meeting, Molotov's attitude had already appeared as differing from the line

taken toward the Yugoslav problem by Khrushchev and most of the other Politburo members. In February, however, Khrushchev did not attack Molotov, because he needed him in the showdown with Malenkov. This is proved by the fact that the Soviet Politburo permitted his official address to the Supreme Soviet to express views which opposed those of the majority of the Politburo. Yet there is no doubt that the texts of such speeches are scrupulously approved by the Politburo, and primarily by the Party First Secretary, before they are delivered.

From the stenographic record of the secret part of the Plenum, it appeared that preparations for Molotov's removal began immediately after Malenkov's resignation. In the spring of last year, the Politburo held a meeting at which Molotov was criticized as Minister of Foreign Affairs for his attitude toward the Yugoslav problem and several other international problems. Molotov was accused of having hampered the re-establishment of Soviet-Yugoslav relations by every possible means.

The Battle over Tito

Before Khrushchev and Bulganin left for Belgrade, the Politburo held another meeting, at which Molotov opposed the visit. Molotov was for re-establishment of international relations with Yugoslavia, but, for ideological reasons, re-

Before—"The Executioner"



After . . .



To the left a caricature of Tito titled "The Executioner", *Uzica* (Bucharest), June 3, 1950. Above, photo of Tito and Khrushchev, *Izvestia* (Moscow), May 28, 1955.

"We have seen that Yugoslavia did not abandon her sovereignty, but maintained her independence from the imperialists."—Khrushchev at Sofia, from Radio Sofia, June 3, 1955.

sisted re-establishment of Party relations with the Yugoslav Communist Party. What he had in mind was not only the visit of Khrushchev and Bulganin to Belgrade, but also the character of their visit.

These facts were given by Khrushchev in his opening speech at the secret part of the July Plenum. Even after the Politburo discussions, Khrushchev continued, Molotov had still not changed his attitude. The disagreement found expression in the adoption of two Politburo resolutions. In one, the majority of the Politburo recognized the necessity of the Belgrade visit and the necessity of attempting to reconstitute inter-Party relations with Yugoslavia. In the second resolution, Molotov's attitude was described, appraised by Khrushchev and the rest of the Politburo, and a decision was taken to put the matter up for discussion at the forthcoming Plenum of the CC of the CPSU.

At the July Plenum, Khrushchev once again charged Molotov with having prevented the re-establishment of international relations with Yugoslavia, and denounced his attitude on this issue as both erroneous and against the Party line.

Molotov Fights, and. . .

The stenographic record showed that Molotov addressed the meeting, and that after several days of discussion the Plenum of the CC declared itself against Molotov. In addition to Khrushchev, Bulganin, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Suslov, and Shepilov criticized Molotov severely. The discussion was accompanied by a series of personal skirmishes, abusive remarks flowed freely, and time and again the speeches were interrupted. This was particularly true during Molotov's speech.

I shall give an example: when Molotov was explaining his opinion that Party problems should not be discussed with Tito, because Tito was anti-Soviet and his views were far removed from Communism and rather close to those of the anti-Communists, Khrushchev interrupted him, shouting: "But in 1939 you could talk to Ribbentrop!" Incidentally, it occurred to me while I was reading the minutes that the comparison to Ribbentrop was not very flattering to Tito.

. . . Capitulates

As a result of this violent discussion, Molotov made a short declaration toward the end of the secret meeting, a declaration which occupies not more than one page of the shorthand minutes, in which, in an extremely formal manner, he listed Khrushchev's charges and admitted that they were well founded. He also said that he yielded to the Central Committee's view of the Yugoslav problem. His declaration was so formal that I had no doubt when I read it that it was only an attempt to save what could still be saved. It was an attempt to take away from Khrushchev all the arguments that could be used as a basis for Molotov's dismissal.

An Allegedly "Impersonal" Encounter

The shorthand minutes showed that the discussion was full of Khrushchev's personal remarks about Molotov. Khrushchev therefore devoted a good deal of time in his

closing speech to assurances that there was no question of a personal misunderstanding between himself and Molotov. Personally, he said, he had nothing against Molotov: his sole concern was the Party. These assurances were so numerous that I understood them to mean the opposite. Besides, even in his closing comments Khrushchev could not resist making a personal remark leveled at Molotov. He said, and I remember that passage extremely well, "Vyacheslav Mikhailovitch, all this is your wife's fault. It would be much better for you not to listen to her. She pushes you and makes you ambitious. She is your evil genius."

Such was the general outline of the showdown with Molotov at the secret session of the Plenum last July.

Mikoyan on "Brotherly Soviet Aid"

One of the most interesting problems discussed at the secret session of the July Plenum in Moscow was the problem of economic relations between the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies. Mikoyan devoted a good deal of time to that problem in his speech. I read those passages with considerable interest because I had written a series of articles on those relations for Party and economic publications. One of my articles, published in *Trybuna Ludu*, was reprinted in the Cominform paper, *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy!* Why do I speak of that now? Because I had closely followed the Party line in my articles, yet when I read Mikoyan's speech, I saw that everything I had written in those articles was simply a lie. Of course I knew several facts which proved that the Soviet Union was taking advantage of many privileges in its economic relations with Poland; but only after reading Mikoyan's speech did I realize how great was the economic discrimination that was applied to all of the captive countries.

Mikoyan denounced these discriminatory measures and plainly implied that it was not exceptional but the general rule. What was this general economic discrimination with regard to the captive countries? I shall mention some of the examples I found in the stenographic record of the secret session of the July Plenum.

Joint Stock Companies

The problem Mikoyan discussed most extensively was that of the so-called "mixed companies" activities. Mixed companies were commercial or industrial enterprises set up by the Soviets in almost all the captive countries. In such a company there are two partners: the Soviet Union and the People's Democracy in which the company operates. According to the statutes of these companies, there is complete equality between the two partners.

In all the various tributes to so-called Soviet brotherly help extended to the People's Democracies, the mixed companies were always set up as an example of the Soviet Union's sacrifices for its younger brothers. Romanian First Secretary Gheorghiu-Dej once said that mixed companies were the most efficacious and profitable form of Soviet brotherly aid offered to the countries building "Socialism." The mixed companies were given in ideological training as an example of proletarian internationalism. This was the official Party

and ideological line. However, at the secret session of the July Plenum, Mikoyan said that the mixed companies were the most conspicuous form of Russian interference in the domestic economic affairs of the People's Democracies. They were, in Mikoyan's opinion, a sign of Soviet imperialism, and they had become an example of economic exploitation of the People's Democracies, which is why they had to be dissolved.

Chinese Communists Slap Moscow's Face

But the mixed companies were dissolved for other reasons than the fact that they were inconsistent with the principle of proletarian internationalism. And Mikoyan himself admitted it. Here is a passage of the shorthand minutes which I remember particularly well: "Did we need those mixed companies?" Mikoyan asked. "Were we very happy when our Comrade Mao Tse-Tung put our nose out of joint by refusing to allow similar companies to be established in China? Shouldn't we draw a lesson from past mistakes and dissolve those companies?"

Mikoyan then explained in detail how the Soviet nose had been put out of joint by Mao Tse-Tung. This took place even after Stalin's death. The Soviet Union proposed to China the founding of such mixed companies for the production of tropical fruits in China and the exporting of a certain quantity of them to Russia. Mao Tse-Tung did not agree to the offer and proposed instead that China export tropical fruits on a normal commercial basis. Thus, Mao gave a very eloquent appraisal of the mixed companies' activities from the point of view of Chinese interests. However, while Mao was putting the Soviet nose out of joint about mixed companies in China, mixed companies in the European People's Democracies continued to be a symbol of Soviet "brotherly aid."

In my opinion, these experiences explain why it was decided to wind up mixed companies. As we know, most of the mixed companies have been dissolved, but some of them still exist. Secondly, what struck me particularly when I read the minutes of the secret session was that the dissolution of the companies was not in the least explained by the arguments given by Mikoyan to the secret session of the July Plenum.

On the contrary, in the communique announcing their dissolution, I read that they had played a very important role in the development of the People's Democracies, that they had been a symbol of the brotherly Soviet aid offered to those countries, that they had been dissolved merely because their task had been completed. The Soviet directors of the mixed companies received the highest decorations from the countries in which they had operated. That is why, when I saw the minutes of Mikoyan's speech, I was amazed at the fantastic hypocrisy of the Soviet Party leaders and their unwillingness to tell the truth. In practice, I saw one of the aspects of the alleged open sincerity of political life in the new post-Stalin era.

Soviet Experts: Arrogant and Overpaid

In another passage of the record of the secret session, Mikoyan also gave a fair assessment of the behavior of the Soviet experts and delegates in the People's Democracies.

The work of our experts abroad, Mikoyan said, necessitates a good deal of tact and modesty. In no case can we hurt the feelings of the local population. But in practice, Mikoyan said, our experts have constantly violated this rule. They have been patronizing and arrogant. They think that everybody can learn from them and that they have nothing to learn. In this way they often do a disservice to the cause of friendship between the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies. Mikoyan also admitted that the excessively high salaries of Soviet specialists were a source of discontent among local workers and employees.

Mikoyan devoted a great deal of space to Soviet-Yugoslav economic relations. He admitted that the breaking of the trade agreement with Yugoslavia in 1949 was a violation of international law, and that there were many other instances, on a larger and smaller scale, of breaking trade agreements. Indeed, they were imperialistic moves, Mikoyan said.

Principles are Principles, Business is Business

When I read this exceptionally frank statement by Mikoyan I remembered several cases of unilateral breaking of trade agreements by the Soviet Union with Poland. I know, for example, that in the past few years the Soviets broke the agreement on supplying wheat and cotton for Poland, and besides, the Soviet Union never paid any indemnity. Poland, on the other hand, was forced hastily to look for new sources of grain and cotton supplies on the Western markets.

From the minutes of the secret session, it emerged clearly that Mikoyan had violently condemned all discriminatory practices concerning the People's Democracies. Last January I could ascertain how sincere this condemnation of past mistakes was. I was told that Mikoyan had delivered an address at the Conference of Mutual Economic Aid which was held last December in Budapest. There the Polish delegation proposed, quite justifiably after all, that the export of Polish coal and farm products to the Soviet Union and the other People's Democracies should be decreased. The Polish delegation also called attention to the necessity of increasing exports of machines because this was the only way to improve Poland's difficult economic situation.

In a long speech Mikoyan said, among other things, that Poland's traditional exports were coal and farm products and that she should continue to export them. I wonder how Mikoyan would have described this sort of economic aid last July?

What is Poland to the Soviet Politburo?

As I have mentioned several times, the secret session of the July Plenum was primarily a scene for the battle between Molotov and the rest of the Politburo. As usual in such battles, there was plenty of violent discussion and mutual recrimination, and we know that in the heat of argument matters about which one normally remains silent reveal themselves. That is precisely what happened in the course of those discussions.

It began with Khrushchev attacking Molotov because the latter did not fully appreciate the damages that had arisen



from the break with Marshal Tito and from the subsequent history of Soviet-Yugoslav relations. This accusation seemed to have hurt Molotov a great deal. He violently defended his policies, and in his reply to Khrushchev's attacks Polish affairs were brought suddenly to the surface. In his comments on Poland, Molotov revealed the truth about Soviet leaders' attitudes toward the People's Democracies.

I quote here briefly some of the arguments Molotov used, as I remember them from reading the stenographic report of that secret session.

Molotov began with an appraisal of the situation which preceded the break with Yugoslavia. Indeed, he said, we made a grave error here. Why? Because without having exhausted all the possibilities for conciliation we brought about a break with Yugoslavia so sharply. I admit, he went on, that this error in our policy caused many disadvantageous complications. Can the blame for this, however, be put on Beria and Beriaism?

I must admit that I read this last sentence with great emotion. Was it Molotov's intention, I thought, to blame the break with Tito on Beria and also on Stalin and his other collaborators? But Molotov had something quite

different in mind. No, he said, to blame Beria and only Beria for breaking with Yugoslavia would have been a great error and untrue, for an equal share of guilt belongs to Yugoslavia and Marshal Tito. At that time Tito's behavior was provocative and anti-Soviet. If we had not then adopted the strong and definite stand we took, he continued, we would have been confronted with grave complications in the other People's Democracies.

And that is how Polish affairs came to the surface. I read and did not believe my own eyes.

Let us take Poland as an example, Molotov continued. Which is more important to us, Poland or Yugoslavia? Poland has 10 million people more than Yugoslavia and Poland can mobilize 10 divisions more than Yugoslavia. And we know only too well that not everything was right with the Polish Army at the time of our conflict with Tito. There was, as we remember, Gomulka in Poland. If we had not taken a strong stand in Yugoslavia's case, Molotov explained, who knows what would have happened in Poland? Poland would have wavered and gone Yugoslavia's way. That is why, Molotov stated, our sharp and definite reaction in the Yugoslav affair was perfectly justified, for



Top picture (Polish jets) from *Skrzydła Polska* (Warsaw), January 29, 1956; bottom from *Poland* (Warsaw), No. 5 (9), 1955

it prevented a still greater disaster.

However, we must admit, Molotov said, that our tactics were not always proper. The best proof of that is the fact that we failed to repair our position in Yugoslavia; hence, the conclusion that the policy we followed was false.

I must say that I read this part of Molotov's speech with great irritation. Molotov was altogether cynical. Is that, I thought, the way a Soviet Foreign Minister and Moscow Politburo member treats the friendly People's Democracies? Is Poland for him merely the equivalent of so many people and so much cannon fodder? For only in this sense was Poland more valuable to him than Yugoslavia. What should we think of our own Party line with respect to Soviet policy, I thought, a policy which allegedly treats large and small nations equally? Wasn't this cynical statement of Molotov, the acting chief of Soviet foreign policy, a proof that the Soviet Union was quite ready to sell out a smaller ally for the price of gaining a stronger one, one who has at its disposal a larger number of divisions?

While reading Molotov's statement I was further struck by the fact that—as he put it—Soviet policy with respect to Yugoslavia was wrong because it failed to bring the anticipated results. Is it true, I thought, that even in dealings with the People's Democracies, Molotov considers all methods, including provocations, permissible provided they bring the expected results?

All Wolves Howl the Same

I was particularly indignant about the fact that Molotov was justifying this policy of threat and blackmail even after Stalin's death. Even in the post-Stalin period, Moscow's policy of table pounding with respect to Poland and the other People's Democracies was still justified.

I have already written that Molotov's speech made me indignant. I had naively supposed that in the other Politburo members' speeches, particularly in that of Party First Secretary Khrushchev, I would find unequivocal condemnation of Molotov's stand. When I finished the stenographic record, I saw that my illusions were naive.

Certainly Khrushchev and other Politburo members attacked Molotov sharply, but their views were merely the other side of the coin. Their attitudes toward the People's Democracies were similar to Molotov's: they differed from him only in their estimate of the situation. As an example, let us take Khrushchev's final speech. He argued against Molotov's thesis that in the Yugoslav case the policy was basically justified even if errors in it had taken place, for it prevented Titoist outbreaks in the other People's Democracies. Thus, Khrushchev said exactly the same thing as Molotov, except perhaps that he saw a different danger in the Yugoslav example.

What was the difference between them? Molotov saw the danger in the absence of harsh policies toward Tito: he maintained that without such policies, other countries would follow in Yugoslavia's footsteps. On the other hand, Khrushchev maintained that the danger lay in making policy too harsh, that this would result in pushing the People's Democracies on the Yugoslav road, particularly after Stalin's death. Not with so much as a single word did he



Oehab, right, with Soviet Ambassador Popov.

Express Wieczorny (Warsaw), July 18, 1953

object to Molotov's contemptuous treatment of the People's Democracies.

I understood then that Molotov, Khrushchev, and Mikoyan were in perfect agreement as to the basic role of the People's Democracies. The difference lay only in the degree of advantage that a policy would bring to the Soviet Union. Was it to be a line of compromise and ignoring ideological deviations, as Khrushchev and Mikoyan wanted, or was it to be the older policy advocated by Molotov? But all of them—Khrushchev, Mikoyan and Molotov—treated the People's Democracies with equal contempt. The only difference was that the estimate by the first two was more realistic.

Not Diplomats But Proconsuls

The stenographic transcript of the secret part of the Plenum of the CC of the CPSU also contained many matters which pertained to Poland and Polish-Soviet relations. The question of the real role of the Soviet Ambassadors to Poland, particularly Popov and Lebediev, confirmed a state of affairs I had suspected for a long time. The Soviet ambassador in Poland was more a proconsul interfering in the internal affairs of the country than the diplomatic representative of a friendly nation. He does not take into account either the feelings of the people or the Party leaders' ambitions. There is, of course, nothing new in this. What is new is that it was described in this manner at a Central Committee meeting in Moscow with Khrushchev and Kaganovitch there.

How was it that the question of the behavior of the Soviet Ambassador to Poland was discussed at the secret meeting of the July Plenum? It so happened that Molotov's activity as Minister of Foreign Affairs had already been examined and in order to substantiate their criticism of him, Khrushchev, Kaganovitch and others cited facts which either directly or indirectly discredited him. Among other things, the activities of the Soviet ambassadors to Poland emerged.

Long before I read the shorthand minutes of the July Plenum, I heard rumors and sometimes even full details which threw light on the real role of the Soviet ambassadors to Poland. Besides, I was in personal contact with other Soviet inspectors in Poland. Thus, I often met Professor Alexandrov, ideological tutor of some of the Polish training schools, Comrade Nietchkina, guardian of the Polish philosophers, Professor Kuzminov, who occasionally came from Moscow to inspect the Polish economists and their work, Comrade Pankratova, member of the Central Committee in Moscow and patron of Polish historians, and many others. On the basis of these contacts and seeing their condescending attitude toward Poles, I could easily imagine how the Soviet ambassador, whose rank was much higher, behaved. But there is a difference between imagining and finding a confirmation of one's suspicions in Khrushchev's or Kaganovitch's speeches, and the stenographic minutes of the July Plenum secret session confirmed them amply.

Popov Liked to Give Orders

At the Plenum Kaganovitch criticized Molotov's activities as Foreign Minister and, among other things, appraised the Soviet Ambassador's work in Poland. Kaganovitch maintained that Popov's behavior was simply inexcusable. What was this inexcusable behavior? According to the report, *Popov thought he was fully entitled to issue orders to the comrades in the leadership of the Polish Party. He grossly interfered in Polish internal affairs. Kaganovitch said that Popov was intriguing among the Polish Party leaders and inciting them one against the other. Moreover, Popov spoke disparagingly in the presence of Polish comrades of the Polish Party leadership. Such behavior on the part of a Soviet Ambassador to Poland, Kaganovitch said, was inadmissible.*

While I read the above criticisms of the Soviet Ambassador's behavior by Kaganovitch, I involuntarily asked myself the following questions. First, Popov became Ambassador to Poland in June, 1953 and remained at his post until March, 1954. He was, therefore, Ambassador after Stalin's death, after Beria's purge, and when Khrushchev was made Party First Secretary and came to Warsaw on several occasions. It is hard to believe that the Soviet leadership was unaware of Popov's behavior, yet in spite of this his activities in Warsaw were tolerated.

Second, I wondered how meek the PZPR Politburo was if it had tolerated Popov's actions for so long. This same Popov was not even a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU. They even tolerated him when they were no longer obliged to listen to Stalin's orders.

But the criticism of the Soviet Ambassadors to Poland made at the July Plenum was not limited to Popov only. In his closing speech at the secret session of the Plenum, Khrushchev violently attacked another Soviet Ambassador to Poland, Lebediev.

Lebediev and Popov: Twins

Commenting on Lebediev's activities, Khrushchev used the same expressions as Kaganovitch did about Popov.

Among other things, Khrushchev maintained that Lebediev took it upon himself to be a leader of political life in Poland, and used to summon the higher Polish Party dignitaries to the Soviet Embassy and tell them what to do. In addition, Khrushchev accused Lebediev of having written a book on Poland which had already been sent to the printer, but its publication stopped at the last moment. Had it been published, it would have done irreparable damage to Polish-Soviet relations. Lebediev had stated in his book, among other things, that the bulk of the Polish intelligentsia was fascist.

Nor was that all. For Khrushchev also said that Lebediev formulated a fundamentally erroneous thesis that the Polish United Workers' (Communist) Party had been set up as a result of the Soviet offensive on the eastern front, and as a result of the great Russian victories. And yet, Khrushchev said, the roots of the Party were in the Polish people's independent struggle.

In the light of the stenographic record of the CC's secret session in Moscow, it is easy to understand why Khrushchev considered the appearance of Lebediev's book a disaster. The thesis contained in it would have discredited the Soviets in the Polish readers' eyes.

After criticizing the book, Khrushchev returned to Lebediev's activities in Poland, emphasizing that Lebediev's constant interference in Polish domestic matters was revolting and inexcusable. Khrushchev several times pointed out that such behavior was inconsistent with the instructions of the Soviet Party leadership. Khrushchev supported this statement with a quotation from the Russian Party's CC resolution which forbade ambassadors to interfere in the domestic matters of the People's Democracies. *Lebediev had been Soviet Ambassador to Poland for seven years and had not been complying with CC decisions for that time.* Even though Khrushchev hinted that this type of harmful activity was connected with Beria's era, I know enough to believe that the resolution was pure hypocrisy, and Khrushchev was doubly hypocritical in making use of it to attack Lebediev.

For Breaking Party Resolutions: the Order of Lenin

This violent Khrushchev criticism of Lebediev was made at the Plenum in July of last year. The minutes of the speech reached Poland in October, but almost simultaneously a Moscow *Pravda* communique reached Warsaw stating that Lebediev had been awarded the order of Lenin. It so happened that I read that issue of *Pravda* and the minutes of the Khrushchev speech during the same week. Which was I to believe—the Khrushchev who had criticized Lebediev's conduct as Soviet Ambassador to Poland so violently, or the Khrushchev who had awarded him the highest Soviet decoration for meritorious achievements and services rendered to the Soviet fatherland? Whom was I to believe—the Khrushchev who accused Lebediev of violating the Central Committee resolutions or the Khrushchev who considered Lebediev to be a suitable man for the post of Soviet Ambassador to Finland?

"'Youth is ours' . . . is the commonplace we have used to . . . put up a smoke-screen to conceal many disquieting phenomena among youth. . . . The fact that large groups of young people remain under the influence of alien hostile ideology must cause us great anxiety. The appearance of hooliganism, alcoholism, crime, a cynical attitude towards life, disdain for the basic norms of social life, immorality, and the pursuit of pleasure at any cost have reached considerable proportions. . . . A great many of our young people remain under the influence of various reactionary points of view, and yield to the pressure of the most backward clerical circles and religious fanatics. . . . Symptoms of indifference and passivity, which are rather widespread among young people [who] desire to live in the quietest way possible, without shocks or engagement in the tempestuous processes taking place all about us, must also cause us anxiety. . . . We have to fight the tendency among some groups of young intellectuals to stand aloof . . . from the rest of youth, as well as the hostility towards the intelligentsia which may be seen among certain young workers. . . . The poison of nationalism is still felt. Anti-Soviet feelings have started to come to the surface among youth. . . . These feelings invade the minds of the less resistant young people in the form of . . . anti-Semitism. Our ZMP organization must undertake an energetic, unrelenting struggle against these backward, harmful theories. . . ."

Helena Jaworska, at the Third ZMP Plenum, *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), August 19, 1956.



Trybuna Wolnosci (Warsaw), July 15, 1956

Youth in Ferment I

A Survey of Current Problems in Poland

THE COMMUNIST program of winning over the youth of the countries they control is undoubtedly more vital to the regimes in the long run than any other aspect of their rule. It is particularly important in a country like Poland, Western in tradition, Catholic in religion, nationalist in outlook, historically conditioned to stubborn sacrifice in opposition. The Communists knew when they took over the country that the majority of the population was opposed to their rule; the best they could hope for was that, through indoctrination of the coming generations, the future would be theirs. Now, after a decade of power, the Communists seem to be in a weaker position than they were at the end of World War II: through the long years of Stalinism, the original opposition of the people grew stronger rather than weaker, and power was maintained mainly through the exertions of a hard core of fanatics backed up by the might of the Soviet armies; recently, however, even this hard core has shown signs of disintegration, and the signs have been most dramatic among young Communist intellectuals in connection with the latest political contortions of their elders.

To many Communist students and young intellectuals, the torrent of criticism released by the year-old "thaw" brought dismay and shocked disillusionment. Much of what they had been taught to believe in—and had indeed often come to accept despite inner doubts and the evidence that surrounded them—was suddenly condemned or denied, not by misguided "bourgeois" critics, but by the Party leaders themselves. The carefully erected pyramid of absolutes, constructed by their elders to dazzle them into awe and respect, crumbled before their eyes. In the midst of the resultant chaos, in which their teachers found it difficult to find their own way, the young Communist intellectuals succumbed to fear and despair; they no longer knew whom to trust or what to believe.

In broad outline, therefore, the picture is now one of outright hostility on the part of the huge majority of Polish youngsters, and of disturbed dedication on the part of a tiny minority of young intellectuals who belong to the Communist-dominated youth movement (ZMP), write letters to the Communist-directed youth papers (such as *Poprostu*), and generally are in the forefront of national

activities. In between these two groups there are chiefly young people whom the regime calls "hooligans." Relatively few of these appear to be real criminals, though certainly the abnormally low living standard of the people as well as the dreariness of everyday life constitute a constant invitation to crime for the more restless young people in the country. In actual fact, the majority of the "hooligans" the regime so often speaks of are sons of Party and State functionaries who are relatively well off but have lost faith in the system; these young cynics exploit their advantages in the new society unscrupulously for their own selfish ends. They engage in various "deals"—not necessarily unlawfully—for their own profit. They are "Communists" or potential Communists, and they thus dramatize the regime's failure to win over the youth, to make good their claim that "youth is ours." In an explosion such as occurred at Poznan, the hatred of some, the cynicism and disillusionment of others, and the impatience of yet another group, all mingled on a common platform of opposition: throughout the demonstrations, youth took a prominent part, and even young Communists rose against the regime.

From the Party's point of view, the crucial problem relates to conditions in the ZMP, the official youth organization whose main object is to attract and train the Communist leaders of tomorrow. In the past, the chief problem was one of drawing into the organization a sufficient number of the correct kind of youngsters; now, there is the added worry that the small core of dedicated young Communists within the movement is either unable or unwilling to shoulder the new responsibilities that have sud-

denly been thrust upon it by the new policy of liberalization. The difficulty is in some respects similar to that which confronts the more mature members of the Party, for among the latter there has also been ample evidence that the new policies of the post-Stalinist period have required drastic readjustment by some, as well as the removal of many others. But while among the more mature Party members there could be found a good number of persons whose training preceded the Communist assumption of power—persons whose formative years in Western society had equipped them with the kind of knowledge and experience that was essentially anti-Stalinist—the same situation did not prevail among young Communist intellectuals who have grown up in postwar Poland. These youngsters were educated by a totalitarian regime that provided them with the security of fanaticism while penalizing them for initiative and the ability to think for themselves.

Many of these formerly dedicated Communist youngsters, while still dedicated and still Communists, have been propelled into an unfamiliar new world. They are no longer told what to do in the simple language of order and exhortation. Their reaction has been twofold: some have lapsed into "passivity"—they have stood pat and kept silent—while others have thrown themselves headlong into the current wave of criticism, often outdoing their elders in their probing of current reality. The Party has reacted with exasperation to both stands, but without much success. At present, therefore, there is a real crisis among young Communist intellectuals: they are a bewildered, isolated minority, irreplaceable, yet the only hope for a Communist future; much of what they have learned they will have to unlearn, and the process is bound to be arduous and painful and it will take years to accomplish.

Poprostu

The young Communists' anguished reappraisal of their own position and their often savage, impertinent questioning of their elders was mirrored in *Poprostu*, a Warsaw weekly organ of "students and young intellectuals." By printing some of the liveliest and most penetrating commentaries on Polish reality, this paper has come to occupy a unique place in the "unofficial" campaign for liberalization and, though it seems to have come under closer Party scrutiny in recent weeks, it continues to be the most outspoken paper in the entire orbit. Its influence was described as follows by Radio Warsaw commentator Osmanczyk in *Nowa Kultura* of April 18: "Today, anybody in Poland who wants to form his own opinions and who wishes to see the world in a new light should not only study the Twentieth Congress but also *Poprostu*."

The paper, as has repeatedly been reported in this magazine, has taken a leading role in the condemnation of anti-Semitism, in deploring the isolation from the West, in pointing up the dreariness and fear pervading small towns, and in discussing in the frankest possible terms economic and political "distortions," both past and present. One of its issues contained a letter entitled "Am I a Weathercock?" (see NBIC, June 1956, pp. 38-30) which posed such disquieting questions as "And what about the



Trybuna Wolności (Warsaw), July 15, 1956

Central Committee? To whom is it responsible?" and "I want to ask what the comrades in the highest positions did to prevent the development of the cult of the individual?"

Poprostu has also dealt at length with the problem of unemployment in Poland, for instance, and in a series of articles two young men, Włodzimierz Godek and Ryszard Turski, gave a close, revealing analysis of economic ills. In a June 24th article entitled "Is This the Decline of Marxism?" they claimed that the real reason for lack of technical progress in Poland was the fear of increasing unemployment *even further*. The article charged that major difficulties in the Polish economy spring from the fact that the workers have a small share in the production process, which is dominated by a crew of "professional" administrators who, despite incompetence, are promoted from one managerial post to another.

Among its various other activities, *Poprostu* has been credited with initiating the formation of clubs for young intellectuals and with starting discussions on the subject of "world outlook" at universities. The clubs, which were intended to offset the stagnant atmosphere in small towns, were described by *Trybuna Ludu*, July 27, as follows: "The secret of the clubs' achievements and popularity lies in the fact that they do not recruit people who were ordered to do something, but people who want to be active, who want to defend themselves from the sticky, drowsy atmosphere of towns which . . . disarm, destroy, lull to sleep the most active fighting people."

Because of its outspoken views, *Poprostu* has won enemies as well as friends and the Party has cautioned the paper not to forget its proper role. *Trybuna Ludu* delivered a mild warning on March 22, when it commended *Poprostu* for its witty, aggressive style, but suggested that its task was not merely to stimulate public controversy and to stimulate young intellectuals, but also to lead popular opinion along acceptable lines:

"[We must] give *Poprostu* a great deal of credit . . . for taking the initiative on discussions of world outlook. . . . However, in order that this weekly's efforts are not lost in a vacuum, we should find a platform on which these matters can be discussed with activists. Until now, the bitter evaluations of [Party] activists by *Poprostu* have not helped much in the discussion. . . .

"*Poprostu* is a good and interesting weekly. It has great merits with regard to the political and intellectual revival among young intellectuals. . . . However, I think that its editors should not forget the twofold role of the periodical which, on the one hand, should express public opinion and, on the other, have an influence on that opinion. The problem lies in how to combine properly these two roles: I do not think that combining them will be detrimental; to *Poprostu's* uncompromising vivacity, passion and energy."

Relativism and Rebelliousness

Part of the difficulty confronting the Party in restricting the scope of discussions in a youth organ like *Poprostu* derives from the fact that the entire Party is now in the midst of a convulsed reappraisal of the last decade. Much of what is being said by adult Communists refers to the

youth and to both their own and the youth's failure to live up to the ideals of a "Socialist" society. In such circumstances it is almost impossible not to permit the younger generation to answer, argue, justify and propose new solutions. Restrictions would not only stifle the youthful energy the new program is meant to release, it would also alienate more than ever those members of the younger generation who have so far been hostile to Communism and whose cooperation is now required. It is therefore a characteristic feature of the current "thaw" that much has been revealed about youth which had been carefully hidden in former days and that these revelations have in turn led to an aggressive self-defense on the part of the younger generation. As early as December 11, 1955, *Poprostu* published an article which clearly used the new-found criticism of past Party policies to point an accusing finger at the older generation for showing a poor example to youth; speaking of youth's hypocrisy, *Poprostu* said:

"In response to schematic questions, young people give schematically correct answers to demonstrate that they know the rules of the game. . . . To adults who aggressively demand an explanation, young people show impatience; to captious or delicate questions, they know how to find laconic, correctly clear but shifty answers. . . . They know how to blacken people to suit their own needs; they speak one way to a judge, another to a priest, and still another to the Secretary of the POP [primary Party organization]. . . .

"[Our] faulty system of education has resulted in a significant moral devastation. . . . It has awakened in youth new, instinctive and conscious forms of resistance, ranging from passivity to hooliganism. . . . When the old moral system broke down, the adult generation lost its moral and intellectual authority, and the younger generation proved itself confused in the face of many new and complicated educational problems. . . . Youth is well aware of the conflicts of this generation, the inconsistency of orders that are changed from day to day, the contradictions in opinions, the change in concepts, and the not always fair solutions to certain problems. Such a state of affairs brought about in youth a feeling of all-encompassing relativism."

A few days later, *Zycie Warszawy*, December 18-10, as if in answer to *Poprostu*, and obviously unable to deny the truth of these accusations, reappraised past reality with respect to youth in the following terms:

"[In recent discussions] young people showed their dislike for all forms of temporary and shallow ethical relativism. Certain people seemed to express the fear that . . . Marxism, as a materialistic ideology derived from an economic base . . . was the creator . . . of this temporary relativism whose consequences in practice are dire indeed. We would be simplifying the matter if we were to say that such fears were harbored only by young people . . . under the influence of the Catholic world view. This is not so. Frequently, vulgarized Marxist propaganda, as well as unsocialistic deeds . . . undertaken under the guise of Socialism, introduced into young Socialist minds an uncertainty as to whether something that is accepted as good and morally positive today will not be considered bad or morally negative tomorrow and vice versa. And

Polish Youth in Poznan Riots



UP Photo

Participation by young Communists in the Poznan riots was admitted by the regime press. *Glos Wielkopolski* (Poznan), August 10, 1956, described what an "old militiaman" found out, to his great sorrow, in the midst of the insurrection: "He noticed that the part of the leader [of a group of rioters] . . . was played by Joseph R., an inhabitant of P., an ardent activist and President of the local ZMP group." The article also stated that "it must be admitted that it was adolescents who constituted the majority of the assailants."

youth does not want such uncertainty, it violently and passionately does not want it."

The article spoke in the past tense, but it is clear that the reference to the ever-changing Party line and its demoralizing effects on Communist or fellow-traveling youth is even truer of the present. After the Twentieth Soviet Congress and the beginning of the fierce denigration of the former Soviet dictator, a number of even more candid articles began to appear. A typical example is the following excerpt taken from *Nowa Kultura* of April 22, 1956:


"I think that at present it would be much easier to speak to Bulganin on many topics than to one of our 'unyielding Marxists' who are more Marxist than Marx himself. Of course Mr. Braun [a critic] is afraid of young people who renounce the 'ten-year period.' They appall him. Yet what could we do in that 'Stalinist' period? We did what we were ordered: we shouted, clapped, participated in parades and meetings where our presence was checked. And we built Socialism. I do not want to reject what has been built. . . . However, I reject the atmosphere in which Socialist construction occurred, an atmosphere similar to that in which the Egyptian pyramids were built. In how many things they wanted me to believe! I had to submit because I am a man without an army or an organization at his disposal; yet, I have my eyes, I have a memory; these were not taken into account by the 'comrades.'"

Given the opportunity to express themselves more freely, the young intellectual Communists or Communist sympathizers asked for more "relativism," not less, but of a different kind: instead of being driven ideologically hither and thither like intellectual slaves, they asked for the opportunity to go their own way, to see reality with their own eyes, to judge and compare, and to grow on their own, independently. They criticized their isolation from the West, and voiced their desire to compare the only society they knew, their own "Socialist" environment, with the world at large. But their most ominous demand in response to the "thaw" around them was for the creation of an independent youth organization, one that would be free from the turns and twists of the Party that had failed them. This, of course, the Communists could not countenance.

Future of the ZMP

That young people did not consider the ZMP their own organization was evident from numerous discussions on its failings. Officials of the youth union admitted that the ZMP was regarded by young Poles as a tool of the Party and that it had been unable to attract those who were best suited to become the future Communist leaders. It was also charged that the ZMP stifled the initiative of its most energetic members, attracted recruits for the wrong reasons and was unable to cope with "reactionary viewpoints," hooliganism, alcoholism, or the passivity and indifference of the masses.

On April 11, *Sztandar Mlodych*, the ZMP daily, reported on a meeting of the Central Executive Board of the Youth Union at which the necessity of revising the ZMP's mem-



FOLLOWING THE SOLID ARMY RANKS WITH THEIR RIARING MILITARY EQUIPMENT, MARCHED THE COLUMNS OF SUAVY, EFFICIENT LOOKING ATHLETES — THE YOUTH OF WROCLAW

Picture and caption from *Poland* (Warsaw), No. 5 (9), 1955

bership policy and program were discussed. Chairman of the Board Helena Jaworska stated that the lowering of ZMP's membership requirements had "diminished" its "organizational cohesion" and that young people did not always join for altruistic reasons: "It should be remembered that ZMP membership gives certain advantages to young people. . . . It facilitates admission to institutions of higher learning and sometimes is even helpful in professional work." Chairman Jaworska also revealed that "with regard to institutions of higher learning . . . all the most intellectually and socially active students, all the most creative elements among them, engage in activities outside ZMP ranks."

The editor of *Sztandar Mlodych*, Irena Tarlowska, said that the Party was largely responsible for ZMP weaknesses because, by failing to "guarantee the principle of the openness of Party life," it had created a split between the Party and the masses which had turned the Party's authority "into an instrument of oppression." Editor Tarlowska remonstrated: "We should not look upon the ZMP as a transmission belt acting in one direction only—from top to bottom—but also as a transmission belt acting from bottom to top."

Marian Renke, Chairman of the ZMP Executive Board in Lodz, was even more outspoken: "Within the ZMP . . . there has been active an apparatus preventing practical application of the conclusions drawn from discussions. Everything new and fresh has consistently been broken, stifled and eliminated by that machine. The present state

of affairs is much the same. . . . If we don't change ourselves, we will be changed by others; in the meantime, we shall play a nasty, presumably, "poor" role within our organization."

Many young people demanded that the ZMP become independent of the Party; others went so far as to declare that the ZMP was a cumbersome, ineffective institution which should be disbanded in favor of a number of new youth organizations which would satisfy their members' particular interests and needs. *Poprostu*, which urged a separate students' organization, on April 8 bitterly assailed ZMP units in universities, claiming that their program resembled "educational activity in a kindergarten":

"The students are treated like young children: naive moralizing, handholding and earcuffing if they trespass even the most trivial regulations of the higher authorities. And yet, as recent developments have proved, the student is a mature and intelligent man in the full sense of these words. Thus, the ZMP program . . . [and] the present study program . . . paralyze the activity of the intelligentsia and isolate it from life and practice."

Poprostu made even more stinging complaints about the composition of the ZMP. Stating that the "cult of the individual" had turned ZMP groups at universities into "loyalist" organizations, totally obedient to Party authorities, the newspaper concluded:

"Such a system was not conducive to training young people with active and revolutionary minds. On the contrary, it favored the education of people with a religious and not a rational mentality, prepared them not for a struggle with evil but for uncritical submission. It is no coincidence that within the ZMP the highest value was placed on emotional participation, while intellectual participation was virtually ignored."

"Currently, the ZMP is a conglomeration of revolutionists and loyalists, idealists and those without any ideals, Communists and petty-bourgeois, enthusiasts, cynics—savvy guys. It is a loose group which calls itself a col-

lective; it binds people formally and not ideologically. . . . Many people belong to the ZMP for one reason only—they count on good positions, personal gains which—why mince words?—the union provides. . . . At the same time, the organization has people who are serious thinkers and wish for constructive action. . . .

"Many ZMP members . . . are rebelling against the present situation in organization. . . . Students of the psychology department at Warsaw University are actually forming another ZMP cell composed of honor students. . . . They are working on a plan of their own in which they propose [changes] in the educational system. . . . But why go on about something that is well-known in every school. . . . The possibilities of solving the impasse in which the ZMP now finds itself are being widely discussed. . . . Some propose the liquidation of ZMP cells at institutions of higher learning and the formation of a completely new organization. . . . It would have its own administration and administrative organs dependent on or independent of the main ZMP Board."

"Others propose the formation of a nationwide union of young intelligentsia, in other words . . . a new revolutionary organization of students and graduates. . . . In our opinion, the most practical way is to revise the current ZMP organization attached to every school into a revolutionary and autonomous union of students."

A similar plea for a separate students' organization was made two months later by Chairman of the ZMP Students' Department, Stanislaw Turbanski, who described the desired autonomy as "organizational" and not "ideological." Writing in *Poprostu*, June 6, Turbanski envisioned an organization that would include not only Marxists but young people with "uncrystallized" views as well as those who were "idealistic"—presumably religious. Turbanski was careful to point out, however, that all members would be dedicated to "Socialism" and that the organization itself, within the framework of the ZMP, would have a "clearly defined Marxist-Leninist world outlook."

(Continued on page 24)



Sign on picture at left reads "To the City"; sign in picture at right reads "To the Village." At left the agitator is shown pulling a peasant girl, at right a city girl. Caption under both pictures reads: "Fluctuating Traffic or Agitation Then and Now." Reference is to the change in policy: until recently youth was encouraged to emigrate from country to town; now, with the greater stress on agricultural development, the process has been reversed. These abrupt changes have met with resistance, particularly on the part of young people, who have been pushed in either direction as shockworkers in the service of the regime.

Picture and quoted caption from *Szpilki* (Warsaw), July 8, 1956

"Fear"

A Young Communist's Torments

By I. Lewandowska

Sztandar Mlodych (Warsaw), August 4-5, 1956

YOU ARE AN ENEMY.

The year: 1953. Night. Someone has just emerged from the head offices of the ZMP. He has slowly closed the gate behind him. He is the hero . . . so I may as well introduce him now: Wiktor Grzelak, age 25. He is from a worker's family and married. . . . Party affiliation—he has belonged to the Party since 1945. However, this is no longer quite true. Wiktor may be said to be non-Party—in fact, he handed in his Party card exactly ten minutes ago.

He walked home, less than two kilometers, through a strange and sleeping city. How long was it? Perhaps three hours, perhaps more. He had no watch, and anyway, he was in no hurry. He wanted to go back and address the meeting once again:

"But Comrades, I spoke the truth. Yes, here at the meeting, I spoke the truth. You're wrong, I am not an enemy. What nonsense. I, a worker and a Communist, an enemy?"

But he did not go back. He remembered them, their unanimous decision, their faces which suddenly had become foreign to him. . . . An enemy?

The few passersby looked at him with some surprise. Who is this man walking along muttering, stopping now and again, gesticulating? Is he drunk? No, he doesn't look it. Then perhaps he's lost something, or been robbed?

"What's the matter, mister?"

"I'm afraid!"

It was true—from the very moment he thought of it and said it for the first time. Yes, he had said—why hide it?—a Party member ought to be honest with his comrades: "We activists of the political apparatus tell people lies. We falsify our ideology." From that moment he began to be afraid. Not that he feared imprisonment, or losing his job and having nothing to eat. Had he been afraid to travel to bandit-infested villages? Had he not fled countless times along walls spattered with bullets aimed at him, only to return again? He was afraid that some force was tearing him from the Party, something he could not explain. He listened with terror as his comrades spoke at the daily briefings of the executive committee, giving their reports on local affairs. How these people lied! They looked at the same things Wiktor looked at every day and yet they saw something quite different! Could it be that their eyes were different? Or was he perhaps mistaken?

Like a man drowning, he tried to save himself at any cost. There, that's a letter to the Party Central Control Commission:

"Comrades, this is to inform you that I am not fulfilling my duties as a Party member: a Party member should be a leader in his sector whereas I, a political activist, have not been doing my job well and have even failed recently to speak at seminars.

"There are many things which I am unable to explain. We say, for instance, that we are bound closely to the people, yet we don't even know what the people do and the people don't trust us. The workers lead a hard life, pledges are forced on them and defined in advance. All the workers know this, even my father who is a textile worker, told me so. And yet we say and write things which are quite the opposite. This means that reality does not coincide with what we are taught in the course of our Party training. . . . As a Party member I demand help from the Party Central Control Commission, for in a few months' time it will be too late and I shall have become unworthy to be called a Party member.

Wiktor Grzelak."

(This and other documents quoted are authentic.)*

The Control Commission sent the letter to Wiktor's parent organization. The only thing he received was the carbon copy of a laconic memo: "Your letter has been sent to whom it may concern."

Now, after the meeting, he examined his thoughts once more, as if they were a forbidden book. "There is a tragic misunderstanding somewhere. What have they made me out to be?" And suddenly he realized that in his mind he was referring to the Party as "they," and there and then he began to wish he were dead. . . .

The following day he went to see the Secretary. His fear did not leave him for a moment. Perhaps it was possible to explain everything. Perhaps he had forgotten to say something important . . . at the meeting. Something which would enable his comrades to understand the whole truth. Perhaps then they would understand that they had made a mistake . . .

"Can I talk to you for a few minutes? I would like you to clarify something . . ."

"Weren't you told at the meeting yesterday that you're an enemy? We don't talk with enemies. With enemies, we . . ."

"Oh well, I'll be going. I'll go back to Lodz and look for a job."

"You'll have to stay here for a while. The comrades want to talk to you."

"I won't. There's nothing to talk about."

"You will."

He did stay, and he talked and listened carefully to the questions they put to him. He did his best to understand them, to answer exhaustively and sincerely. After all, they don't know whether I'm an enemy or not, he thought. . . . No one ever heard a bad word from him about the executive, about those comrades who sealed his fate by taking away his Party card. . . .

A special commission went to Wiktor's house in Lodz. Perhaps the origins of Grzelak's suspected doubts might be found there? Maybe it's his wife. It is a well-known

* This remark is the author's.

fact that a family is often the source of all evil, that it "infects" otherwise right-thinking comrades with petty-bourgeois ideas. . . . But no. His wife is a textile worker and a comrade. . . . There can only be one other explanation:

"Tell us, comrade, perhaps someone suggested this perfidious attack on the Party to you?"

"To me?"

"Yes, to you. . . . The conversations you have had with our comrades . . . in which you threw doubt on the justice of certain measures taken by our authorities have had a demoralizing effect on them and have blunted their vigilance. . . . Why don't you try and remember? Who suggested all this to you?"

"How can you talk to me like this? . . . If anyone said anything against the Party in my presence . . ."

"Don't get excited, comrade. We're trying to help you. Four months ago, for instance, you told a certain comrade . . . that the things we say about our bonds with the masses are untrue because the workers, who have a hard time, get smaller meat rations than we do. You thus denied the basic principle of our authority, didn't you?"

"But it's true. We do get bigger rations. But it's got nothing to do with . . ."

"Don't play the fool. . . . You say that you want to go back to Lodz to work in a factory. Aren't you afraid that you might infect the working class with your petty-bourgeois views?" . . .

There were other questions, day after day, week after week. Wiktor no longer tried to make himself heard. . . . What kind of people are they, he thought. . . . A good thing they aren't like that everywhere. Just wait until I get back home. . . .

Silence. A room, a battered sofa by the wall. . . . Two men are sitting at the table. Father and son.

"I didn't know you would bring such shame on me. . . . How can you face me without your Party card?"

"But listen, you yourself told me . . ."

"I don't want to listen. Conditions in our factory are one thing and the Party is quite another. Were they right or wrong when they expelled you?"

"They were wrong."

"You're lying. If they were wrong you would be appealing their decision. . . ."

For eight months his father did not say a word to him. . . .

Disaster.

The grey dawn, a bright light outside the window. . . . Does the revolution, just and severe, answer for people's ideas about it? Is it possible to be right against everyone else? Wiktor looks out over the city. . . . It was he who was wrong. He should have carried out the self-criticism asked of him and understanding would have come later. . . . There are always wise people and others who are less wise. Why had he suddenly decided that he was wisest of all? If the Party is in power, then everything is as it should be. . . . To build a different world is a very complicated matter and one cannot attach too much importance to details. Yes, he would apply for readmission right away. . . .

"Go to the committee, my son," the father said, "the comrades there know me and they'll know my son cannot

be a scoundrel. He may be stupid and obstinate . . . but . . . they'll forgive you readily enough."

But if they don't? Wiktor is ready to do anything. . . . All right. He will agree that objectively—yes, only objectively—he was an enemy of the Party. That he violated Party discipline by writing to the Control Commission. He was blind and conceited. . . . He must get his membership card back. Otherwise nothing will help. . . .

"I, the undersigned, wish to state that in the years 1952-3 I committed a number of ideological errors. I shared my opinions with my comrades and by so doing might have undermined their moral and political balance. Being unable to explain to myself the source of these difficulties, I began to think that they were caused by errors in our economic policy about which the Party does not wish to tell the masses. I lacked faith in the policy of the Party. With this error . . . was connected the feeling that the working class is at present in a difficult situation and that it is imperative that its situation be alleviated. Being in this frame of mind, I was unable to react properly to the activities of enemies or of people under the influence of the enemy, afraid that I could not stand up to them in discussion. . . ."

Wiktor still thought that it was not permissible to lie to the Party. This is how he closed his statement: ". . . These things were explained to me 'almost' to the end."

That single word was the reef on which the whole application was shipwrecked. In April 1954, Wiktor was refused readmission. . . .

The next application. Its date is much later:

"If I were to write about my love for the Party, it might merely evaporate into a meaningless phrase. I shall put it briefly: the Party has made me what I am, it has given me faith in the new order we are building. Two years outside the Party have been for me more than only moral punishment. Even my own father would not speak to me for a long time, as if I were a leper. I beg to be readmitted to the Party. . . ."

In 1955, Grzelak was admitted to the Party as a candidate member.

It is said that misfortune adds years to one's life. I worked with Wiktor for many years. I did not recognize him after a year's absence.

"You know what," he said, "I've been taken back to the Party . . . as a candidate."

"And your training, Wiktor," I asked, "are you going to give away ten years as easily as that?"

"I'm quite happy with things as they are. You don't know how much trouble I had to go to, to be readmitted at all. I'm not going to start all over again. If I were to ask for my past training to be recognized, they would think that I consider my expulsion unjust."

"Does that mean that you think your expulsion was just?"

He did not answer. He did not smile, and he looked at that very moment as if he had forgotten forever how to smile. . . .

"Wiktor, stop being afraid. It wasn't they who were right. Is there a loyalty to the Party which is also a betrayal of oneself?"

"WE HAVE no right to close our eyes to the fact that there are at present serious difficulties in finding employment for young people, particularly for youths under eighteen; that many graduates of vocational schools are unable to find work in the trade they have learned; that disproportions between the expansion of housing and industry . . . are causing difficult living conditions for working youth; that the health and physical development of a considerable part of young workers, students and young peasants is disquieting; that . . . we even encounter among working class and peasant youth manifestations of recurring illiteracy, [and] that generally speaking the cultural level of youth is relatively low."

Helena Jaworska, at the Third ZMP Plenum, Radio Warsaw, August 18.

The students' demands for a separate organization were, on the whole, greeted mildly by the regime, although the Party in no way sanctioned the plan and rejected any and all projects which would lead to dissolution of the ZMP or weaken Party control over it. Throughout the debates Party officials preserved the idea of the ZMP as a single mass organization refusing intellectuals the right to secede from it. Instead, they turned their attention towards reinvigorating the ZMP and solving some of its membership problems.

On April 26, *Trybuna Ludu*, the Party newspaper, remarked that "here and there hot blood dictates some not too sensible ideas" and that "impatience throws young people from one extreme to the other." This phenomenon, the newspaper said, was the "natural reaction to an excessively long stretch of time during which others have been doing the thinking and deciding for young people." *Trybuna Ludu* then cleared up a few "confusing" ideas about the ZMP's relation to the Party:

"Has the Polish Youth Union really become a transmission belt for the Party's ideology to youth? I maintain that it has not. . . . The conception of 'transmission' has been opposed artificially to the concept of 'independence.' Instead of drawing conclusions from the general Party line . . . we have been making a 'little Party' out of the ZMP. Yet if the ZMP is to be a real youth organization, it must retain a certain separateness of aim and working means. . . ."

On May 3, *Trybuna Ludu* again adopted a moderate attitude towards the organization of a separate ZMP unit in a Warsaw school:

"It was going to be a truly Communist group with a revolutionary program and a plan for studying the classics. The young conspirators, when asked why they couldn't limit themselves to the ZMP replied: 'Because it is an indefinite organization, a supplement to school activities similar to the League of Soldiers' Friends [a paramilitary organization]. . . . All these remarks have one thing in common: the young people's longing for an organization which has some distinction . . . which has a militant program of action. . . . In my opinion [however], the tendency towards creating a number of youth organizations which would compete among themselves is nonsense."

Although the Party was thus willing to admit that the ZMP should have a certain "separateness" of aim, and although it described the formation of separate youth groups as motivated by the desire for a "militant organization," it was not blind to dangerous political implications in the students' ferment, and to these it called an abrupt halt. *Tygodnik Demokratyczny* (Warsaw), May 2-5, indicated in no uncertain terms that while students would be given more leeway in the future they definitely would not be given their heads: "It is not good," the newspaper said, "if in certain student circles the students—to whom People's Poland undoubtedly gives more than it can afford—become brutal, intolerant and aggressive in their preoccupation; if they express concepts and demands which are not only unjust and demagogic but—let's say it openly—ill-adapted to reality."

Zycie Warszawy, May 5, stated the Party's attitude even more succinctly: "We must combat harmful and dangerous proposals to form in Poland several political organizations of young Catholics, liberals, Socialists, radicals and Communists. The division of youth is not necessary for anyone; no one, in my opinion, is for the . . . creation of a multi-political system of youth organizations." There was evidence, however, that such suggestions were very popular in intellectual circles and, in the case of young Catholics, had even been voiced at a recent session of the Sejm (Parliament).

After the Poznan riots, in which youth played a prominent role, the Party was left in no doubt as to the urgency of coming to grips with the problem of the ZMP. Again, discussion centered on the all-important question of membership policy: as opposed to Turbanski, who had advocated an autonomous organization for students and had pushed for the inclusion of "non-Marxists," *Sztandar Mlodych*, the official ZMP voice, committed to the preservation of an unsplintered organization amenable to close Party control, now called for the purge of "unhealthy" and "undesirable" elements from ZMP ranks. The newspaper declared on July 17 that the official figure of two million ZMP members was deceptive and that the policy of "putting the mass character of the organization above everything else" was incorrect. *Sztandar Mlodych* claimed that energetic ZMP activists were drowned in the mass

"RECENTLY, I met a young man of the type that 'had not polluted itself with membership in the ZMP.' . . . 'How are you feeling these days, you noisemaker?' he asked me with unconcealed irony. It should be admitted that many of us belonged to 'groups of enthusiasm,' as they were called among us. Many of us were among those who loudly expressed the catchwords and most carefully scanned the leaders' names. Of course, these external accessories were symbols of a certain attitude and an expression of inner convictions. Now some of us do not want to admit this and prefer to maintain that we did it cynically."

Trybuna Ludu (Warsaw), April 28, 1956.



Left: "And who on earth are you?" Right: [Old man points to tie under beard marked ZMP, the initials of the Polish Youth League] —"I, my dear colleague, am the delegate of the [Youth League's] Main Executive Board."

rys. Karol Barancki

Szpilki (Warsaw), June 3, 1956

membership and that their "desperate" attempts at action ended by their sinking in the mire of indifference, silence and passivity:

"Without reducing the present membership . . . we won't be able to attain sufficient ability for action . . . and sound conditions for future growth. . . . All of us know that the present vagueness of the ZMP's ideological character can no longer be sustained. . . . The theoreticians . . . who bear the main responsibility for the present plight of our organization, have not taken into account . . . the class character of our society and, consequently, its manifold ideologies. Considering that all of our young people have an ideological attitude, they have drawn the conclusion . . . that we can safely bestow ZMP membership indiscriminately on every young person. Unfortunately, they have not noticed that in this way they shelter hostile influences within the ZMP . . . that they blur the progressing class struggle.

" . . . Poznan . . . was a crushing lesson for those theoreticians according to whom youth in general has an 'ideological attitude.' It showed the extent of the ideological and political influence which may be exercised at certain times by elements alien and hostile to the working class if we neglect the work aimed at the consolidation and deepening of Communist consciousness among the people. . . ."

In August, the Party's present line on youth was amplified further in a ZMP Plenum which scheduled a ZMP Congress for February 1957. According to Radio Warsaw, August 22, the Plenum drafted a resolution "outlining the tasks of the ZMP as a revolutionary and independent leader of young people in the struggle for democratization and improved living standards." The ZMP program calls for "democratization of the ZMP, elections to all executive offices, a revolutionary ideological attitude and independence of decisions in all matters and action." From the speech of Central Committee Secretary Jerzy Morawski, however, it would appear that while the ZMP will be given somewhat more "consideration" and freedom, its functions and its status will remain substantially the same.

It also appears that the Party's main concern at the moment is to give direction to the disorganized yearnings of the young intellectual elite and to channel its efforts in endeavors both acceptable and helpful to the regime. It appears that the uncoordinated, chaotic behavior of this elite has had adverse effects on the less active, but more numerous members of the youth organization, and just as the Party itself has lately disciplined itself into curbing expressions of anguish and coping instead with pressing problems of the people's living standard, youth too has now been given more precise tasks to fulfill.

Morawski (*Trybuna Ludu*, August 22) tried to win the confidence of youth by urging them to participate in the present process of liberalization, and he warned that democratization "is in danger of being stillborn" unless speedy and efficient action is taken with regard to the workers' grievances and demands:

"The people will cease to have faith in a democracy which only gives the right to criticize . . . without guaranteeing that the correct demands are translated into life. There are many painful and urgent issues, issues which can be settled but which have not been settled due to the soullessness of various bosses in the administration . . . and rigid officials who cannot see the complexity of everyday problems . . . behind their screen of regulations and clauses. The ZMP organization in work establishments must become a tireless champion for settling such issues, for respecting the rights and demands of working youth, for making wrongs good, for reacting to workers' criticism and for taking those responsible to task."

In his attempts to conciliate youth, Morawski conceded that the role of the ZMP had been "underestimated"—that the voice of youth had been ignored—and that the Party was to blame for ZMP shortcomings. He claimed that the Party now wants the ZMP to "grow into an important political force" which "can march along with the Party." Morawski also remarked that he was surprised that the meeting directed so little criticism at the Party's suppression of ZMP discussions, as well as its unceremonious handling of the ZMP, the removal and appointment of

RECENTLY I HAVE been reading many articles of various kinds; the newspapers have become interesting, eagerly sought by the reader; the tempo of life is quickening; heads are being raised; tongues loosening. There arises the question of the reasons for this state of affairs—who or what brought it about?

Let me tell you how things looked to my young eyes in the years now past—and I may add that I saw many interesting things. It happened that I have always been in the midst of situations about which, after a certain time, they tried to falsify the truth, presenting it in the form most convenient to those who presented it; yet, I saw through it all. . . .

Going to school, I used to tread a path in the snow. Nobody but us went along that path in the morning; it was a strangely winding path, whose every turn was marked—as a road is marked with milestones—with the corpse of a German stripped of clothes by our kind villagers.

Easter: ZMP [Youth League] members keep honorary guard at Jesus Christ's tomb.

Return to Warsaw. The new era. The threshold of the so-called Ten-Year Period. Agitation, elections, voting. After that, year by year, the slow turning of the screw. Finally, the advent of terrible years of almost total lawlessness.

At the Powazki Cemetery [in Warsaw], ZMP members, or perhaps the security police, take away the candles and wreaths from the Warsaw Insurgents Monument. Bureaucratization of all of life, terrible boredom everywhere. Lack of entertainment, fight against the so-called bikiniarze [zoot-suiters]. The silencing of public opinion, shouts and applause from the claue. Palace of Culture, the Marszalkowska Residential housing project district, mass songs. Humbug in architecture, humbug in literature, humbug in plastic arts. Were there no wise people at that time? There were, but they had to be silent in order not to become corrupt; they had to stay apart. . . . We cannot suspect those people of "hostility." At the present time, those people are being told that they may start creative work, that it was they who were right. . . .

1. I have written all this in earnest.

2. I am not an enemy.

3. I do not sign my name because I am afraid that in a year or two a new wind may blow, and my soul is that of a slave; no wonder: I have been brought up by the war and by you.

Excerpts from a letter in the "Letters and Answers" column of Nowa Kultura (Warsaw), April 22, 1956.

ZMP workers, the alteration of ZMP plans at the eleventh hour and the assignment of unnecessary tasks:

"We have repeated that the ZMP was the assistant of the Party. This would not have been too bad if other institutions had not also tried to turn the ZMP into their assistant, into the assistant of the school teacher, the factory manager. This did not remain in the sphere of words. The ZMP has, in fact, been reduced to this position, it has been pushed about, it is a helper and not an independent organization. . . .



Cartoon shows hooligans flying by jet while police trail them. Caption: "The police have finally received the long-awaited scooters for their struggle against the hooligans."

Trybuna Wolności (Warsaw), July 22, 1956

"Independence [however] cannot be given as a gift. No order will guarantee that a ZMP chairman become a courageous man . . . or have sound judgment on essential problems. . . . The ZMP will have to fight for this leading part among young people. . . .

"Only a ZMP organizer who is self-reliant, thinking, militant, unafraid of making a move and convinced about the correctness of his attitude can insure the proper direction of the union. This does not alter in any respect the struggle to turn the ZMP into a coherent organization, an organization which will consistently . . . implement the decisions adopted, an organization of iron discipline. . . .


"Things have been said here about the need of freeing the ZMP from the ballast of passive members, careerists and the lazy. One cannot fail to agree in this. . . .

"The main danger now lies in underestimating our strength and the possibilities for action among the younger generation. And I think that the discussion at this plenum proves, despite everything, that the Central Board of the ZMP not only has great aims but also the means to achieve them."

Morawski's advocacy of ZMP participation in the Party-controlled process of democratization seems to be an inadequate and belated remedy for the ZMP's unpopularity. The young Communist intellectuals have already rejected the organization as unsatisfactory, and the large majority of youth undoubtedly will continue to be wary of the ZMP for a long time to come. At present, the ZMP has to cope not only with the hostility and indifference of the masses, but the partial withdrawal of intellectuals, anti-Soviet feelings which continue to manifest themselves strongly among youth, and the blows its reputation has suffered in the recent reappraisal of its shortcomings.

Iron and Steel

Third of a series of articles on the development of heavy industry in the captive countries. Surveys of coal and electric power appeared in the July and September issues. Though available information does not permit an intensive analysis of the iron and steel economy, it is possible to show in some detail what the Communist planners have accomplished in recent years. Future issues of NBIC will carry articles on chemicals, construction and machinery.



The second blast furnace at Nowa Huta.
Wirtschaftsdienst (East Berlin), September 1955

IN THE LAST seven years Satellite Europe has more than doubled its steel production. By 1960, if present plans are fulfilled, production will exceed 21 million tons. The 1955 output of approximately 13.7 million metric tons was about a fifth of Western Europe's, a quarter of the Soviet Union's and a little more than a tenth that of the U.S.

Two thirds of Satellite steel capacity is accounted for by

The manufacture of iron and steel is a complex series of processes. Pig iron is made by charging iron ore and coke into a blast furnace, along with limestone, and sending a hot blast of air through it. The combustion of the coke reduces the oxides in the iron ore, and the limestone absorbs impurities. The resulting pig iron is not entirely pure: it contains a small percentage of carbon and certain other elements, depending on the nature of the ore.

Steelmaking involves a further purification of pig iron, in which the extraneous elements are oxidized away and the carbon usually reduced to a proportion of less than one percent. The original way of doing this, the Bessemer process, has largely been superseded, especially in Eastern Europe, by the open hearth furnace. The open hearth uses various combinations of pig iron, scrap iron or scrap steel, and iron ore. Limestone is added to make slag. Molten steel is poured into ingots, and these constitute "crude" or "raw" steel. Further stages in manufacture involve rolling the steel into various forms such as rails, girders, bars, plates, sheets and strip.

Czechoslovakia and Poland, which have most of the coking coal. Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and the Soviet Zone of Germany are expanding their industries, but as yet they are relatively small. Production of pig iron and crude steel in 1955 was distributed as follows (in millions of metric tons):

	Pig Iron	Crude Steel
Bulgaria	n.a.	n.a.
Czechoslovakia	3.0	4.5
Germany (Soviet Zone)	1.5	2.5
Hungary	0.8	1.6
Poland	3.1	4.3
Romania	0.6	0.8

The area is not self-sufficient in raw materials. While all of the countries except Albania produce iron ore, most of the deposits are small and of inferior quality. In pre-Communist years the industry was dependent on imports of iron ore from Sweden and Yugoslavia and scrap iron from Germany and other industrial countries. Under Soviet hegemony it has been forced to rely on the ore fields of Krivoi Rog in the Ukraine for much of its external supply, a development which has undoubtedly meant higher costs, and there is evidence that some iron ore has been imported all the way from China. In the early postwar years the industry was able to draw upon large quantities of war scrap, an important substitute for iron ore, but this source has long been exhausted. No information is available as to

present supplies of scrap. Coking coal is also scarce in the southern part of the orbit; Romania and Bulgaria have to choose between importing it from Poland or from the Soviet Donbass.

Manganese, valuable both in the production of steel and as an alloy metal, is found in substantial quantities in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania. Other ferrous metals are in short supply, including chromium (found in Albania, Bulgaria and Romania), nickel, molybdenum, tungsten, cobalt, titanium and vanadium. To overcome these deficiencies the regimes are stressing geological research and are attempting to find ways of exploiting inferior mineral deposits.

Iron and steel production is now being planned on an areawide basis, through the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance. The Comecon planners consider such matters as: "the production and distribution of coke and iron ores, the exchange of particular types of rolled steel goods," and measures to "increase the supply of rolled steel products to such countries as Bulgaria or Romania." The structure of steel production in each country is also being planned with respect to the requirements of the whole area, particularly the assortment of rolled products produced by each (*Trybuna Ludu* [Warsaw], June 7, 1956).


Poland*

THE POLISH iron and steel industry is centered on the bituminous coal fields of Upper Silesia. Iron smelting began there in the 18th century, and the nucleus of the present steel industry was developed by the Germans during the 19th century. Although Silesia was split between Germany and Poland after World War I, German capital retained a large interest in the Polish industry until the end of World War II, when all of German Silesia went to Poland. The Communists have since built large new plants at Czestochowa, north of Silesia, and at Nowa Huta, east of Cracow. But with the exception of several small plants in the Radom-Kielce district (Starachowice, Ostrowiec and Stalowa Wola) and a new plant at Warsaw, all of the crude steelmaking capacity is still located within a 60-mile radius of Stalinogrod (Katowice).

The war brought heavy damage to the industry in the Radom-Kielce and Lower Silesian areas, and the industry suffered further when the Russians dismantled some of the German rolling mills in Upper Silesia as war reparations. But by 1948 the production of crude steel had risen above the level of 1938 (including the prewar German territories in both years). The Three Year Plan for Economic Reconstruction (1947-1949) set a target of 1.3 million tons for pig iron, 2.03 million tons for crude steel and 1.3 million tons for rolled steel products. (The production of these items in 1938 had been 1.3 million, 1.9 million and 1.4 million respectively.) While there were some difficulties in the rolling mill sector because of lack of capacity, reportedly the targets were more than fulfilled in 1949.

*Much of the following material is taken from "Steel Developments in Poland," British Iron and Steel Federation, *Monthly Statistical Bulletin*, London, Oct. 1953.

Polish Steel Mill



"Partial view of the Bobrek Works, for which the Soviet Union has delivered the most modern rolling mill." (Sign reads: "To Socialism through the lowering of costs.")

Wirtschaftsdienst (East Berlin), May 1955

The Six Year Plan (1950-1955) envisaged a doubling of crude steel production. Pig iron production was to increase by even more—to 2.5 times the 1949 level—and rolled steel products were to reach 2.2 times the 1949 level. The relatively greater increase in planned production of pig iron was a reflection of the shortage of scrap iron. Whereas in 1949 the charge of pig iron in steelmaking had been less than 55 percent and the rest had been scrap iron, during the Plan it was expected to rise to 75 percent.

The largest single project of the Six Year Plan was the famous Nowa Huta steel complex. This involved the construction of a new town 10 miles east of Cracow on the Vistula River. The town was to house 100,000 people when finished, at some time after the end of the Six Year Plan. The steel plant was to have a capacity of 1.5 million tons, or nearly as much as the total prewar production of Poland and the former German territories. Its components would include coke ovens, a sintering plant, four blast furnaces, 10 open hearth steel furnaces, various types of rolling mills, a foundry and a fire brick factory.

Another big project was the Bierut Works at Czestochowa, named after the late First Secretary. This was an integrated iron and steel plant expected to have an ultimate capacity of 1.1 million tons. It was built alongside the old Rakow works, which were absorbed in the new plant. Other expansion was planned at the Stalin Works near Gliwice and the Kosciuszko at Chorzow. An electric steel plant was to be built at Warsaw for the production of stainless, acid-resistant and high speed steels.

The planners estimated that about 9 million tons of iron ore would be required in 1955. Domestic production was to provide only a third of this. Although Poland has ore deposits in the Czestochowa area and scattered sources in the Radom-Kielce area, their quality is inferior (averaging

18 to 48 percent iron and having a high moisture content) and the costs of preparing them make it cheaper to import Swedish and Russian ores. Before the war most of the imports came from Sweden, but in recent years a growing proportion has come from Krivoi Rog in the USSR.

The ore target was not reached however, and in 1955 domestic production covered only 15.7 percent of requirements (*Inwestycje i Budownictwo* [Warsaw], November 1955). Total imports of iron ore in 1955 were 4.4 million tons, of which 3 million came from the USSR and most of the remainder from Sweden and Finland (*Trybuna Ludu* [Warsaw], April 21, 1956).

The other Six Year Plan targets were also unfulfilled. Pig iron production in 1955 was 3.1 million tons, as against the target of 3.5 million, and crude steel production was 4.3 million tons, compared with the target of 4.6 million. Performance was still inadequate in the rolling of steel, particularly in small sections, steel sheet and steel pipe (*Inwestycje i Budownictwo*, November 1955). By the end of 1955 Poland had 90 open hearth steel furnaces and 32 electric furnaces, of which 27 and 6 respectively were added since the war. The average capacity of open hearth furnaces had grown in the ten years from 43.5 tons to 59.5 tons (*Glos Pracy* [Warsaw], December 11-12, 1955).

The Nowa Huta project had made considerable progress. By 1956 four coke oven batteries, two blast furnaces and four open hearths—three of 370 tons capacity and one of 185 tons—were in operation, as well as a blooming mill of 700,000 tons per year capacity and a continuous wide strip mill. The continuous mill, said to be the first ever built by Soviet technicians, will ultimately produce 1.2 million tons of strip annually. Its operators are being trained at Zaporozhe in the Ukraine. Nowa Huta's production in 1955 was claimed to be 390,000 tons of pig iron and 330,000 tons of steel.

The Five Year Plan

Speaking at a meeting of steel industry managers in Stalinogrod in December, First Deputy Premier Hilary Minc said that in the coming five years the industry will have to concentrate on modernizing its old plant rather than building new. He noted that during the Six Year Plan the daily productivity of open hearth furnaces rose from 3.62 tons per square meter to 4.4 tons, but added that in the Soviet Union the average was 6.67 tons in 1954, while the best Soviet furnaces were producing 8.5 tons. "What do these figures prove? They prove that immense reserves exist in our metallurgical industry." By 1960, he said, Poland will produce 7 million tons of crude steel.* "How shall we achieve this new production? We shall expand establishments under construction to planned capacity and modernize old works."

The major project will continue to be Nowa Huta, which is now expected to produce about 1.5 million tons by 1960. The electric steel plant at Warsaw will be completed. The Bobrek plant will increase its production from 460,000

tons to 545,000, and the plant at Pokoj from 435,000 to 520,000. But new facilities will provide only 39 percent of the expected increase in production (as compared with 68 percent during the Six Year Plan); the rest, 61 percent, will be achieved by modernizing old facilities (*Glos Pracy*, December 11-12, 13 and 14, 1955).

While the details of this modernization have not yet been published, Minc's remarks in December imply that the basis of it will be the installation of larger capacity equipment. There is also to be more mechanization, improvement in smelting techniques and a more extensive use of oxygen (*Glos Pracy*, December 13, 1955). Steel rolling will continue to be the industry's weak spot, but new rolling mills will go into action at Nowa Huta and Warsaw before 1960. According to the article in *Inwestycje i Budownictwo* already cited, Poland's needs will be met "but the supply will be tight." Another article in *Hutnik*, the technical journal published in Stalinogrod (Katowice), 1956, No. 3, states that rolled steel production will be 4.6 million tons in 1960. About a quarter of it will be sheet and the rest sections. Total capacity of the rolling mills will be somewhat higher, about 4.8 million tons.

Recently discovered iron ore deposits will enable Poland to expand its use of domestic ore. In 1960 domestic pro-

Pig Iron Production
(Thousands of Metric Tons)

Year	Poland	Czechoslovakia	Hungary	Romania
1938	1,294*	1,323	335	133
1939	n.a.	1,608	409	119
1940	n.a.	1,618	427	122
1941	n.a.	1,570	442	118
1942	n.a.	1,594	418	162
1943	n.a.	1,706	417	226
1944	n.a.	1,593	296	141
1945	n.a.	576	44	54
1946	726	961	160	66
1947	867	1,423	309	90
1948	1,134	1,600**	384	191
1949	1,391	1,808	428	275
1950	1,533	1,980	461	320
1951	1,616	2,080	527	350
1952	1,836	2,330	620	390
1953	2,359	2,800**	716	456
1954	2,663	2,800**	843	432
1955	3,112	3,000**	854	575

* Postwar boundaries.

** Approximate.

Polish production in 1938 from *Maly Rocznik Statystyczny 1939*, Warsaw (prewar territory), and *Statistisches Handbuch fur Deutschland 1928-1944*, Munich, 1949 (former German territory). Other years from *Nowe Drogi* (Warsaw), Jan. 1956.

Czechoslovakia's production in 1948 and 1953-55 from *Statisticky Obzor* (Prague), Jan. 1956; in other years from United Nations, *Statistical Yearbook 1955*, New York, 1955, and *Economic Survey of Europe in 1954*, Geneva, 1955.

Hungary's production in 1955 from *Szabad Nep* (Budapest), April 27, 1956; in other years from United Nations, *op. cit.*

Romania's production in 1950 and 1955 from *Scinteia* (Bucharest), Dec. 24, 1955; in other years from United Nations, *op. cit.* (estimates from 1948 to 1954).

*Plan targets are still under discussion and cannot be taken as final.

duction is expected to cover 30 percent of requirements, compared to 15.7 in 1955 (*Inwestycje i Budownictwo*, November 1955). But Poland will still be dependent to a large degree on Krivoi Rog ore. In spite of this, the long-heralded plan for canalization of the Bug River, which would make it possible to bring ore by barge from the Ukraine to Nowa Huta and the Silesian steel plants, has been postponed.

Poland is also short of materials used in the production of alloy steels, such as manganese, nickel, chrome, molybdenum, wolfram, cobalt and vanadium.

The postwar progress of the industry has been achieved largely with the aid of the Soviet Union. The Nowa Huta complex was designed by Soviet engineers and its equipment came from the USSR. The blast furnaces and blooming mills at Czestochowa, the blooming mills at Bobrek and the equipment of the Warsaw plant are also of Soviet origin.*

Czechoslovakia

CZECHOSLOVAKIA is the largest steel producer of Satellite Europe. Its western territories were formerly the industrial heart of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and after the First World War the new State inherited more than half of the Empire's iron and steel industry. The bulk of it is located in two centers: in the vicinity of the Upper Silesian coal fields and around the iron ore deposits of Bohemia. A smaller center exists near the Slovak ore mines west of Kosice. Production of crude steel followed a fluctuating course from 2 million tons in 1929 to 683,000 tons in 1932, when the industry was suffering from the world depression. It recovered to 2.3 million tons in 1937. In 1939 Hitler occupied Czechoslovakia and under German direction steel production reached a peak of more than 2.5 million tons in 1943 and 1944.

After the war the coalition government of President Benes nationalized all iron and steel works and rolling mills. Economic planning began in 1947 under the same Government. The Two Year Plan Act (1947-1948) set targets of 1.46 million tons for pig iron—below the highest pre-war level—2.40 million tons for crude steel and 1.65 million tons for rolled products. The Plan was more than fulfilled so far as overall production was concerned, as can be seen from the accompanying tables.

The Two Year Plan was mainly a program for reconstruction. It was followed, after the Communist seizure of power, by the First Five Year Plan (1949-1953). This had the customary aspects of Communist economic planning, stressing the long-term development of the economy with priority for the expansion of heavy industry. Pig iron production was to expand by more than two thirds during the five years, crude steel by slightly more than a third, and rolled steel by almost a half. In April 1951 the Plan was revised and the heavy industry targets raised. The new goals were 3 million tons for pig iron, 4.6 million tons for crude steel and 3.8 million tons for rolled steel. While

* *Gospodarka Planowa* (Warsaw), April 1956; *Trybuna Ludu*, April 21, 1956.

these higher targets were not reached by the end of the Plan, production did exceed the amounts specified in the original version. Two years after the end of the Plan, in 1955, the regime claimed that production of pig iron reached 3 million tons and that of crude steel 4.5 million tons, or substantially the levels envisaged in the expanded version of the Plan.

The most important investment in iron and steel during the Five Year Plan was the Klement Gottwald Works in Vitkovice in the heart of the Silesian coal and metallurgical region. When finished it was to comprise four blast furnaces, a steel works, an electric power station, a coke plant, an engineering shop and rolling mills. By October 1952, two blast furnaces, two coke batteries and three open hearth furnaces had been put into operation (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], October 2, 1952). Work was continuing in November 1955, when a press item announced the reconstruction of a fourth blast furnace (*Rude Pravo*, November 14, 1955).

Another project was the extension of the Trinec works, now known as the V. M. Molotov Works, not far from Vitkovice. Modernization and expansion of this plant was begun during the Two Year Plan. One new blast furnace was completed in October of 1948, and another went into operation on May 1, 1952; a third new open hearth furnace was nearing completion at the end of 1952 (*Hospodar* [Prague], December 6, 1951, and *Rude Pravo*, May 2 and December 14, 1952).

Rolled Steel
(Millions of Metric Tons)

Year	Poland	Czechoslovakia	Hungary	Romania
1938	1.4*	1.6**	0.4	0.3
1948	1.3	1.7	n.a.	0.3
1949	1.6	1.9	0.5	0.3
1950	1.8	2.2	0.5	0.5
1951	2.0	2.3	0.6	0.5
1952	2.2	2.5	0.8	0.6
1953	2.6	2.9	0.8	n.a.
1954	2.7	3.0	0.8	0.5
1955	3.0	3.0	0.9	0.6

* Postwar boundaries.

** 1937.

Polish production in 1938 from same sources as in pig iron table; in 1948 from United Nations, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1954*; in 1949, 1953 and 1954 from *Rocznik Statystyczny 1955*, Warsaw, 1956; in 1950, 1951, 1952 and 1955 from United Nations, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1955*, Geneva, 1956 (based on percentage increases in annual plan reports, applied to 1949 production of 1.5 million tons).

Czechoslovakia's production in 1937-54 from United Nations, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1954*; in 1955 calculated from percentage increase in Second Five Year Plan.

Hungary's production in 1938 from United Nations, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1954*; in 1949-54 from United Nations, *Economic Bulletin for Europe*, Vol. 7, No. 2, Geneva, August 1955; in 1955 from *Szabad Nep* (Budapest), April 27, 1956.

Romania's production in 1938, 1950 and 1955 from *Scinteia* (Bucharest), Dec. 24, 1955; in 1948 and 1949 from British Iron and Steel Federation, "Steel Developments in Rumania," *Monthly Statistical Bulletin*, London, Feb. 1952; in 1950-54 from United Nations, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1955*.

Crude Steel Production
(Thousands of Metric Tons)

Year	Poland	Czechoslovakia	Hungary	Romania
1938	1,897*	1,873	648	284
1939	n.a.	2,293	733	267
1940	n.a.	2,358	750	261
1941	n.a.	2,416	782	n.a.
1942	n.a.	2,379	784	n.a.
1943	n.a.	2,565	776	351
1944	n.a.	2,533	694	n.a.
1945	n.a.	959	129	118
1946	1,219	1,677	353	157
1947	1,579	2,286	597	183
1948	1,955	2,600**	733	340
1949	2,304	2,760	849	459
1950	2,515	3,190	1,048	555
1951	2,787	3,510	1,290	646
1952	3,179	3,790	1,459	698
1953	3,604	4,400**	1,543	719
1954	3,949	4,300**	1,491	629
1955	4,295	4,500**	1,623	765

* Postwar boundaries.

For sources see Pig Iron Production.

** Approximate.

One of the most publicized schemes of the Five Year Plan was the development of a huge new iron and steel complex in Slovakia, near Kosice. The Huko Works (Hutny Kombinat) was to be second in size only to the Gottwald Works and was to produce a million tons of pig iron and 1.3 to 1.5 million tons of crude steel on completion in 1955. It was to include rolling mills, engineering shops and chemical and power plants. Like similar projects at Nowa Huta in Poland and Sztalinvaros in Hungary, it involved the building of a whole new town with 6,000 inhabitants. Coke was to be brought from Ostrava in upper Silesia and iron ore from nearby Roznava and Krivoi Rog in the USSR. After 1952 the Huko scheme was shrouded in silence and nothing was heard of it for a long time. According to a *New York Times* dispatch from Vienna, May 15, 1956, Premier Siroky told a meeting of the Slovak Party Central Committee in Bratislava the previous weekend that Huko had been discontinued because of "negligent research into available iron ore deposits and a delay in the construction of primary production enterprises." Siroky admitted that the undertaking had been a mistake and had resulted in considerable economic loss.

According to First Deputy Premier Dolansky, the new plants built since 1945 now produce 30 percent of the coke and steel, 40 percent of the pig iron and 20 percent of the rolled products (*Rude Pravo*, October 7, 1955).

Like most of the Satellites, Czechoslovakia has inadequate supplies of iron ore and depends heavily on imports from the USSR. The main deposits are near Nucice and Beroun, west of Prague, and in Slovakia west of Kosice. The Bohemian ores consist of limonite and hematite averaging 37 percent iron. The Slovak ores are siderite of 32 to 38 percent iron. In 1948 the Slovak mines provided

76 percent of the domestic ore supply. Their ore is commonly transported to Silesia in exchange for coking coal for the industry in Slovakia. Because the domestic ores are of relatively low quality Czechoslovakia has always relied heavily on imports. In 1929 imports amounted to 47 percent of the total supply; in 1937 to 44 percent; and in 1948 to 56 percent. Formerly the high-grade Swedish ores were of great importance, amounting in 1937 to well over half of total imports.* In recent years the use of Swedish ore has declined in favor of the Krivoi Rog ore from the USSR. The latter, however, is of rather poor quality and Czechoslovakia has recently been importing Chinese ore, which is said to be much superior. According to one report, in 1952 the Gottwald Works in Vitkovice mixed about 25 percent Swedish or Chinese ore with about 25 percent scrap iron and about 50 percent Soviet or Slovak ore.

The draft directives of the Second Five Year Plan (1956-1960) propose to increase the total production of the iron and steel industry 49 percent by 1960. Most of this will come from a 41 percent increase in productivity rather than from capital expansion. Pig iron production is to increase by 60 percent to 4.78 million tons, partly through the addition of two blast furnaces at the Gottwald Works, but largely through improvements in technol-

*Ore statistics are from publications of the State Statistical Office, Prague, compiled by Vladislav J. Paulat, *Iron, Steel and Metal Industries in Czechoslovakia*, microfilmed manuscript, Mid-European Studies Center, New York, 1952.

Iron Ore Production
(Thousands of Metric Tons)

Year	Poland ¹	Czechoslovakia ²	Hungary ²	Romania ²	Bulgaria ¹
1938	942*	525	74	68	16
1940	n.a.	652	65	72	24
1943	n.a.	634	86	110	n.a.
1946	424	387	33	48	9
1947	544	460	61	46	n.a.
1948	636	430	80	94	n.a.
1949	677	480	85	146	n.a.
1950	732	480	92	178	n.a.
1951	835	540	n.a.	215	n.a.
1952	943	630	102	294	n.a.
1953	1,236	690	n.a.	310	n.a.
1954	1,495	690	98	313	n.a.
1955	1,750	**	**	**	n.a.

¹ Crude ore.

² Estimated iron content.

* Postwar boundaries.

** Production of crude ore in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania in 1955 was approximately 2.5 million tons, 400 thousand tons and 600 thousand tons respectively (from plan reports).

Polish production from *Wiadomosci Statystyczne 1945-48*, Warsaw, 1949, *Geografia w Szkole*, Warsaw, No. 5, 1954, and plan fulfillment reports.

Bulgarian production from *Statisticheski Godishnik*, Sofia, 1938 and 1942, and *Industrialni Problemi na Bulgaria prez 1947*, Sofia, 1947.

Other figures are United Nations estimates of iron content, *Statistical Yearbook 1955*.

ogy. "It is estimated, for example, that by improving the sorting of ores coming to the blast furnaces and by carefully processing them according to their variety and quality before melting, by thorough introduction of steam into the melting process, by increasing the temperature of air driven into the furnace, by increasing the acidity of slag and other such measures, it will be possible in four or five years to raise the present output of pig iron by 30 percent in existing installations." (*Prague News Letter*, Nov. 12, 1955)

Crude steel production will go up 46 percent, according to the Plan, to a level of 6.54 million tons. At least half of the increase is to result from the introduction of new technique and the better utilization of existing facilities, but the completion of new steel furnaces will add another 1.16 million tons to total capacity. Rolled products are to increase by 47 percent, to 4.38 million tons annually. Six new rolling mills with a total capacity of 1.3 million tons and a 70,000-ton pipe mill will be installed.

The mining of iron ore is to be highly mechanized with the object of increasing its production by 46 percent. According to Minister of Foundries and Ore Mines Reitmajer, this will suffice to cover only 30 or 40 percent of total requirements. The necessary imports will come from the USSR, which has agreed to furnish ore of better quality than in the past. More attention will be given to the preparation of ore as well as to its quality. Reitmajer also stated that the average size of blast furnaces has increased from 427 cubic meters before the war to 609 in 1955, and will reach 655 in 1960 (*Rude Pravo*, May 31, 1956).

Hungary

HUNGARY'S iron and steel industry is roughly a third the size of those of Poland and Czechoslovakia. Although the country is poor in iron ore and coking coal, the Communists have made strenuous efforts to expand the industry and have succeeded in doubling the production of pig iron since 1949. This has meant importing more than 80 percent of the necessary iron ore and nearly all of the metallurgical coke, some of it over considerable distances. By ordinary standards this may seem a costly program, but it is not new to Hungary. Ever since the Trianon Treaty after World War I, which deprived Hungary of its ore mines in Slovakia and Transylvania, the country has been an importer of iron ore. In 1929 and 1937, relatively good years for the industry, about two thirds of the iron ore was imported. Describing the situation in 1937 one writer said that of the total iron used in steel production, less than a quarter came from domestic mines. The rest had to be imported in various forms: "as iron ore, largely from Yugoslavia; pig iron, from Germany and Italy; and scrap iron, from the U. S., U. K. and Egypt." In return, Hungary exported iron and steel products to Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, Sweden and other countries. Supplies of metallurgical coke were even poorer: in 1937, 94 percent of it came from Poland and Czechoslovakia.*

As elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the production of iron

and steel reached a peak during 1943 under the pressure of the German war effort. That year's level of 417 thousand tons of pig iron and 776 thousand tons of steel was not reached again until 1949 and 1950. The first postwar planning was the Three Year Plan, terminated after two and one half years in December 1949. It was essentially a reconstruction plan, intended to raise iron and steel output to approximately the level of 1943. Production in 1949 was about 400 thousand tons of pig iron and 860 thousands tons of steel. A ferromanganese furnace was built in Diosgyor and the ferrosilica plant at Zagvarona, destroyed during the war, was rebuilt. Other investment was made in existing plants at Csepel and Ozd.*


The First Five Year Plan (1950-1954) undertook a vast expansion of the industry. Initial targets called for increases of 140 percent in pig iron production and 86 percent in crude steel. In 1951 the Plan was revised upward, raising the target for pig iron to an increase of 220 percent and for steel to 156 percent. By 1953 the regime realized that the new goals were impossibly high, and a second general revision was made in August. The target for pig iron was cut all the way back to 860 thousand tons, or substantially less than in the original version, and that for steel to 1,680 thousand tons, or approximately the same as the original Plan. Even this compromise with reality was more than the industry could attain, and in 1955, the year following the end of the Plan, production had not quite reached the original 1954 goals.

The industry is now located in three main centers. The Ozd-Diosgyor area in the northeast was the basis of the industry between the wars, and the site of the most important iron ore mines. At Diosgyor the Communists have modernized an old plant and named it after Lenin. The Lenin Works has a blast furnace claimed to be capable of producing 814 metric tons of pig iron in 24 hours, plus two older blast furnaces, seven open hearth furnaces, rolling mills, an ore treatment plant and other facilities (*Szabad Nep* [Budapest], May 23, 1954). The plant at Ozd is the oldest in Hungary, with four blast furnaces, 12 open hearths and a rolling mill (*Nepszava* [Budapest], May 1, 1953). At Borsodnadas there is a rolling mill producing thin plates, and at Salgotarjan a plant producing crude steel, rods and steelware.

An entirely new iron and steel center is growing up at Szatinalvaros, on the Danube river about 45 miles south of Budapest. It is a product of Communist planning, a "Socialist town" like Poland's Nowa Huta. Originally the town was to have been located at Mohacs, near the Yugoslav frontier, but after the Communists broke with Tito the site was transferred. The present population is about 30,000. The regime has built a large blast furnace of 700 cubic meters capacity, three open hearth furnaces and various auxiliary plants. Work is in progress on a second blast furnace, a coke works, an ore-concentrating plant, hot and cold rolling mills, etc. Supplies of iron ore are brought up the Danube from the USSR. When the coking plant is completed it will utilize coal from the Komlo-Pecs dis-

*Charles Will Wright, *The Iron and Steel Industries of Europe*, Washington, D. C., U. S. Government Printing Office, 1939, p. 84.

*L. D. Schweng, *Economic Planning in Hungary since 1938*, Mid-European Studies Center, New York, 1951.



"The blast furnace of Sztalinvaros. The power station seen in the background provides energy for the town and its industry."

Hungary (Budapest), June 1954

trict in the south, and will provide Hungary's first large-scale production of domestic coke. According to *Szabad Nep* of August 30, 1955, the coking plant is expected to pay the whole cost of Sztalinvaros in ten years, by saving 135 million *forint* a year on imported coke.

To the plants named after Lenin and Stalin, Budapest adds one named for Matyas Rakosi. This steelworks, located on the island of Csepel, has four open hearth furnaces, a rolling mill, a tube plant and various engineering shops. It consumes pig iron from elsewhere, as well as taking steel from Ozd. In the Pestszentlorinc section of Budapest there is another rolling mill.

An idea of the relative size of these plants may be had from the claim that each of the large blast furnaces at Diosgyor and Sztalinvaros produces almost as much as the three blast furnaces at Ozd combined. The two furnaces together accounted for 41 percent of the 1955 production of pig iron, or about 350 thousand tons (*Statistikai Szemle*

[Budapest], May 1955).

The Second Five Year Plan (1956-1960) calls for further increases in production. Targets for 1960 are 1,410 thousand tons of pig iron, 2,240 thousand tons of crude steel and 1,400 thousand tons of rolled products. The necessary increase in capacity will come from the completion of Sztalinvaros and also from the use of enriched iron ore at the large blast furnaces. The regime is attempting to economize on imported raw materials. It hopes to mine enough iron ore to satisfy 28-30 percent of the industry's requirements in 1960, and completion of the coking plant at Sztalinvaros will allow a greater use of domestic coking coal. As elsewhere in the Satellite area, emphasis is placed on more efficient techniques. Among other things these include the complete mechanization of furnace charging, a greater use of oxygen in the open hearths, and measures to reduce waste (which the Plan characterizes as "insupportably high").

Romania


MOST OF ROMANIA'S iron and steel industry is located in southwestern Transylvania and the Banat. The districts of Pojana Rusca and Ocna de Fer have the main deposits of iron ore and coking coal, and in 1948 the two plants at Resita and Hunedoara represented 90 percent of total pig iron capacity and almost 80 percent of total steel-making capacity.* Romania's iron and steel industry is not large. In 1943, at the peak of the war effort, it produced only 173,000 tons of pig iron and 324,000 tons of crude steel, and in 1955, at the end of the First Five Year Plan, only 567,000 tons of pig iron and 765,000 tons of steel.

The industry was nationalized in June, 1948. Economic planning commenced with two One Year Plans in 1949 and 1950, calling for extensive investment in iron and steel. This included the rebuilding of several blast furnaces and open hearth furnaces, as well as the construction of a huge new blast furnace and several new open hearths, two coking plants and two rolling mills. While the precise extent to which these Plans were fulfilled is not known, the regime claimed that the production of iron and steel substantially exceeded the targets. Production of pig iron in 1950 was said to be 320,000 tons or 68 percent more than in 1948. Crude steel output had risen 63 percent to 555,000 tons, and rolled products 50 percent to 459,000 tons.

The First Five Year Plan (1951-1955) was an ambitious one so far as iron and steel were concerned, calling for increases of 150 percent in pig iron production, 126 percent in crude steel and 80 percent in rolled products. In the final event it turned out to be highly unrealistic. The Plan called for the construction of five new blast furnaces, each of 320 tons daily capacity, at least five new open hearth steel furnaces, four new rolling mills, a steel tube plant and new ferro-alloy plants. The works at Hunedoara and Resita were to be rebuilt.

The status of all these projects is not clear. Speakers at the Second Party Congress in December, 1955, were almost eloquent in their silence as to iron and steel. First Secretary Gheorghiu-Dej extolled accomplishments in other departments of heavy industry, but concerning iron and steel he was forced to say: "The lagging of the iron and steel industry is felt in all branches of the national economy, and especially in the machine building and capital projects branches." He released statistics which show the extent of this lagging: only 575,000 tons of pig iron were produced in 1955 instead of the 800,000 originally planned; only 765,000 tons of crude steel instead of 1,252,000; and only 567,000 tons of rolled products instead of 828,000 (*Scinteia* [Bucharest], December 24, 1955).

No explicit reason was given for the industry's failure, but evidently not all of the capital projects were completed. Apparently there was also difficulty in obtaining the necessary raw materials. While Romania has extensive deposits of manganese, chrome and refractory clay, it is not so fortunate in its supply of the more basic materials—coke and iron ore. Gheorghiu-Dej said, "Our own coke and iron



The Sarmetal—Resita plant, one of the most important metallurgical centers in the RPR

Picture and caption from *Romanian News* (Washington), February 3, 1952

ore production does not cover more than approximately 50 percent of the needs of the iron and steel industry. This results in an insufficient use of the capacity of blast furnaces and steel mills and increases to a considerable extent our import requirements." And Premier Chivu Stoica, outlining the tasks of the Second Five Year Plan, stressed the importance of coke and iron ore: "The development of the iron and steel industry to the level of the national economy's demands requires the elimination of lagging in the raw material base itself."

These statements are significant in light of the fact that Romania's reserves of iron ore and coking coal were known to be relatively small long before the conception of the Five Year Plan. Production of iron ore in 1950 was only 392,000 tons and imports amounted to about 250,000 tons, mostly from the USSR. Figures for the production of metallurgical coke are not available, but total reserves are known to be small; even before the Five Year Plan Romania was dependent on imports of coke and coking coal from the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Poland (British Iron and Steel Federation, *op. cit.*). The industry's failure to meet its targets (by 28 percent in pig iron and 39 percent in crude steel) may have been due in part to a failure to receive the expected raw materials from other Communist countries.

The Second Five Year Plan (1956-1960) will not do much to remove this deficiency. It aims to double the production of pig iron and to raise crude steel production by 100 to 120 percent. In absolute terms this means 1.15 million tons of pig iron and 1.53 to 1.68 million tons of crude steel. But the target for coking coal is only twice the 1955 output,* and iron ore production is to increase only between 80 and 100 percent. Even if all the targets are realized the present raw material shortage will remain, and the necessity for imports will be at least as great.

* British Iron and Steel Federation, "Steel Developments in Romania," *Monthly Statistical Bulletin*, London, Feb. 1952.

* The production of coke, as distinguished from coking coal, is to increase five-fold; but much of it will be made from imported coal.

The Plan also requires a considerable capital investment. Three blast furnaces will be built with a total volume of 1,850 cubic meters; a new open hearth steel mill with an annual capacity of 700,000 tons; an electric steel mill with an annual capacity of 40,000 tons; a rolling mill for medium sections with a capacity of 550,000 tons; a pipe-rolling mill of 300,000 tons capacity; a blooming mill; and additional capacity for the rolling of thin sheets. The battery of coke ovens at Hunedoara will be extended by two more batteries with an annual capacity of 400,000 tons.

But the Communists have even bigger plans. In the words of Premier Stoica, "The increase in steel production achieved by the development and modernization of the aforementioned units does not cover the . . . ever-increasing demand for steel." To this end, studies are to be made and plans drafted for a new iron and steel combine, and its first blast furnace put into operation by 1960.


Bulgaria

UNTIL RECENT years Bulgaria's role in the European iron and steel economy was confined to the export of iron ore in exchange for pig iron and rolled steel products. Before the war exports went to Hungary and Czechoslovakia; since the war they have extended to the whole Satellite area, although their quantity is not known. Known

deposits of iron ore were small and scattered, the largest being at the Vasil Kolarov mine in Yambol county. Total ore production was about 20 thousand tons in 1941, dropping to 8,700 tons in 1946. The First Five Year Plan set a target for 1953 of about 99 thousand tons, but no information is available on actual performance or subsequent targets.

The regime has been pushing geological research in hope of discovering additional resources of coal, iron and other minerals. An article in *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia), June 8, 1956, asserts that recent discoveries at Kremikovzi near Sofia have "completely changed the estimate of iron, lead, barium and manganese reserves." It claims that the Kremikovzi iron ore deposits exceed 150 million tons and can be worked by open pit mining. But so far as is known, Bulgaria remains poor in coking coal, and future development of the iron and steel industry will depend on imports from the Soviet Union.

In keeping with their predilection for heavy industry, the Communists are fostering a modest iron and steel industry. Prior to the war there was a small production of steel from an electric furnace in Dimitrovo (Pernik), utilizing scrap metal. This has been renamed the "Peace Works." By 1952 there were several electric furnaces, including one at the Stalin Machine Works in Dimitrovo. However, the main project is a large iron and steel works now under



"Part of the Lenin metallurgical plant in construction, built with Soviet aid."

Bulgarian Foreign Trade (Sofia), No. 2, 1953

construction in Dimitrovo, called the Lenin Works. Three open hearth furnaces and a rolling mill have gone into operation since August 1953, and a blast furnace and a fourth open hearth are to be completed in the near future. In 1957, the last year of the Second Five Year Plan, the Lenin Works are expected to produce 113 thousand tons of pig iron, 250 thousand tons of crude steel and 170 thousand tons of rolled products. The plant's output of steel has thus far been maintained largely by imports of pig iron from the Soviet Union. Much of the steel, according to press reports, is already being exported to Romania, Greece, Syria, Egypt, Turkey, France, Libya and India.

The Area Prospect

Although the industry's growth has been impressive, it has not been without hazards. Investment in heavy industry in general was so high during the early 1950s that several of the Satellites were forced to revise their plans downward in 1953. In Czechoslovakia the Huko project was abandoned, and in Hungary the work at Sztalinvaros slowed down. Steel output in 1954 in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania declined below the level of 1953—an unusual state of affairs in Communist countries. But in 1955, as the regimes oriented themselves to the new

line emanating from Moscow, steel production began to climb upward again.

Much has been written in the Satellite press about the new "thaw" in the Party's relationship to the people, with promises of a rise in the standard of living. However, there is no sign that the regimes are ready to abandon their old emphasis on heavy industry. The new iron and steel plans anticipate that expansion in the next five years will be as rapid as in the last five. Steel production in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Romania grew by 53 percent from 1950 to 1955, and by 1960—if plans are fulfilled—it will have grown another 55 percent. In absolute terms the new increases will be much larger than in the past: annual production will rise by 6.1 million tons compared with 3.9 million in 1950-55. While it is true that earlier plans were frequently unfulfilled, the new Five Year Plans seem to have been more realistically considered. There will be less emphasis on massive capital construction and more on the improvement of existing facilities. In Poland and Czechoslovakia, for example, from 50 to 60 percent of the new steel output is to be achieved by modernization. This is part of the areawide program for reducing costs and raising production per man-year, and to the extent that it succeeds it will make the burden of industrialization easier for the people to bear.

Too Well Prepared

A PROFESSOR explaining what a traitor was, gave this definition: "an enemy of the working class and agent of the war-mongering imperialists." Then, he asked if any of the students could give examples.

First little boy: "Trotsky."

Teacher: "Very good, but I would like a more recent example."

Second little boy: "Beria."

Teacher: "Better, but I want some one even more recent than that."


First little boy: "Oh, yes, I know, it is Stalin."

Teacher: "Excellent. That is exactly what I wanted."

At this moment another student raises his hand and says: "I know an even more recent traitor. It is Khrushchev."

Teacher: "No, no, the class must stay together. You've been reading the next lesson."

Eyewitness



Reports...

There have been many versions of what happened in Poznan on June 28, from official Communist sources and from the accounts of foreign visitors attending the International Trade Fair when the riots broke out. The following is the first account by a Polish worker who took an active part in the uprising. 27-year-old Włodzimierz Kaczmarek, who fled to the West to escape the regime's reprisal, is a native of Poznan, an electrician by training but in recent years obliged to support his wife and children by selling homemade confectionary to private shops. Here in his own words is the story of how the Poznan workers rose in the name of "bread and freedom." His story was broadcast to the people of Poland by Radio Free Europe. For further news of Poznan and its aftermath, see pp. 46 and 50.

I WAS BORN in Poznan. I lived on Sowinski Street almost from the day I was born. During the past few years I made candy in the kitchen and sold it to the few remaining private confectionary shops. I had not been able to get enough electrician's work to support my family. . . .

On the evening of June 27 a friend who worked in the big Stalin Locomotive Works told me there was going to be a strike. He said that that afternoon workers in the railroad repair shops had walked out demanding to know what had happened to the delegation that went to Warsaw to ask for better wages and decent norms. For two years the regime had promised to cut taxes and give us more money. But they did nothing, and the delegates had not come back. My friends said the Stalin Plant workers decided to send another group to the city hall to see Sroka, the President of the City Council.

The reason for the discontent was that people were earning so very little—800 to 1,500 *zloty* a month. Then they [the regime] took 300 or 400 *zloty* in taxes from every worker. I was able to earn only about 1,200 *zloty*. Some days I could not buy enough food for the children. How could I—bread costs 3.7 a kilo and it is no good. There are only three or four private bakeries left in all Poznan. It is State bread we get. A ready-made suit costs 1,500 to 2,000 *zloty*. That is more than a worker makes in a month. Tailor-made suits at 800 *zloty* a yard for the material would cost over 3,000 *zloty*. No worker could afford that. Only the Communist 'big shots' get good clothes, and they have special stores.

(Kaczmarek then describes the events of June 28):

I wondered if there would really be a strike. It seemed impossible. How can you strike when one derogatory word out loud on the street lands you in jail? But walking toward the center of the town I began seeing workers com-

ing from the direction of the Stalin plant. They were in work clothes. They had first gone to the factory, and then at nine o'clock they started for the city hall. They wanted to ask Sroka where the [second] delegation was. Later I learned none had come back. As we approached the castle, which is the city hall, other factory groups seemed to be joining the march. And the population—the Poznan people, shopkeepers, streetcar workers, others, came along. There were many foreigners around who had come to the Trade Fair. I saw workers talking to them on the street. People began shouting and chanting: 'We want bread; we want better pay; get the Russian occupiers out; give Poland freedom.'

I shouted too. Everybody did. Later I saw posters which said the same thing. They had been painted in a hurry on sheets and paper and boards.

It was hard to tell how many people were marching. But the streets by the city hall were jammed. Perhaps there were six thousand or more. There were many people there besides the strikers.

At the castle, the Stalin plant fellows shouted that they wanted to see the President. He did not appear. No one came out. Flags of all the different nations had been put up for the Fair. Someone shouted, 'Pull down the enemy flag.' Someone climbed up and the crowd pushed a pole and all the Soviet flags came down. Other Red flags also disappeared. As the Soviet flag fell the whole crowd clapped and cheered. They were happy; so was I. It was the enemy flag of the Soviet occupiers of Poland.

Then someone said maybe the delegation was in prison. I went along with a big crowd headed for the jail on Mlynska Street. The guards did not defend the prison and we walked right into the courtyard. Someone opened the cells and the prisoners were freed. Many were from

other cities—some in prison clothes, some in their own. It was a detention jail. The guards made no trouble at all. They gave up their guns and people found other guns in the office, maybe fifty or more including some machine guns. The prisoners came into the office and everybody started throwing papers and files out the window. When I came back down to the courtyard there was a big bonfire of records burning.

Then I headed back along Dambrowski Street and there was another crowd at the social insurance building on the corner of Mickiewicz Street. The jamming station is on the top, or fourth, floor.

Everyone knew about it; since it started two years ago it has been much more difficult to listen to the radio. Someone shouted, 'Let's destroy their jammer.' I went along. I was glad to help wreck the jammer that jammed us. We went up to the fourth floor. The social insurance building was open but the radio station was locked. Someone broke the door in. There was one man there but he could do nothing. We pulled tubes and machinery from the walls and threw them out the window. Someone went to the roof and cut the antenna. Every time a piece fell in the street the crowd cheered.

As we were destroying the station I heard the first shots from the direction of the UB [State secret police] building on Kochanowski Street. . . . I went along to the corner by the building. There was much shooting and people with the guns from the jail were shooting back at UB men in the window. A friend who saw it told me that the crowd had marched on the building and then a woman police officer in uniform had started shooting from the window. As I got there some of the workers also were shooting and people were running. There were bodies in front of the building; some dead, some wounded. Some were children. There were lots of youngsters in the crowd, not over 14 or 15 years old. I heard that the first killed was a 13-year-old boy, shot by the woman police officer. I saw a flag with blood on it.

The workers were outraged and everyone said: let's go after them [the police]. People were storming the building. I heard later that they also attacked the UB living quarters nearby. The people had to defend themselves. The Communists started shooting first. There was a sharp exchange of gunfire.

Then in half an hour—it must have been about noon—three Polish Army tanks came up. People shouted: 'Poles, do not shoot at Poles.' The soldiers in two of the tanks climbed down and workers took over the tanks. But they did not know how to run them. Also there was no ammunition for the guns. There was an officer in the third tank. He said, 'I don't shoot brothers,' and he turned the tank and went away. They were T-43 tanks; Soviet, but with Polish markings.

Soon four new tanks came up. It was clear that they were run by Russians in Polish uniforms. They started firing machine guns and cannon. Many were killed and wounded. Ambulances began to come and take them away. Both dead and wounded were taken off quickly.

I know that they were Soviet soldiers. I saw someone

throw a gasoline bottle at a tank and it caught fire. The officer climbed out. People asked 'Why do you shoot Poles?' I heard him say 'I do not understand Polish.' They were in Polish uniforms but they spoke Russian and we all knew they were Russians.

Later others told me they too had heard the men in the shooting tanks talking in Russian. In Poznan in the residential section there are about a thousand Russians from signal, liaison and engineering brigades. They live there, officers with their families, in the best houses. This Grunewald district is only for Russians.

. . . Then troops—Polish troops—came and surrounded the downtown district. But they did not shoot. They just told people to go home. I left about seven in the evening and started home. I could still hear shooting, but not so much. We did not have much ammunition. And I never did get my hands on a gun.

On my way home, on the streets near the UB building, I saw almost a hundred tanks. Then I went by the hospital and saw a great many ambulances and trucks coming up with many wounded. They were jammed around the entrance.

Next day, Friday, Warsaw radio announced that streetcars were running again, that shops were open and that all was normal. It was not true. We could still hear shooting. It went on until Sunday. The city was surrounded and on every street there were tanks, armored cars and militia patrols. I saw streetcars that had been crumpled by the tanks.

Everybody was shocked that there were so many victims. No one had thought there would be shooting. It was just [meant to be] a demonstration to get back the delegations and to tell the regime we needed food and better wages. It was only meant to be a strike. . . . Everyone was glad there were so many foreigners in Poznan, who could witness what took place and tell the world what happened in Poznan.

Funerals were held secretly. Not even families were told. Only the police were buried publicly. The dead workers were buried secretly in cemeteries all around the city. Authorities were afraid that if they were all buried together in one place there might be another demonstration.

Everyone is horrified at the number of arrests. There must have been at least two thousand. Not all are in the Poznan jail. Many were taken to other cities. A friend of mine was arrested and beaten so badly that he could not move. . . . He said that they had my name. For a long time I had wanted to leave. But what he said made me decide to go at once. . . .

They [the regime] will try to prove that agents provoked [the uprising]. But we all know—I know myself—that this is not so. People went out on strike with no intention of rioting. They just wanted to protest that a man with a family could not live on only 800 *zloty*. We hoped it might make things better. The Poznan people regret that so many died. But they were heroes, like those who died in the war. Somewhere that flag with the blood has been hidden. Poles will not forget about it.

FROM THE COMMUNIST PRESS:

What A Communist Must Believe From Morning To Night

by Gyorgy Paloczi-Horvath

from *Irodalmi Ujsag* (Budapest), August 4.

In the early morning: you wake and unfold your paper. It is really in there. With your eyes you glean a few important parts; then dress fast, breakfast at home, or by favor of the quick-wristed coffee-shop girl, and the week-day begins. The paper is spread out on your desk and in the atmosphere of undisturbed security you most carefully and repeatedly read that which "is really in there." While you are reading small changes ripple across the muddy pool you call conviction, and the small ripples are occasionally swallowed up by huge waves. Simultaneously with the ripples and waves, decisions as quick as lightning are born and then die away. Finally you have read the paper, lean back and feel that everything has become different. Indeed, there has been a change, something new has started, in some way or other the manner in which objects refract the light has changed.


And then you circulate among the people, you step from group to group, and in the meantime your views take shape and expand. The manner of connecting sentences has really greatly changed, many write in a far more unequivocal manner, and you feel that many of your sentences of yesterday no longer make sense. Consciously or "instinctively" the revaluation of your personal past begins in your mind. Certain things will be forgotten, a thoughtless remark for which you reproached yourself for weeks now, all of a sudden, becomes a moral gold reserve. Yes, you spoke up firmly even at that time. (Of course you more frequently said exactly the opposite, but right now that does



"Now, now, I told you not to overdo that self-criticism." (Basket is marked "trash.")

Dikobraz (Prague), June 28, 1956

Political Weathercock



Ludas Matyi (Budapest), July 19, 1956

not fit into your line.) You spoke up even at that time, you were consistent and true to yourself (your present self), your life course led in a perfectly clear and straight line to the present change.

In the late morning hours: you find out that you had somewhat overestimated the change. One of your friends with a sturdier character explains the situation in a more careful manner and your gold-reserve courageous attitude of two weeks before is seen in a more sober light. Of course, even at that time yours was a sober judgment; true, the careful word "relatively" was not there to soften the edge of your remark, but actually anyone could imagine it there who was not an enemy of yours.

Towards noon: your friend who as a rule is the cleverest weather vane relates a small detail or generally behaves in a manner which makes your speedy retreat of one and a half hours before seem somewhat hasty. True, the word "relatively" could be assumed to have been there by anyone; the fact is, however, that it was not said, and the facts—as we well know—are obstinate things.

In the afternoon: a new rumor is spread, diametrically

opposed to the other. Now you are like Pavlov's dog, in whose case the conditioning was changed too often. For weeks he had been receiving food after the ring of a bell and an electric shock after a flash of light; this changed and then the flash of light meant food and the bell fear, and when again a bell was rung before he was given food, the dog showed signs of hysteria. Just as you do. But, of course, the dog is in a better position than you are, my friend. At least the dog knows that the light is light and the ring a ring, but you, poor thing, have no way of knowing whether the rumor spread from mouth to mouth is true or not, until it appears in print, and even then you have your doubts as to how lasting it will be. You remember the little verse in your son's story book: "In forest circles people are of the opinion that Teddybear likes honey—This is not just an opinion, it is a fact, fact, fact!" But how are you to know that the rumor which had disturbed your personal course and had made several fast tricks necessary in your maneuvering . . . how are you to know that it is not just an opinion?

In this hesitant frame of mind you meet X, whom you called a numbskull back in '53, and now you greet him with a great outburst of love. X looks at you somewhat nonplussed and again you become hesitant: was there sense in making this open demonstration in a busy corridor?

Towards the evening: you feel sort of dazed and for a moment you toy with the idea of reporting sick for a few days. Perhaps you could have that dental operation after all, because if one is out of circulation one can commit no mistakes. But you merely flirt with the idea, for if certain things are really true you cannot afford to lose this opportunity of three days to rearrange your past. You may badly need these three days in order to remind everyone you meet of certain remarks you had made and to make them forget certain others. Life is hard, and one struggling in public life like yourself does many things that must be put in parentheses from time to time. So in the evening you go to the conference after all, to the conference whose participants remind you "of certain things," and your sentences like swift corvettes around a warship conceal behind a thick smoke screen all your deeds that should be forgotten and that are by no means in keeping with your present-day self. However, everything turns out better than you had expected. S. and T. and Y. all enthusiastically offer to be witnesses to the negative: indeed, you did not commit what you committed. (And of course, neither did they do that which in light of today's change would be disagreeable; to this you are the voluntary witness.) Nasty Z., however, waves his hand unequivocally, but who will listen to him in the face of the majority? Thank goodness, facts are not so very obstinate after all.

In the evening: you test your brand new past on your wife (or your husband); your past on which one can hardly notice the frequent alterations; that, in fact, once or twice it has even been turned and then re-turned. When after supper you remain sitting around the table for a while, you come to like yourself. You feel that you resem-

ble a captain who artfully steers his ship past dangerous rocks. Your thoughts circle around so feverishly that they almost stumble over one another. Your body is in a state of hurry, in fact, rush. And this is due not only to the increased intake of black coffee but also to the tremendous amount that must be accomplished, to the minor and major tactical maneuvers planned by your swift brain. You wish it were tomorrow morning so you could start your calls to make connections, to oblige some by doing a few favors, and to drop others with a few bored sentences.

About the Author

GYORGY Paloczi-Horvath earned a reputation in the years before World War II as one of the most fearless and penetrating of the younger liberal Hungarian journalists. He had spent several years in the US in his youth, and during the war he worked closely with the anti-Nazi Hungarian underground from abroad, in Turkey and elsewhere. He returned to Hungary in 1945. When the Communists assumed power in 1948, he was immediately imprisoned, and only released sometime in 1955. His work began to appear in the Hungarian press early this year; it has contained some of the most striking and far-reaching criticisms of the current ferment. Among these were "Rip Van Winkle's Second Awakening," *Irodalmi Ujsag* (Budapest), June 16, and "A Meeting of Two Young Men," *Irodalmi Ujsag*, July 7 (to appear shortly in NBIC).

This time your wife (or husband), who has often assisted in rewriting your life story, swallows the remark: "After all, people are not quite stupid, my dear," because she (or he) knows that this revaluation must succeed, and even though people are not quite stupid: one may hope that they are a little stupid.

In the meantime you run through in your mind the alphabet of the various (officially condemned) isms, from bureaucratism and dogmatism to secretarianism, against which you have always consistently fought. From time to time some disturbing event of your past flashes across your mind, and little twitches of disgust run along your face muscles as if you had swallowed a nauseatingly greasy morsel. But you hurriedly drive away the painful memories and say with a sigh: "Well, let's go to bed, my dear."

The ceremony of making the beds is performed, the feverish discussion in the dark slows down and then stops completely. You are half asleep but are still wondering whether one lies to oneself in one's dreams, and in the meantime in your drowsy head you keep repeating your little son's favorite verse:

"At times like this you see how true it is
That that and this is this and that."

FROM THE COMMUNIST PRESS:

These two articles, from Hungary and from Poland, deal with a subject long taboo in the Communist press: the special privileges afforded the army of Party and government bureaucrats in the Communist countries. Always profoundly resented by a population struggling on a low living standard, these privileges were first admitted and denounced in Poland in the current thaw; Hungary and to a lesser degree Czechoslovakia followed suit.


"Delicate" Questions

by Judit Mariassy

from *Irodalmi Ujsag* (Budapest), August 18.

IN THE FOURTH GRADE, at the Montessori School, I had three real archduchesses as classmates. This fact was a sensation for the grown-ups, but we children just found it funny that we had three school-mates who had no second names. Their copy-books and the stickers above their coat-pegs bore just the names: "Margit," "Ilona," "Anna Maria." Since in this school history was very honestly taught, we gave this semi-anonymity the brief explanation that they were obviously ashamed of being Hapsburgs and preferred to live just with first names. No one was friends with them. I must admit, they could not be blamed for this. The rest of us could not forgive them for the fact that every noon a beautiful car appeared driven by their mother and they went home in this car. Before the final tests all three fell "ill" and it was an open secret that all

"Incorrigible"



"Now he wears his crown under his hat."

Ludas Matyi (Budapest), July 12, 1956

"Rank-Consciousness Disease"



Bureaucrat is shown having hung a sign on his locker reading: "Kis Pal, Department Chief."

Ludas Matyi (Budapest), July 26, 1956

the illness meant was that special teachers were preparing them at home for the final big feat. I even complained about this unjust and mean thing to my father. I remember exactly what he replied: "You see, my little girl, this is precisely one of the reasons why we want to bring about Socialism, to do away with such privileges."

I am not telling all this because I want to prove the democracy of the Archduke Jozsef Ferenc. It would be useless for us to try to do so. Such democracy did not exist. And even this case is more of a curiosity, for after graduating from the elementary school the archducal kids never enrolled in a public school again. But I feel that what my father said in connection with them about the future dream world of Socialism was not just a mere fairy tale for children. Even when we grew up this was the way we thought, the same wish lived in us in the unforgettable days of '45, when we not only tore down our statues and knocked crowns off coats-of-arms, but published in our papers pictures of our Communist ministers, representatives and mayors as they talked to women in the market places, as they did their share in reconstruction, as they lived the lives of simple people in factories, in the streets, in stores. These pictures told no lies. It was not play-acting when one of the Party leaders laughingly told the Csepel workers how funny he felt when he was obliged to wear a tuxedo for a reception.

How did it begin, when did it begin? For a long time the answer we gave one another and ourselves was that after the attempt on Comrade Togliatti's life it became evident that security measures to protect Party leaders must be intensified. There was some truth in that; yet after the Rajk trial the false impression was created that we had not done enough in this respect. Well, since that time we have overfulfilled the norm.

I don't mean to say that anyone doubts or feels jealous that the man who, as a result of our confidence, has reached a high position should enjoy more esteem than the average person, and more comfort in his private life. In fact not even a demagogue has gone so far as to demand that a minister or a member of the Central Committee should squeeze onto a No. 6 streetcar in the morning to get to his work.

But the wish: less privileges! is spreading throughout the country. The other day a factory trade union Secretary mentioned at one of the members' meetings that he had been on a "reward trip" abroad. In his group was—not even the Premier—just one of the Secretaries of the Trade Union Council. "Naturally" the Secretary lived at a special hotel and, on some occasions, condescended to drive over by car to inquire how they [the rest of the group] were. "Why was that necessary?" asked the plant trade union committee Secretary. "Why must the area in which the workers of Party headquarters spend their vacations in Balatonaliga be surrounded by a fence and by guards?" The remark received tempestuous applause. A worker who is rather silent as a rule stood up to talk: "I agree with the opinion of the Comrade Secretary. I would like to move that the special tailor shops and special stores be discontinued. The leaders should rather have larger salaries but they should purchase their food and clothes in the same stores and for the same price as we do. In this way they will always know what the living standard is like, what goods the people suffer shortages of, what prices have gone up, where help is needed."

A short while ago I was walking with a journalist from abroad on Szabadsaghegy [Freedom Hill]. Strolling in the vicinity of Bela kiraly-ut we came to a large area surrounded by a fence. An AVH [Secret Police] soldier with a gun was standing on one side. "Who lives here?" asked my friend from abroad. I could not answer. "Why don't you ask this soldier?" I kept silent. I could not say what I thought: it is hardly likely that he will give a friendly reply.

And the children! The children! I must admit that if my children in the public school to which they will go sit side by side with the child of a Minister or a Party Committee member that will be a "sensation," and they will be proud to be able to talk about it, and their teachers will be even prouder. And if that imaginary child were to be picked up by a car at noon I do not think we would be outraged. We have grown accustomed to it.

In the past weeks some change has started to take place in this respect. It may be ridiculous to write about it, and yet this is where it should be mentioned that I have twice met leading Comrades walking along the boulevard. But

the situation will really be healthy when a similar event will not strike one as a special pleasure and when the Minister walking in the street will not be followed by a car with the curtains down.

"Delicate questions?" Everyone is talking about them. They will cease to be delicate the minute we discuss them openly and publicly and do not belittle the idea that once seemed so very beautiful, the idea that "making Socialism"—also means this.

Behind the Golden Drapes

by Janusz Chudzynski

from *Poprostu* (Warsaw), April 1.

ON THE CORNER of Pulawska and Belgijska streets stands a good-sized line of women. The wind is cold, blowing through the coats and fur jackets, the women stand close to the wall, backs to the buildings, seeking cover. In the shop window is a blue sign with red letters: MHM [Miejski Handel Miesem—City Meat Trade Center] Shop No. 313.

I look through the window. Empty inside, bare hooks on the background of white tiles. The pre-holiday delivery of fresh and smoked meats has not yet arrived.

Across the way on the corner of Dabrowski Street stands an unstuccoed building. A separate driveway for automobiles, several carelessly parked cars. I cut across the road and come closer. Warsaws, Pobiedas, Chevrolets, some sort of Cadillac or something of that kind, a car on which it is difficult to tell the front from the rear. In each auto a chauffeur.

A navy blue "Warsaw" automobile, number D 005-817, drives up. A lady in a sealskin coat and a green kerchief descends. She takes several steps to the entrance, opens the door covered with gold colored drapes. I walk in right behind her and maybe that is why the short heavy-set man who holds back unauthorized persons from making purchases does not stop me.

I walk behind the lady in the sealskin coat along the counter. Chocolate, spices, all kinds of alcoholic drinks, canned goods; on the sides, many flowers. A door, over which is artistically written: fresh and smoked meats. Behind the door, white tiles—smoked meats, lard; on the counter—behind glass—bacon, much meat. On the left, a cash register. My lady in the sealskin coat takes out and counts her money. The salesgirl behind the counter looks questioningly at me. I have nothing to do here now. I turn around with an appropriately bored and disappointed expression. The heavy-set doorman keeps his eyes on my face, escorting me to the door with his look. I quickly look at the other end of the shop, and see shelves filled with bolts of material. The golden drapes at the windows do not let in any light from outside. From the ceiling hang lamps. In the large shop there are barely fifteen customers, mostly women. The personnel is alarmingly polite, like an army at attention, waiting behind the counter for the first word. . . .

Boulevard Wojska Polskiego, Boulevard Niepodleglosci, Nowogrodzka, Rakowiecka, Nowowiejska and anywhere else—everywhere shops with golden or cream-colored drapes. No signs; only the Army goods are marked: Military Trade Center. This shortage of signs gives the impression that the institutions keeping this type of shops are ashamed of plain, ordinary people, fencing off the well-stocked shops with heavy curtains from the eyes of the passers-by.

But the people can see. For the contents of the shop can be kept secret by posting a man at the door and camouflaging the entrance, but one cannot hide the lines of automobiles, government and military automobiles, waiting till the wives or servants finish their shopping.

If one roars along the asphalt Warsaw streets the houses and people melt behind the windows of plexiglass into one smear. It is difficult to hear what those people say.

And they speak many bitter words—and they are right. They say, for instance, that during the occupation there were *Meinl* shops [shops reserved exclusively for Germans]. And today the shops behind the golden drapes are commonly called *Meinl* shops.

One can agree with the statement that during the war there were reasons for having such commercial establishments, which supplied officers and people directing the struggle with necessary food-stuffs. It is difficult to demand that an employee of the General Staff or a member of the government stand in line or even run to the shop for a quarter pound of butter or a loaf of bread, since his presence may be necessary at such time somewhere else. But the war ended eleven years ago, and one can see no tendency to abolish these remainders. Rather the contrary. . .

There is a variety of these consumer shops. There are consumer shops for regular employees of the Security apparatus, Militia, Army or lower echelon of employees of the Party apparatus. There are consumer shops which are patronized by officers up to the rank of Colonel or General, and there are also separate shops for the military higher-ups and Ministers.

It can be concluded from this that even among these privileged segments of society there is no equality. In the shop at Pulawska street the limits of the privileges are guarded by the doorman. In other consumer shops a system of showing special cards is used, permitting the purchase of articles.

This is not the road to be followed for the improvement of material conditions. [It should be done] not through giving privileges to part of society, but by the more or less rapid raising of the standard of living of all the people.

We do not need unreasonable trade policies, expressed in the existence of closed shops only for privileged persons, [we should not want] to deepen the bitterness of all those who find it difficult to make the ends of their budget meet. There should exist only one retail network, for then people would more easily endure many self-denials and they would believe that difficulties will be overcome.

These consumer shops, especially those of the lower category, which are the most numerous and where the prices are identical with regular city shop prices, first of all imply the sanctioning of the existence of two unequal kinds of people—"better" and "worse."

Golden drapes do not make a completely tight covering, especially from outside. It is unnecessary that they should grow to the size of a symbol.



Fathers—Inscription on door: "Special Shop."



Sons—Inscription on door: "Special Kindergarten."

Szpilki (Warsaw), May 6, 1956

Current Developments

Poland

Cyrankiewicz Addresses Parliament

The ninth session of the Sejm was officially opened on September 5, and Premier Cyrankiewicz took the floor to deliver one of the most conciliatory official speeches of the current Polish thaw. As he touched upon a variety of problems connected with political and economic policy, he confirmed what had become increasingly apparent in recent weeks—that, following the first shock of the Poznan riots and under their influence, the Party had decided to risk going deeper into the dangerous waters of democratization, with particular emphasis on the immediate, often hurried, implementation of concrete, economic and social goals (*Trybuna Ludu* [Warsaw], September 6).

Greater Role for Parliament

Cyrankiewicz first spoke about increasing Parliament's prestige and powers and making it the "main workshop" of legislative activity. He mentioned specifically that the government is now trying to reduce the number of its decrees, and he indicated that the Sejm would be given greater influence in the drafting of decrees: "It seems right to prepare a new procedure for the approval of decrees by the Sejm because, according to the existing procedure, the Sejm can only approve or reject a decree, while in some cases amendments to the draft might better be made without rejection of the whole. It seems that the . . . Sejm committee which proposed changes in procedure is correct."

Closer Ties with the People Advocated

After discussing the role of the Sejm, Cyrankiewicz turned to the broader and more important question of the Party's relations with the people. He frankly admitted the existence of widespread discontent among the population, and stated that the chief means of eliminating the "note of discord and mistrust that had crept between the Party and certain segments of the population" was the solution of concrete economic problems. Along with this emphasis on the standard of living, Cyrankiewicz stressed the value of nation-wide criticism:

"It is obvious that the entire community is preoccupied with economic problems . . . I should like to state from this rostrum that the situation is not easy. . . . We must say, however, that as a result of exhaustive [nation-wide]

discussions . . . we have attained a clear picture of the true situation. . . . [They] have facilitated a correct estimation of the Six Year Plan and new conclusions in regard to preparation of forthcoming plans. . . . We are concerned not with theoretical or academic arguments about the past but with the most concrete elements of policy and economics for today and tomorrow."

Cyrankiewicz conceded that the low living standard during the Six Year Plan had caused people to lose confidence in the regime's economic planning: "The citizen," he said, "is inclined to appraise results of economic policy on the basis of his own direct experiences and to use his own pocket and his own stomach as a guide. It is difficult to deny the citizen's right to do this." The Premier said that the low living standard had often blinded people to the real "achievements" of the Six Year Plan, but he admitted that attempts to eliminate "disproportions" in the Plan were often superficial and belated. The coming period, he said, "should be given to eliminating disparities and correcting mistakes."

Increased Benefits for Workers, Peasants

In his discussion on the new Five Year Plan, Cyrankiewicz reiterated the previously announced goal of a thirty percent rise in the living standard. Although this was the planned goal, he said, it was not impossible to achieve more. "That is why we count so much on the initiative of factory staffs, engineers, technicians . . . and the broadest masses." The Premier announced that as of September 1, the real wages of 3,259,000 manual and office workers had been raised and that their combined annual earnings had increased by 7.18 billion *zloty*.^{*} He said that there were still workers in the engineering and chemical industries, drivers, fire brigade workers, bakers, postmen, and some 600,000 workers who "undoubtedly" should be given wage increases as soon as possible. "After the conclusion of work on the 1957 economic plan, the program of implementing wage increases for those who received none this year . . . will be made public."

Cyrankiewicz also referred to suggestions made by workers and the press for the abolition of taxes on earnings. He objected to these proposals on the grounds that "this tax accounts for over 6 billion *zloty* in annual budget revenues." He also pointed out that the tax was sharply progressive and its abolition would not provide relief for workers in the lowest income brackets. Instead, he said, the government was nearing decision on a plan to raise the limits of tax exempt earnings, which would give relief exclusively to lower paid groups. Also, "proposals for gradual extension of the thirty percent relief on taxed earnings are now being drafted. This year we intend to give this relief to 1.6 million workers in industry and building and, by the end of 1957, gradually to all employed persons."

Cyrankiewicz also disclosed that, as a result of recent

^{*}Some of the topics discussed by Cyrankiewicz in the above speech were discussed earlier at an August 30 press conference. At this meeting, attended also by Deputy Premiers Jedrychowski and Stawinski, Cyrankiewicz announced the formation of eight special economic commissions which will draft proposals for consideration by the government.



Unusual cartoon showing two men handing over a garment for alteration to a tailor; the garment is the Polish economy; the man receiving the garment is Jedrychowski, chief economic planner; the men handing over the two pieces of clothing are: left, First Party Secretary Ochab; right, Premier Cyrankiewicz. This is probably the first time that top Party leaders have been caricatured.

Front page of *Szpilki* (Warsaw), August 19, 1956

government measures, peasants had received over 2 billion *zloty* more for agricultural products sold to the State in the first half of 1956 than in the same period last year.

Future Reforms, Foreign Credits, Plan Fulfillment

With regard to intended reforms, Cyrankiewicz defined these as "planned decentralization, a revision of the system of material incentives, greater initiative on the part of workers as well as a universal increase of the interest of manual and office workers in the production process and of the sense of responsibility of all personnel." He also repeated previous promises about private handicrafts, promised the building of more houses; and announced that the government was trying to obtain foreign credits. In this connection, he said that the government was working on three important decisions concerning: 1. export production and additional investments for this purpose; 2. increases of wide-scale local production of building materials; 3. development of local industry and handicrafts.

Cyrankiewicz pointed out that the situation in both

building and export production was unsatisfactory. In view of failures in the first half of the year, he said, the 1956 plan for house building may not be fulfilled. Furthermore, mining difficulties have forced the government to reduce the coal export plan by 2.6 million tons. "This has given rise to serious problems in our foreign trade. It has caused a reduction of exports both to countries of the Socialist camp and the capitalist countries, and it has caused difficulties in the import of a number of raw materials." The Premier also indicated that the government wanted foreign help in increasing coal production. Greater exports, he said, required more mechanization and "this is impossible to achieve without investments by interested countries."

Cyrankiewicz expressed greater satisfaction with results in agriculture. This year's harvest, he said, was good, livestock production improved and "we have entered the period of a rise in agricultural production." He did state, however, that the rate of agricultural production was still inadequate, a conclusion confirmed by recent statements about Poland's need to import more than one million tons of grain annually. As for agricultural policy, the Premier said that the government would continue to "strengthen its alliance with the small and middle peasants" and at the same time remove "errors and distortions which led to a drop in [kulak] production and to the liquidation of sound farmsteads."

Government Reorganization

With respect to both agriculture and administration, Cyrankiewicz placed particular emphasis on decentralization. He said, for instance, that the prerogatives of the State Commission for Economic Planning had been reduced with regard to "decisions concerning the powers of directors of enterprises and central offices," and also spoke about further cuts in the administrative staff. "Up to this moment, the number of ministries has been reduced by four. Further mergers of ministries are scheduled, as well as further reductions of central offices and boards." Furthermore, certain prerogatives of the Chairman [Cyrankiewicz himself] and Deputy Chairmen of the Council of Ministers are being transferred to ministers, central boards and enterprises.

Repatriation from the USSR

Towards the end of his speech Cyrankiewicz touched upon a problem long of major concern to Poles. He said that talks on further repatriation of Poles in the Soviet Union were held recently and that "our postulates [presumably, demands] met with the friendly reception and support of the Soviet side." The Polish government, he said, had appointed a "plenipotentiary and a group of assistants to cooperate with the Soviet authorities in this campaign on USSR territory."

Defense of the Press

One of the clearest affirmations of the Party's intention of continuing "democratization," was contained in Cyrankiewicz' discussion of the press. In a rebuke to "conservative" elements in the Party and administration who have demanded stricter press censorship, Cyrankiewicz said that although the press had made quite a few mistakes in

the course of nation-wide discussions, "nothing could erase" its great efforts in the past two years, efforts whereby it has passed from the stage of "ossified propaganda" to "live, bold creative criticism and participation in shaping Polish political thought."

Poznan

At the conclusion of his speech, Cyrankiewicz dealt with the question of the Poznan trials and the possible attendance of foreign correspondents and observers. He said that the trials would, of course, be public and in accordance with "the strictest requirements of the rule of law and legality," but that the government had no intention of turning the trials into an "international spectacle."

Lively Parliamentary Debates

In the period reserved for debates, the Sejm deputies discussed, among other things, the importance of decentralization, of giving more authority to the local councils, and of allowing what is left of the Peasant Party (ZSL) a greater role in national life as a means of overcoming the political apathy of the peasant masses. The most interesting speeches were made by deputies Drobner and Hochfeld, who touched upon various topics related to the extension of the Sejm's powers. Deputy Drobner (Radio Warsaw, September 7) complained about the work of the State Commission for Economic Planning and said that the Sejm should have its own committee on economic plans. He also spoke about the failure of State organs to supply the Sejm with information. "There was not even a bulletin," he said, "which, every two or three weeks, would have informed the deputies about the progress being made." Drobner asked specifically for more information on the form of assistance extended by the USSR to Poland. At another point in his speech, he discussed the need to combat anti-Semitism and remarked: "It is a pity that the Comrade Premier (Cyrankiewicz) did not point out in his address that this exists in our country."

Hochfeld Speech

Deputy Hochfeld was even more outspoken in his demands that the Sejm become a genuine law-making body. He insisted that the Parliament meet in plenary sessions and committees throughout most of the year, instead of several times annually for a few days at a time. He was particularly bitter about the Sejm's failure to appoint a commission to study the Poznan events:

"Who has given the Sejm and the deputies the right to remain aloof from the examination of this matter? . . . Why did the Committee for the Administration of Justice fail to meet immediately? How did the Presidium of the Committee find it possible not to react to the demands of some of the members of the Committee, including those contained in my own letter of June 29, 1956? Why did the Presidium of the Sejm fail to find it possible and expedient to take steps in order, perhaps, to set up a special Sejm commission or a Sejm-government commission to examine the background and course [of the Poznan events]? And how can one speak here of carrying out the duties of deputies, if facilities for examining the course of the investigations . . . are available to the press but not to members of the Sejm Committee for the Administration of Justice?"

. . . A Sejm which devotes more attention to matters connected with the changing of surnames than to a penetrating and responsible examination of Poznan events is not the type of Sejm we have in mind."

Hochfeld's reference to the "changing of surnames" was a pointed demand that the Sejm not be given the mere illusion of power, but full legislative rights. The question of surnames came up at an August 24 meeting of the Sejm Legislative Committee, which considered a Council of State decree on this matter. The Committee rejected the decree on the grounds that it failed to protect "historical names," and that it permitted anyone to adopt the name of a prominent Polish family. This rejection of a government decree—the first in the history of the postwar Sejm—was hailed by the Party press as a significant step in democratization. Deputy Hochfeld, however, was apparently not impressed.

Bills and Debates

Further debates took place in connection with the Sejm's approval of a number of draft bills pertaining to: the transfer of prison administration from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Ministry of Justice; the development of handicrafts; the transfer of the direction of vocational education from the Central Office of Vocational Training to the Ministry of Education; the government reorganization since the last Parliament session; the repeal of regulations providing for punishment for violations of labor discipline; the independence of university schools in some matters previously controlled by the Ministry of Higher Education; the extension of pensions; and the registration of civil documents.

Deputy Hochfeld delivered a heated address in connection with the transfer of prison administration to the Ministry of Justice. By implication, he suggested that the Ministry of Justice was no more to be trusted than the Ministry of Internal Affairs, if one were to judge the Ministry of Justice by its administration of reformatories for juvenile delinquents. Hochfeld said that conditions in the reformatories were appalling: "These conditions were disgraceful in 19th century Britain, but they are even more disgraceful in 20th century Socialist Poland."

Hochfeld based his report on unpublished data which had been collated by *Poprostu* and other publications on conditions in the Kcynia reformatory, which had been cited by the Ministry of Justice as one of "the better institutions of this type." Hochfeld said that inmates of the reformatory were "starved." "Although the regulations specifically stipulate a good diet, they get no meat, no sugar and no vegetables. . . . The main educational method applied is beating, and thoughtless, idiotic and humiliating drill." Hochfeld went on to describe how one inmate had been beaten because he went on a hunger strike, while another had suffered the same fate and had been put into solitary confinement for two months "because he had complained." Furthermore, he said, it was known that one of the instructors had inflicted a brutal beating on a boy who was incurably ill. "If people," he said, "without any qualifications are employed in the [instruction of delinquents] then we cannot wonder at the results."

Minister of Justice Wasilkowska replied to Hochfeld in accordance with the Sejm's new policy of requesting immediate replies. She said that wardens guilty of abuses were removed from their posts and that Deputy Hochfeld would be given detailed explanations in the near future. Minister Wasilkowska pointed out that the Ministry administered 20 reformatories with 3,000 inmates between 14-20 years of age, and that a large percentage of these young people were "recidivists and even murderers."

The bill on raising pensions for craftsmen apparently also aroused heated discussion. Many of the deputies evidently wanted a broader increase in the pension system. It was pointed out that pensions could be raised by cutting down on expenses for harvest festivals, trips in official cars, and trips abroad by employees of the Foreign Trade Ministry. Despite these objections, however, the bill was passed by the Sejm committees, although seven members abstained from voting: "The committees accepted the explanation of the Minister of Labor and Social Welfare that any overall increase of the lowest pensions out of existing funds would give a negligible result per pensioner."

The law on schools, as discussed by Deputy Wyka, a professor at Cracow University, was considered only a preliminary to future school reforms. He said that there "could be no lasting change for the better with regard to the freedom of students so long as the students we receive from secondary schools get only 11 years of education—one year less than previously [1939]." Wyka also discussed the low pay of research workers and assistants and said that this had resulted in a decline of independent scholarship, since scholars had to seek additional sources of income.

Hochfeld-Drobner Debate

A controversy developed between deputies Drobner and Hochfeld on the question of punishment of former officials of the Security Police. Deputy Drobner, who spoke first, complained about the Council of State's failure to inform Parliament about the true state of affairs with regard to these men. He said that on March 17, 1955, the Council of State had said that Stanislaw Radkiewicz was making "excellent progress" in his post as Minister of State Farms, to which he had been appointed in December 1954 after his transfer from the post of Minister of Public Security. Then, Drobner said, on April 17, 1956, the Council of State recalled Radkiewicz because of serious violations of the rule of law when he was Minister of Public Security. "Didn't the Council of State know on December 7, 1954, about the things that took place in the Ministry of Public Security?" Drobner asked. He also objected to the secrecy of the trial of former Chief of the Investigations Department Rozanski. "There was a trial, but why did the trial take place so quickly, without [public notice], and why were we only told that he was given five years?" Drobner made the point that changes in the government should be given extensive and speedy justification to the deputies and the public, and suggested that a separate vote be held in connection with the recent appointment of certain ministers. He objected particularly to the recent appointment of Eugeniusz Szyr as Minister of Building. He said that Szyr, who had formerly held a higher post as chief of the much-

Front Page Photo in Polish Party Paper



This picture was prominently displayed on the front page of *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), August 22, 1956. The photo is interesting both because it indicates that old Polish manners have survived in the new "People's Democracy" and because it was used by the official Party newspaper. Such a Party display of "bourgeois" manners would have been unthinkable only a few months ago. The lady is Elzbieta Dunska-Krzesinska, who is being congratulated by her colleagues for having scored a world record in the broad jump (6.35 m.).

criticized State Economic Planning Commission, should not again be given a post as minister.

Hochfeld objected to Drobner's speech on the grounds that "fundamental changes" were more important than the elimination of a few officials:

"It may be very unpopular to say so at this time, but I do not know at all whether it is right to take criminal proceedings against Comrade Radkiewicz, who was unfortunate in being the Minister of Public Security at that time, for matters which were then part of a certain system. I do not wish to imply that proceedings should not be instituted against depraved people . . . but to deal with individuals would not solve the problem. The much more important thing is to secure an institutional role and responsibility for the Party and government executive. It is difficult now, with regard to the past period—in the shaping of which we all, or almost all, took part . . . to pick one victim and say, 'you are bad.' Perhaps it would suit some people, but this would not safeguard that which is most important for our future. . . . I think it much more important to make certain moves of a more fundamental nature and to carry out more fundamental reforms." (Radio Warsaw, September 12.)

National Front Meeting

The All-Polish National Front Committee held a meeting on August 13-14, largely in preparation for the December elections to Parliament which will be held under the Front's sponsorship. The keynote of the conference was that "Socialism cannot be built by the hands and brains of Party members alone," and that the unity and participation of the entire nation is a prerequisite for further development of the country. Both the Party press and official speakers at the meeting emphasized that democratization, as applied to the Front, meant that it would now be given a broader membership base—that it would seek to attract "those social forces and political circles which have so far stood aloof." Members of the puppet Peasant and Democratic Parties allied with Communists in the Front were assured that, in the future, their "progressive traditions" would be observed and that they would not be "ordered about" by Communist members. At the same time, members of the former Home Army were welcomed into the organization and there was some indication that appeals will be directed at Ukrainians, Jews and other minorities to join the Front. Chairman of the State Council Aleksander Zawadzki, who was named Chairman of the Front, delivered the chief address. He discussed both the Party's past achievements and errors, and the tasks of the Front in the future (*Trybuna Ludu*, August 14).

National Unity Urged

Zawadzki stated that Party organs had treated the Front as another "executive organ" instead of as a "center of social activity" and that valuable citizens had been excluded because of "some old objections to their past." He pointed out that the Front was a "broadly-conceived union of patriotic Poles," and that all attempts to introduce "harmful and artificial divisions" must be opposed. People, he said, should be judged according to the "value of their work, their knowledge and their patriotic attitude." This stress on patriotism and national unity was also evident in Zawadzki's reference to Poland's "road to Socialism":

"The road of every nation to Socialism has its specific characteristics, peculiar to a given nation, and on this road, benefiting from the experiences of others, the goal can be achieved even faster. To make use of the best Polish tradition, of the real achievements of national culture, and to put into life the ideas of Socialism which we have in common with other peoples—this is the just road before us."

Later in the speech, the theme occurred again:

"I should like to mention briefly the case of all those who, in the ranks of the AK, the Peasant Battalions or Polish formations in the West, fought against the Hitlerite invaders for the liberation of Poland. We have condemned and are condemning every form of discrimination against those of our brothers who fought against the invaders in ranks politically or ideologically different from those of the People's Guard and the People's Army."

National Front Tasks

As for the tasks of the National Front, Zawadzki called

upon "every honest citizen" to ensure that the rule of law is never again broken. "The National Front," he said, "will perform one of its basic public duties when it rises in defense of a victimized citizen, no matter what the reason." He also urged the National Front to help solve the problem of youth, to "uphold and develop every sound public initiative" and to help bring together "the intelligentsia, workers and peasants." Lastly, Zawadzki mentioned the "immense social task" confronting the National Front in the Parliamentary elections.

The elections, of course, are under strict Party control and the National Front's sponsorship of the campaign is a sponsorship only in the formal sense of the word. Some "liberalization" might occur in the recalling of MP's who fail in their duties. In a broadcast on National Front activities, Radio Warsaw, August 19, remarked that the National Front has a right to hear reports from members of Parliament and that the Constitution provided for their removal in certain cases:

"The Constitution says this, but until the new democratic spirit becomes properly established in our political practice, all these articles of the Constitution will remain mere words. It is well-known that meetings between the deputies . . . and their electors are, generally speaking, rare and, in most cases, a formality. And as for recalling deputies, this never actually happened because [so far] there have been no regulations governing the procedure of recall."

Trade Union Meeting Stresses Reforms

The theory that democratization was the key to "re-activating" the people also dominated a three-day meeting of the Central Council of Trade Unions which began on August 20. As reported in *Trybuna Ludu*, August 21, Chairman of the Council Wiktor Klosiewicz spoke at length about the importance of increasing worker rights, defending worker interests and enhancing the unions' role in the political and economic life of the country, particularly with respect to improving the people's welfare. He referred to a number of grievous injustices committed against workers in the past and said that the Poznan events testified to the unions' failure to defend them. To prevent future infringements of worker rights, such as those which occurred in Poznan, Klosiewicz called for amendments and changes in the trade union statutes which would:

1. Increase the authority of union work councils with respect to protecting employees, improving working conditions, and planning and controlling production.
2. Ensure trade union representatives legal protection, so that they can make decisions in the councils without fear of administrative reprisals.
3. Broaden the powers of arbitration commissions, so that they can settle all problems connected with labor contracts, changes of norms and wages, etc.—"thereby becoming a basic weapon of the councils in protecting the workers."
4. Ensure that decisions made by the commissions are enforced.
5. Provide for a general increase in worker funds, a

"How We Lose Apartments"



"There is a manpower shortage in Broumov. People are needed at the Veba textile plant, for example. When we asked the Comrades at the enterprise about it they told us that the chief reason they can't get new workers is the lack of apartments in Broumov. Now take another look at our picture. It shows one end of a street running off the main square in Broumov. The first two houses are unoccupied. The windows are broken. Cobblestones are piled up in front of the doors. From the windows of the Municipal Hotel, across the street from the two houses, one can see a birch tree at least six feet high growing where the two roofs join. The responsible official departments will no doubt be able to explain why these houses had to remain deserted since the war's end, and why it is impossible to fix the roof so that the decay doesn't worsen. But for those who pass by these two houses all these explanations will not eliminate the unpleasant feeling that here we are neglecting the opportunity of obtaining several apartments with much less expense than by the construction of two new houses." The Polish regime has recently begun releasing pictures of this kind; this appears to be the first Czechoslovak example of the new "realism."

Quote and photo from *Svet v Obrazech* (Prague), July 21, 1956

step which would result in "increasing the workers' material interest in production."

These suggestions will be incorporated into a new draft law on the status of worker councils now being prepared by a trade union commission.

More Power to Unions

With reference to errors of the past period, Klosiewicz stated that trade unions had been prevented from participating in the making of fundamental decisions on the distribution of national income and the blueprint of economic development, that wage policies had been determined exclusively by State organs, and that the problem of wages in itself had been considered taboo. The primary weakness of the trade unions, he said, was that they failed to appreciate the fact that they were responsible first of all to the workers who elected them:

"A state of affairs has prevailed . . . in which . . . workers came into contact with trade union branches only when submitting periodic reports, and had no opportunity to control the daily work of the branches. In

many cases, trade union organs did not consult workers, did not sound out their opinions when dealing with essential matters." (*Trybuna Ludu* [Warsaw], August 21)

The main emphasis in Klosiewicz' speech was on the unions' responsibilities to the workers; the unions' responsibilities to the State were, in contrast to past practice, mentioned only briefly. "It must be understood," Klosiewicz said, "that the decisive factor in improving the workers' situation, a factor linked with further democratization, is the favorable implementation of production plans." Therefore, he explained, the unions must also increase their responsibility for production, for work organization, and for the "economic and correct management of enterprises."

The Resolution

At the end of the meeting, the Council adopted a resolution (*Glos Pracy*, August 24) which embodied the main points made by Klosiewicz in his opening speech. The resolution also called for a review and simplification of existing collective agreements, the continuation of joint sessions of the Central Trade Union Council and the Council of Ministers on worker problems, and action by the trade unions on a number of specific, important matters. These were listed as: putting an end to the practice of granting special rights and privileges to various workers in one branch of an enterprise without granting similar privileges to those in other branches; opposing all attempts to raise prices and to withdraw cheap goods from the market and substitute expensive ones; helping those seeking employment in particular crafts and professions and ensuring possibilities for training in new crafts; working out principles for the gradual equalization of the rights and privileges of white collar workers with those of manual workers; further increasing pensions and subsequently lowering age requirements for pensions; and intensifying the "Socialist" education of the masses, strengthening work discipline, and deepening the people's sense of being "co-masters."

In addition, the resolution spoke in favor of the decentralization of finances and economic activities and the reduction of administrative personnel at all levels. It demanded the independence of trade union organizations and stated that the Central Council of Trade Unions must review and abolish "all decisions which stifle the independence and democracy of the trade unions. . . . The plenum thinks it necessary to emphasize the need for strict observance . . . of democracy within the trade unions in the election of new officers and for fully respecting the will of the wide trade union masses."

Some of the discussions during the meeting were heated. Speakers criticized the higher trade union officials for their luxurious way of living and commented bitterly on an incident which occurred in the trade union villa in Skolimow, where a charwoman lost her life because labor safety and hygiene measures had not been observed. The fact that the trade union leadership did not report this accident to the prosecutor and to the public was said to have "compromised the entire trade union movement."

At one point, attention was focussed on the press, and one of the delegates was quoted as saying: "How can we

consider the youth from *Poprostu* progressive? That's nonsense." Deputy Premier Jedrychowski defended *Poprostu* and some of the other newspapers noted recently for outspoken criticism: "If we want our press to be bold," he said, "to come forth with courageous criticism, we have to resign ourselves to the fact that it will occasionally make certain errors."

Poznan Aftermath (Continued)

Almost all the major official speeches of recent weeks (Cyrankiewicz, Ochab, Zawadzki, Klosiewicz) have contained references to the Poznan events, with emphasis on the economic difficulties that provoked them. While the "lesson of Poznan" (a phrase used frequently in the Party press) is now referred to in a variety of contexts—in current campaigns for increasing the role of trade unions, expanding the National Front, etc.—it seems clear that the "lesson" was not learned merely from Poznan alone. According to recent refugee reports, there were a number of strikes in various parts of the country about the time of the Poznan riots. Some of this unrest has been admitted by the Party press itself. *Slowo Ludu* (Kielce), August 9, reported on a demonstration against the militia in Skarzysko, and *Trybuna Wolnosci* (Warsaw), August 19, printed an account of a strike caused by an arbitrary cut in workers' pay. There was also unofficial information on a strike of riveters working on a construction project in Rzeszow.

In Poznan itself there has been a recent change in the Party leadership. *Trybuna Ludu*, September 13, reported that the First Secretary of the Poznan Provincial Party organization, Leon Stasiak, had been released from his post and "given an opportunity to work in the Central Committee." He was replaced by Jan Izydorczyk, who held the posts of Ambassador to East Germany (1950-54), Chief of the Department of Religious Affairs (1954-55), and Ambassador to Romania prior to this appointment.

The latest official pronouncement on the date of the scheduled trials was made in mid-August. At that time it was said that the investigation would end in August and that the trials would take place in the course of the following month. On July 20, a Poznan paper (*Gazeta Poznanska*) had already reported the trial of a number of men accused of "indirect" participation in the riots—the accused allegedly took advantage of the riots to steal (from Party headquarters) or to receive stolen goods. Their sentences did not exceed eighteen months imprisonment. Nothing was said about the "leading" participants.

Personnel Changes

The Council of Ministers recently appointed General Wacław Komar as Commander of the Internal Security Corps in place of General Julian Hibner, who was named Deputy Minister of Interior (*Trybuna Ludu* [Warsaw], August 25). A one-time chief of military intelligence, Komar was dismissed as Deputy Defense Minister in 1953 and arrested for "treason"; in April of this year, however, he was released from prison and "rehabilitated."

Trybuna Ludu, August 28, reported that Witold Jaroński had been relieved of his post as Minister of Education so that he could take up new duties connected with his appointment as a Secretary of the Party Central Committee. The new Minister is Feliks Baranowski, formerly chief of the Department of Education in the CC.

Visit to Yugoslavia

A delegation of the Party's Central Committee visited Yugoslavia from August 25 to September 2, for the purpose of "intensifying brotherly relations" with Yugoslav Communists and becoming "acquainted" with their "experiences." The delegation was headed by Central Committee Secretary Franciszek Mazur who, in an interview with Yugoslav journalists on August 31, declared that: "What we have done in regard to democratization in Poland is only the beginning and the first step. . . . For this reason . . . knowledge of the experience of Yugoslavia and other countries is indispensable for rapid progress."

The delegation had talks with Tito and a number of other Party leaders, visited factories and farms and, according to official reports, displayed particular interest in matters pertaining to the economic system, worker councils and local self-government. Poland's present interest in the Yugoslav "road to Socialism" was further emphasized on September 3, when a Parliamentary delegation left for Yugoslavia with a similar mission.

Mining

Disaster

On August 25, fire broke out in the Chorzow mine resulting in the death by suffocation of 29 workers. The trade union organ *Glos Pracy* (Warsaw), which published the news after a three-day delay, reported that an investigation of the causes of the fire would be carried out by a special commission under Deputy Minister of Coal Mining Jan Mitrega. There was little likelihood, however, that the regime would make the usual charge of sabotage: both *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), August 28, and *Glos Pracy*, August 30, condemned inadequate safety measures in the mines, and *Sztandar Mlodych* (Warsaw), August 31, said in a report on rescue operations that three days prior to the disaster the miners had complained about poor ventilation but that nothing had been done to correct this. Families of the miners who lost their lives were granted special aid and allowances.

Recruits for Mines

In view of the serious shortage of coal miners, the government issued a decree on August 17 exempting from compulsory military service young men who volunteered to work in the coal mines for a period of twenty months. *Trybuna Ludu*, August 18, pointed out the economic importance of mining and added that military service frequently complicated the lives of young men who wanted to marry or learn a trade.

Mass Religious Celebration

On August 26, more than a million people from all parts of Poland attended a religious-patriotic celebration in

Czestochowa in honor of the 300th anniversary of the naming of Our Lady of Czestochowa as the "Queen of Poland." The ceremony dates back to 1656 when, after a successful mass uprising in Czestochowa against the much-detested Protestant Swedish army of occupation, the Polish King Jan Kazimierz made certain vows to Our Lady of Czestochowa to secure her aid in Poland's liberation from Sweden. The peasant masses who had participated in the uprising, and to whom Jan Kazimierz pledged economic relief, believed that the intervention of Our Lady of Czestochowa, enshrined at the top of Jasna Gora where the bitter encounter had taken place, was responsible for the Polish victory.

The large attendance at the 1956 celebrations undoubtedly constituted a protest against political and economic conditions within the country and the regime's anti-religious policy. The news that one million people had participated in the celebrations came from an American Catholic news agency in Rome; this figure was later confirmed by the Catholic paper *Gosc Niedzielny* (Katowice), September 2.

Hungary

Higher Status for Intellectuals

The latest development in the struggle between the regime and the intellectuals is a Central Committee resolution published in the August number of *Tarsadalmi Szemle* (Budapest), the Party's ideological organ. According to Radio Budapest, August 16, the resolution concedes that the Party's policy toward intellectuals—i.e., professional people—has been unjust. "Members of the older intelligentsia justly feel hurt," the resolution states, "by the biased appraisal of people's political standing with attention focussed only on the past, on the person's origin, with total disregard for the work accomplished by that same person over the years." It blamed the policy on "incorrect theories regarding the class struggle" and "sectarian narrow-minded isolation from the democratic traditions of our history."

Although the resolution was not published in full, accounts so far received shed revealing light on the position of professional people in Party ranks. "In numerous offices of the Party apparatus," runs one passage, "the number of university and college graduates is small. In the council apparatus only 4.3 percent have college or secondary school diplomas, of the Secretaries of the municipal Party committees only 1.7 percent have college degrees and 6.9 percent secondary school diplomas." According to another passage, "expert opinion is not heeded, expert advice not appreciated, and the development of experts does not get sufficient support." Intellectuals in general have resented the "widespread dogmatism, lack of real debates, the suspicion with which individual thought is often received, and the nebulous methods of our propaganda."

After thus analyzing the third-class status of Hungary's intellectuals, the resolution proposed a number of measures

Gyula Hay



to deal with it. One complaint of the intellectuals, that their children are discriminated against in the universities, is to be met. In addition, more material support will be given to scientific, cultural and educational institutions, and professional people are promised higher rewards and more social esteem than in the past.

An editorial in *Szabad Nep* (Budapest), August 26, praised the resolution for its promise that henceforth intellectuals will be rewarded in accordance with their services to the regime. "The interests of the country, the interests of the workers and peasants, match perfectly with the interests of the intellectuals. . . . [We must] create such political, moral and material conditions for the intellectuals as are most favorable for the free unfolding of their creative activities. . . . Now it is the turn of the Party organizations to weld together the various layers of intellectuals, the old and the new, the Communists and the non-Communists, and rally them around the great nation-building program of the Second Five Year Plan."

Gyula Hay Article

An outspoken reaction to the resolution, in the now familiar "Polish style," was voiced in an article by Gyula Hay in the literary paper *Irodalmi Ujsag* (Budapest), September 1. Hay was one of the writers singled out by the Central Committee in a resolution of last December as having "anti-popular and anti-Party views" (see "The 'Revolt' of the Intellectuals," NBIC, June 1956, p. 13). In his article he saluted the recent resolution as "very important." Although regretting that it made no reference to the peculiar situation of writers and artists, he felt that it offered new hope to intellectuals as a group, who until now "have felt themselves third-class citizens." Most of Hay's article was a documentation of this third-class status:

"Talent and professional training were not an advantage but mostly a disadvantage, a crime for which a person was punished to the third generation. The disparaging of professional knowledge matched only the disdain of special abilities. The functionaries—proud of their lack of knowledge—nominated persons with no professional training in the place of those having some. . . . It is true that they did not nominate anybody to the position of brain surgeon or bridge builder, but all the higher was the number of fake pseudo-specialists in the other domains of life. In principle these functionaries supported sciences and the arts, but in practice they disdained them. . . .

"The underestimation of expert knowledge caused significant economic damage. Although the greatest degree of respect was given to intellectuals in the technical field . . . [functionaries in high places] failed to pay any attention to the advice of these experts, the results of which were the absolute failure of our cotton cultivation, the case of the Budapest subway, the great losses in our vineyards and the destruction of many thousands of valuable books in the paper mills."

In the universities, wrote Hay, the "functionaries" refused admission to outstanding students of intellectual parentage or middle and upper class descent and preferred average students of worker or peasant descent:

"It happened just recently that one of our medical schools rejected an applicant of intellectual descent who passed the admission exams with greatest success, for the sole reason that one of his great-grandfathers was Ignac Semmelweis and another was one of the greatest Hungarian writers of the last century—and an estate owner. Only the personal intervention of the Minister of Education succeeded in mending this damage.

"Henceforth our press will be able to unmask and brand these harmful persons in each case. This is rendered possible by the new, very significant resolution of the Central Committee on intellectuals, which . . . takes a stand for healthy development."

An even stronger reaction appeared in *Muvelt Nep* (Budapest), September 2. The author was Geza Losonczy, a former CC member who was imprisoned in 1951 and rehabilitated last July. Losonczy suggested that the resolution did not go far enough. In what was apparently an attack upon the Rakosi faction in the Party, he said that the hostility toward intellectuals had been pronounced ever since 1949, and that it "did not happen of itself." He added that "the necessary conclusions" should be drawn regarding those who had been responsible for the "grave political crimes" condemned in the resolution but who "still hold leading positions . . . in particular those who crowned their crimes by refusing to make a fundamental change in their attitude after the Twentieth Congress."

Second Hay Article

Gyula Hay returned to the attack in another article in *Irodalmi Ujsag* on September 8. He said that the forthcoming conference of Hungarian writers would show to what extent the regime really means to permit intellectual freedom. Then he sounded an uncompromising call for "complete freedom of literature."

"Well, let us get it over with: yes, we are thinking of

the . . . most complete, the most unrestricted freedom that is possible between men who live within one society. In other words, literature shall be forbidden nothing which is not prohibited by the laws of society. Thus the writer must not be permitted . . . to incite to murder, to arson, to robbery and larceny, to the overthrow of the People's Democracy . . . or even to offend certain moral standards which are not contained in the legal code but are accepted by the majority of the public. On the other hand, the writer, like everyone else, must have unlimited freedom to tell the truth, to criticize anyone or anything, to be sad, to be in love and to think about death . . . to believe in Almighty God and to deny God; to doubt in the perfection of some figures in the Plan; to think in a non-Marxist way . . . to find the living standard low, even of people whose salary increase is not contemplated; to find unjust something that is still considered officially as just; not to like certain leaders; to describe troubles without giving a recipe for the cure; to find the New York Building, which has been declared a national monument, ugly, although millions have been spent on it; to notice that the town is falling to ruin because there is no money to repair the buildings; to disapprove of the way some leaders live or speak or work . . . to like Sztalinvaros; not to like Sztalinvaros. . . ."

Describing at length the various forms of censorship that still exist in radio and the theater, in publishing and film-making, he said that the "cruellest" censorship is that which takes place in the mind of the writer. "He creates in his soul a network of complexes which automatically prevent him . . . from thinking or creating ideas and feelings with which his supervisors would disagree." Until all kinds of censorship are abolished, "we cannot speak of literary freedom. At most we can speak of a temporary and relative liberalism which can be cancelled at any moment."

Salary Raises and Further Debates

The resolution was followed by the announcement, *Szabad Nep*, September 2, that salaries of instructors and research personnel at universities, academies and in the scientific research institutes of the ministries were to be raised as of September 1.

On September 9, *Magyar Nemzet* (Budapest) printed interviews with several intellectuals who stressed the necessity of debate in cultural life. They were Beni Ferenczy, sculptor, Demokos Kosary, historian, and Imre Toro, biologist. Gabor Tanczos, secretary of the Petofi Circle where the famous debates of last May and June took place (see NBIC, August, p. 38), announced a new series of debates to begin on September 19. Subject of the first was education, the second, economic management, and the third, "problems of young progressive intellectuals." Tanczos said the Petofi Circle will become a scientific forum for young intellectuals where they can discuss the results of their researches in the social and natural sciences.

Social Democrats Wooed

The recent infusion of former Social Democrats into the Party's ruling body has been accompanied by persistent propaganda urging the alliance of Social Democrats with Communists. Enlisted in this campaign were the recently

rehabilitated former Social Democratic leaders Gyorgy Marosan and Arpad Szakasits. Marosan, appointed a Politburo member in July, wrote an article in *Szabad Nep*, August 19, acclaiming the "unity" of Hungarian "labor" parties and praising the regime's present policy of furthering "the worldwide cooperation of Communists and Social Democrats." He said: "The merger of the two labor parties in our country, as well as in other People's Democracies, has proved that millions of Communists and Social Democrats can find their place alongside each other. . . . Where would the Hungarian working classes be today—or, for that matter, the struggle for Socialism—were it not for the unification of the two working class movements. . . . How ridiculous it is that there are still some people in the West who are dreaming about splitting the Hungarian working classes in two. . . . Such dreams are foolish, even as dreams."

Arpad Szakasits, whose Party membership is still "under investigation" was more reserved on the subject of the Communist-Socialist alliance. In an interview broadcast by Radio Budapest, August 21 (the talk was originally scheduled for August 14) the former Secretary-General of the pre-fusion Social Democratic Party and President of Hungary prior to his arrest in 1950, sought to dispel Social Democrats' distrust of the regime. He said that the Party was trying to make good former wrongs and injustices committed against Social Democrats, and that Social Democrats must "adapt themselves to the radically changed international political situation" in the postwar period:

"If only the realization would dawn on them how the mistrust which they still have towards the countries building Socialism fills the warmongers with joy. The blood-and-war-profit-thirsty imperialists hope it will be easier to drive the working masses of their own countries to slaughter if these masses continue to lack the spiritual and moral force of united action. It is this hope that must be destroyed. . . . If only an amicable agreement could be reached by the various worker parties for the sake of maintaining peace, raising living standards . . . and preventing an economic crisis. But they will, no doubt, do everything in their power to bring such an agreement about. . . . I want to devote my remaining years to this aim."

Widespread PPF Meetings

In August, the regime organized a large-scale campaign to "reactivate the masses" under the auspices of the Patriotic People's Front. Meetings were held in such provincial towns as Nagykanizsa, Szeged, Kaposvar, Szekesfehervar, Kecskemet, Debrecen, etc., with attendance at some of the rallies as high as 15-20,000. The main official speakers at the meeting did not say anything strikingly new but tended to confirm the Party's present policy of liberalization.

In his speech at Nagykanizsa, Premier Hegedus devoted some time to Hungarian-Yugoslav relations. Central Committee Secretary Lajos Acs and Deputy Premier Ferenc Erdei spoke at Kaposvar. The former referred to the rights of minorities and appealed to the masses to take part in the political life of the country: "It is our wish," he said, that "every worker, even if he is not a Communist . . . should have an opportunity to come forward with remarks, proposals and criticism and be able to take part

"Collective Leadership"



Ludas Matyi (Budapest), July 19, 1956

in our work. . . . Let these people rally behind the banner of the PPF, which is led by the Party and the working class."

Erdei spoke about agriculture; he assured peasants that they would not have higher taxes and delivery quotas in the new plan. "On the contrary, the program of the Second Five Year Plan stipulates that surplus crops will be sold under the State bulk purchase system, the prices of which will correspond more or less to free market prices. This economic policy is a safe guarantee that a 25 percent rise in the living standard will be insured in the future also with regard to agriculture and the individual peasants."

Chairman of the PPF National Council Antal Apro devoted part of his speech to the intelligentsia. Addressing a Szeged audience, he urged intellectuals in the community to take a more active part in political affairs, and, in response to complaints of Szeged university leaders, promised that the government would do its best to insure greater independence of university professors and to relieve them of the burden of administrative work.

The speakers also talked about raising agricultural and industrial production, of increasing agricultural collectives on a "voluntary basis," of insuring "Socialist legality," of expanding the role of the local councils, and improving the living standard and the supply of goods. The meetings, though largely unspectacular, were undoubtedly intended to bring the Hungarian thaw to the grass roots.

Strengthening Collectives

On August 23 the Council of Ministers passed a resolution containing various measures designed to improve the economic position of kolkhozes and to encourage simpler forms of collectivization. The resolution, as published in *Magyar Nemzet* (Budapest), September 9, provides that new kolkhoz members are to be paid for their contribution of livestock and other assets immediately upon joining the kolkhoz. It also declares that most of the short-term obligations of kolkhozes are to be converted into long-term loans with an interest rate of one percent. To overcome a serious lack of building materials, the Minister of Con-

struction, the Director-General of Forestry and the Chairman of the Planning Office are ordered to improve the supply of those materials to the kolkhozes. The resolution also orders the Minister of Posts and Communications and the Minister of Agriculture to sell to the kolkhozes 150 trucks, 50 tractors with trailers and 50 "Zetor" tractors. It also contains instructions for broadening the processing and marketing activities of the kolkhozes.

Other measures are intended to encourage the growth of temporary and specialized producers' associations. These are groups formed for the cultivation of a particular crop or for harvesting and marketing purposes; they differ from other associations in being temporary or limited to only part of the members' lands.

Szabad Nep, September 11, stated that the resolution would provide "considerable support" for the collectivization campaign. By creating conditions that would enable the kolkhozes to pursue "modern, large-scale farming," it would make collectivization more attractive to the medium peasants. Also, by requiring that new members must receive immediate payment for their livestock and an "honest price" for their buildings, the resolution would give the peasants a material incentive for joining. "In the past, some people regarded the joining of a kolkhoz as something definitely harmful [to themselves]. The spirit and the letter of the resolution . . . contradict this erroneous view."

In accordance with these developments, the regime has appointed a committee to draft a new law for collectives (Radio Budapest, September 3). The present law, dating from 1947, is held to be obsolete. The new law will "guarantee to the maximum extent the activities of the various types of collectives, collective centers and collective associations, and the assertion of the principles of collective democracy and the independence of the collectives."

Frontier Obstacles Said to be Removed

Premier Andras Hegedus announced on August 15 that all of the "technical" barriers on the border with Yugoslavia had been removed "except for a short section underwater" (*Szabad Nep*, August 16). On the Austrian border, he stated, half the barrier had been removed and the remainder was to be cleared by the end of September. In a speech at Szeged on August 26 he added that the population which had been forced to leave the Yugoslav border area after 1949 would now be permitted to return (Radio Budapest, August 26). "At the same time the Government has authorized the local councils to give these people monetary help, not exceeding 5,000 forint, and to grant them loans not exceeding 10,000 forint to help them return and resume their work." He also said that the regime is seeking an agreement with Yugoslavia to permit travel in the frontier zone without passports.

Private Artisans Encouraged

The Gero regime, reviving a policy of former Premier Nagy, is now seeking to encourage private craftsmen. Minister of Urban and Rural Economy Janos Szabo told a press conference on September 3 that independent craftsmen will "receive assistance to help them contribute to the supplying

of the people" (Radio Budapest, September 3). Gero's regime has apparently concluded, like the Polish regime (see NBIC, September, p. 46) and the ill-fated regime of Nagy in 1953, that by encouraging private artisans to practice their trades it can increase the supply of badly needed consumer goods. Szabo said that coopers, cartwrights, smiths and other craftsmen will be permitted to have apprentices. He also expressed the hope that craftsmen who are members of collective farms will be encouraged to follow their trades in their free time, so as to effect "a considerable improvement in the villages' supply of industrial articles."

Names

In its campaign against the "personality cult" the Politburo has approved a resolution "recommending" that public enterprises and institutions no longer be named after living persons of Hungarian citizenship, and that those now bearing such names be renamed (*Szabad Nep*, September 2). Presumably this does not apply to the names of foreigners such as Soviet citizens.

Czechoslovakia

The Limits of Criticism

Recent pronouncements indicate that the regime contemplates no notable modification in its present policy of moderate, carefully controlled liberalization. This was underlined in a number of speeches made to the first graduating class of the Party University in August. According to the August number of *Zivot Strany* (Prague), the students, who were completing a three-year course in "Marxism-Leninism," were warned by President Zapotocky not to succumb to "intellectualism" but to become representatives of the Party's "new intelligentsia." The graduates also heard Bruno Kohler, Secretary of the Central Committee, explain that firmness is necessary "because some ideological workers are succumbing to various reports [from other Satellites] and, without thoroughly comparing them with our conditions, are drawing conclusions for the policy of our Party." Making obvious reference to the fact that less freedom of discussion has been permitted in Czechoslovakia than in Poland and Hungary, Kohler went on:

"[Some Party members] point out that in Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia, China, etc., they have taken a somewhat different approach to various questions and they express the opinion that it would be better if we would do likewise. . . . However, in our country we have to proceed according to our own conditions. It was precisely this principle which was highly stressed by the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU and there shouldn't be any wavering in this respect on the part of any functionary. . . . Imperialists and their agents, opportunists of all shades, are using our criticism and measures against the cult of personality for the development of an extensive campaign against our Socialist camp. . . . This whole ugly campaign has failed, just as all similar actions in the past, precisely because of the ideological firmness of our functionaries and Party members.

"In connection with our great effort to strengthen peace and peaceful coexistence . . . an increasing number of

"Collective Farmers' Night Work"



The theft of grain from collective farms by their own members has lately been the subject of many regime complaints in the papers. First collective farmer: "I won't tell . . ."; the other: "I won't either . . ."

Za Kooperativno Zemedelie (Sofia), July 7, 1956

people from the West and from other countries of the world with various political and ideological views have been coming to our factories. It would be very bad if the discussions that take place with these guests should disorient us and if we did not know how to explain persuasively the great advantages of our Socialist order and world view. Therefore, we must be ideologically firm."

On the other hand, there is evidence that the current literary ferment in Poland and Hungary continues to exert a great influence on intellectuals in Czechoslovakia. No longer permitted to use the liberalization in neighboring countries to further their own cause, the "rebels" have chosen instead to point to the example of the Soviet Union. For instance, in an article entitled "Let Us Be Honest With Ourselves" (*Literarni Noviny* [Prague], September 1), writer Milan Jungmann said the following:

"We understood Party criticism expressed in some of the speeches at the [Czechoslovak Writers'] Congress as scolding [of rebellious writers]. An atmosphere was created in which discussions are not concrete but merely academic. At present, when a certain pre-Congress nervousness has disappeared and when the Soviet Comrades are honestly facing everything that hampered them, is it not time for us to create a new, more favorable atmosphere?"

Reduction in Workweek

Radio Prague announced on September 6 that the regime has approved a draft bill reducing the standard workweek from 48 to 46 hours, beginning October 1. This is in accordance with the decision announced at the Party's National Conference in June (see NBIC, August), when the regime also promised to cut working hours later in the Five Year Plan to 42 per week—conditions permitting.

As a rule, the 46-hour week will consist of six days, but with the number of hours worked on Saturday reduced to

"not less than five." Workers in mining and in plants under continuous operation will be granted one day of leave for every 23 shifts worked. A five-day week may be introduced in some parts of the construction industry, but presumably it will consist of 46 hours. Workers under 16 will work a 36-hour week.

There is to be no reduction in pay. The change is accompanied by the assumption that workers will produce as much in 46 hours as they have in 48. "Piece-rate tariffs and norms are not changed . . . and pieceworkers will be paid in accordance with work performed. Increased productivity . . . will ensure that pieceworkers attain the same level of wages [as workers on time rates]. . . . Where the present volume of output and, therefore, of wages cannot be attained immediately following the reduction . . . through increased labor productivity, management must, after exhausting all the possibilities and reserves of a given establishment, ensure the fulfillment of production tasks by mobilizing the reserves of other sectors." (This presumably means that workers will be transferred from other parts of the enterprise.)

To some extent the reduction in hours may raise the workers' pay through a resulting increase in the number of hours worked overtime. The Bratislava newspaper *Praca* complained on August 18: "There are many plants which don't have a 48-hour week but a 50 or even 55 and more, where overtime is becoming a necessary evil. . . . It seems that some of the economic officials do not lose sleep over this problem. Quite often they simply conclude that [with the 46-hour week] they will pay two hours more of overtime."

Student Congress

The Fourth World Student Congress was held in Prague from August 26 to September 3 under the auspices of the International Union of Students. The Communist-controlled IUS was founded in Prague in 1946, and now claims 40 member and affiliate groups representing a total of 3,293,360 students. The Congress passed resolutions on education, cultural exchange and colonialism. Jiri Pelikan of Czechoslovakia was re-elected Chairman, and Deputy Chairmen were elected from Ecuador, the USSR, Japan and the Sudan.

Restrictions on Doctors

The few doctors and dentists in Prague who still have private practices must abandon them by the end of next June, according to a resolution of the Council of the Central National Committee, reported in *Svobodne Slovo* (Prague), August 22. The paper said that only university professors, State prize winners and old practitioners unable to work with public institutions will be permitted to continue private practice.

Romania

Economist Voices Criticism

In contrast to policies of the regimes of Poland, Hungary and, to a lesser extent, Czechoslovakia, the Romanian re-

gime has, until recently, suppressed all signs of incipient ferment in reaction to the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Party. When, for instance, several writers attempted to emulate their comrades elsewhere in the orbit by demanding a liberalization of cultural policy, the Party reacted by ousting from its ranks one of the main critics, writer Alexandru Jar. Recently, however, a lone voice of criticism has again been raised. Writing in *Scinteia* (Bucharest), August 9, Vasile Rausser, editor-in-chief of *Probleme Economice*, charged that regime economists have long neglected the country's real problems and have mechanically appropriated "theories expressed by Stalin, without any critical analysis of their validity or applicability. . . ."

The worst of the theories, according to Rausser, were those maintaining that the class struggle increases during the building of "Socialism," and that the consuming power of the masses must increase faster than production. Teachers of economics, he charged, have limited their lectures to "mere paraphrasing" of the Soviet Academy's translated textbooks. According to the author, two leading organs, *Contemporanul* (official newspaper of the Ministry of Education) and *Probleme Economice* (Rausser's own periodical, published monthly by the Romanian Academy of Sciences), have confined themselves to theoretical speculation and discussion of Party policies. "Sometimes even economists who have a good knowledge . . . of the practice of economics and also personal opinions about economic problems don't publish them until their ideas get official confirmation in the shape of a Party or government decision."

These deficiencies, Rausser charged, stem not only from the "Stalin cult" but also from the fact that "some years ago free discussion stopped as a result of the inadequate [sic] way some economists were criticized for their mistaken opinions. . . . It is necessary that various ideas and opinions be discussed logically in a tone encouraging competition of ideas. . . ." However, Rausser was careful not to push his attack too far: "The fight against dogmatism must not . . . lead to the weakening of the fight against liberalizing tendencies." Stopping far short of his colleagues in Poland, he limited the study of "realities" to "the vast historic experience of the USSR" and "the experiences of all People's Democracies."

Resumption of Relations with Greece

Romania resumed diplomatic relations with Greece, interrupted since 1939, in two agreements signed in Athens on August 25. According to Radio Bucharest of August 25, an economic agreement provides compensation for war damages suffered by Greek citizens, as well as payment for Danube ships and other property seized afterward by the Communists. A joint declaration signed at the same time expressed the desire of the two parties to re-establish good relations and to contribute toward peaceful international relations in accordance with the principles of the United Nations.

Bulgaria

Kostov's Status

Premier Yugov stated in an interview with an Indian journalist on August 10 that his regime had not yet decided whether Traicho Kostov "will be completely rehabilitated or whether only certain of the accusations will be declared void. . . ." (Radio Sofia, September 2) He added that the commission reviewing the case "has not yet completed its work." Kostov, a former Deputy Premier and Secretary-General of the Party, was executed in 1949 on charges of high treason, sabotage and espionage. Before his trial he confessed to having "maintained criminal contacts with Tito and his gang." However, on April 14, 1956, First Party Secretary Todor Zhivkov announced that "the accusations in the Kostov trial, based on ties with Yugoslav agencies and leaders, are cancelled. All defendants at this trial are rehabilitated." (See NBIC, May, p. 50.) From Yugov's statement it appeared at first that Kostov's case might be handled like that of Slansky in Czechoslovakia, who suffered a similar fate but whose ghost has been cleared only of the Titoist and anti-Semitic charges and not of the rest of his indictment.

On September 19, however, Radio Sofia announced that the Party's Central Committee had "approved the findings and conclusions contained in the report of the Commission charged with the task of reviewing the Traicho Kostov trial and other trials connected with it." Kostov and all but two of the defendants were restored to Party membership and will be legally rehabilitated.

Ban on Statistics Lifted

The trend in the Soviet bloc toward publication of more economic data has reached Bulgaria. The Presidium of the National Assembly's *Izvestia* of August 21 published a new decree excluding most statistics of production from the list of information considered State Secret. This was done to "facilitate the propaganda of our successes in the field of Socialist building inside the country and outside, and to improve the conditions for scientific research. . . ."

Two days later the first official figure on the production of crude oil was released, when *Zemedelsko Zname* (Sofia) revealed that more than 150,000 tons were produced in 1955, and that 1956 production is expected to exceed 250,000 tons. According to the paper, oil was discovered in 1952 at Tulenovo on the Black Sea. Prospecting is under way in the counties of Stalin and Popovo.

Agricultural Decrees

The regime sought to encourage the cultivation of unused land in the neighborhood of towns by a decree permitting workers and other inhabitants of towns to plant them with orchards, vineyards, strawberries and raspberries without having to make State deliveries from them. The decree will be administered by the municipal People's Councils (*Izvestia* [Sofia], August 23).

Recent and Related

Russia Leaves the War, by George F. Kennan (*Princeton Univ.*: \$7.50). In this first volume of a projected series of studies on early Soviet-American relations, former Ambassador to the USSR George Kennan confines his attention to the year 1917. Beginning with a dramatic account of the Bolshevik *coup* ousting the weak and vacillating Kerensky regime, this detailed historical narrative vividly reconstructs the events leading to Russia's withdrawal from World War I. The author reviews such issues as Wilson's attempts to keep the USSR in the war, recognition of the new government, and Russian resistance to the Communists. An interesting array of personalities, often working at cross-purposes, play an important role in the narrative, illustrating Kennan's belief that diplomacy is a curious combination of "personality, purpose, coincidence and communications." Throughout, Mr. Kennan emphasizes that American statesmanship might have been far more effective had information passing between Moscow and Washington been less confused and more heard. Bibliography and index.

Kibbutz: Venture In Utopia, by Melford E. Spiro (*Harvard*: \$4.50). This study of life on an Israeli *kibbutz* affords unique insight into the way pure Marxist ideology works out and is modified when translated into practice. Unlike the majority of *kibbutzim*, the one surveyed by Mr. Spiro is rigidly Marxist and pro-Soviet; individuality is subordinated to communal life: the members eat, work, and share spare moments together. Accumulation of private property is prohibited, ideological conformity is demanded; even decisions relating to personal affairs are subject to approval by the entire *kibbutz*. There does exist a social equality unsurpassed in the most democratic countries. Despite the unflinching idealism which continues to inspire the *kibbutz* members, and the progress that has been achieved, tensions do exist within the community. The chief complaint concerns lack of privacy—the people wish to eat alone, shower alone, spend more time with their families. The heart of the matter is that many of the older pioneers rebel against the subordination of the individual will to that of the group. Significantly enough, however, the chil-

dren are apparently completely dedicated to *kibbutz* life and loyal to its values.

The Rape of the Mind, by Joost A. Meerloo, M.D. (*World*: \$5.00). Modern totalitarian regimes have found that killing men's spirits can be as effective as destroying their bodies. Here, Dr. Joost Meerloo, eminent psychiatrist and ardent democrat, explains the techniques of and psychology behind the twentieth century crime—brainwashing. Cardinal Mindszenty's ordeal is a case in point. He was subject to constant interrogation day and night, the few hours sleep allowed to him were broken intermittently, he was fed irregularly and inadequately. When even these tactics failed, drugs, perhaps outright physical torture, were introduced. There follows a clinical account of the psychological motivations which make men yield. Dr. Meerloo contends that "menticide" [his own term] is in reality an intensified application of mass pressuring and conditioning used by totalitarian regimes to cultivate robot personalities. Bibliography and index.

Target: The World, Evron M. Kirkpatrick, ed. (*MacMillan*: \$5.00). Impressed and appalled by the extent to which Communism has harnessed technology and psychology to manipulate men's minds, Dr. Kirkpatrick here focuses attention on the crucial role that propaganda plays in Soviet strategy. According to the author, the Kremlin directs its extremely well-coordinated propaganda within three spheres: internally, propaganda is used to secure conformity and obedience; abroad it is utilized to recruit followers and demoralize political opposition; it is aimed at ingratiating Communism with world public opinion. The author reviews the overall shifts that have occurred in the 1955 Soviet propaganda offensive. There follows a thoughtful and provocative assessment of Communist objectives and specific policies in each of the world's major areas. Index.

The Anatomy of Terror, (Public Affairs: \$1.00). In the first part of this pamphlet, Nathaniel Weyl examines key trends set in motion by Khrushchev's "revelations" on Stalin. Mr. Weyl evaluates, for instance, the relationship between Stalin's denigration and the USSR's current drive to woo the uncommitted nations, the espousal of peaceful coexistence, and the efforts to attract all left-

wing parties into a Popular Front. The United States' skeptical approach to Moscow's new line and the impact of the anti-Stalin campaign on American foreign policy are also discussed. Part II includes the text of the Khrushchev speech along with thumbnail sketches of the personalities mentioned in it.

The Price of Peace: A Plan for Disarmament, by Charles G. Bolté (*Beacon*: \$2.50). Contrary to those who believe that only a strong military position can deter war, Mr. Bolté holds that the real price of peace is disarmament. He maintains that in view of the present arms race, the world is in grave danger of stumbling into a third World War. Therefore, if civilization is to escape self-annihilation, disarmament is absolutely necessary. A tentative scheme is offered which calls for total and universal disarmament. The plan provides for an international inspectorate and police unit to enforce the disarmament agreement. The author is well aware that mutual suspicion and distrust among nations is a great challenge to effective disarmament; yet he remains convinced it can be accomplished.

The Theme is Freedom, by John Dos Passos (*Dodd, Mead*: \$3.50). Since the beginning of his literary career some 39 years ago, Mr. Dos Passos' political convictions have ranged from the far left to what might be called right of center. This book, a compilation of articles written throughout this period, documents the familiar process of disillusionment which has gradually overcome many dedicated Marxists of the twenties and thirties. Earlier chapters contain a sympathetic description of the efforts of idealistic radicals and intellectuals in the years after World War I; an embittered protest on the Sacco-Vanzetti trial; and an apotheosis of the USSR, 1932. Significantly one of the concluding chapters is titled, "The Failure of Marxism." The author's political reversal is completed when he writes: "It seems likely, from what we hear faintly through the screen of lies that hems in the Soviet Union, that even the illusions have lost their power in the face of the regime's failure to produce even the rudiments of decent living for its subjects." The thread that binds this collection together is Mr. Dos Passos' unswerving belief in and crusade for individual liberty.



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